The French Religious Wars: A Summary

Introduction
Sixteenth-century France was a place of strife as factions of Catholics and Protestants fought a series of wars in the name of their religion. As a result, “France was nearly torn apart by forty years of agonizing, destructive civil war.” (Dunn, 1970, 20) This civil war, termed by historians as the French Wars of Religions, or the French Religious Wars, lasted between 1562 and 1598. It consisted of eight major conflicts although fighting never really ceased. While some historians put the end of the wars in 1598 with the conclusion of the Edict of Nantes, Mentzer postulates that “the last of the . . . war of religion centred on the Protestant fortress of La Rochelle” (Mentzer, 2000, 341) in 1629 and ended with the Peace of Alais.

This paper will now attempt to give a context to the wars by looking at the events leading up to them. In doing so, it will also point out the social and political circumstances in France at the point of the outbreak of the first war. Subsequently, this paper will also give a chronological summary of how each of the eight major conflicts began, the important events as well as how it ended. Lastly, the focus will turn to the discussion of the core of the issues, questioning whether the wars were truly about religion, as well as important consequences of the war. In the end, it concludes that while the wars may have begun as a result of religious conflicts, the latter was not the driving force behind the continuous conflicts. It was more a war of politics and power, than of religion.

Background of the wars
“The confessional tensions arising from the Reformation led to conflict in France, as elsewhere throughout Europe.” (Mentzer, 2000, 323) From the early sixteenth century onwards, Lutheranism and later Calvinism started making headways into France and was beginning to attract converts, both in the lower ranks of society as well as within the ranks of nobility. The Calvinist movement provided an avenue for “some nobles . . . wary of the extending reach of the Valois monarchy” (Merriman, 1996, 142) to express their dissent with the monarchy, “which had vigorously embraced the Catholic Reformation.” (Merriman, 1996, 142)

At the same time, the death of the king, Henry II, in a jousting accident in 1559 set the stage for a power struggle between the monarchy and the nobles from the House of Guise and House of Bourbon who represented the Catholics and the Huguenots, as the French protestants came to be known as, respectively. “Religious differences sharpened the rivalry between them for influence.” (Merriman, 1996, 143) Furthermore, France had just ended a war with Spain and with the successors of Henry II, Francis II and Charles IX being only fifteen and ten years old, the monarchy was in no position to control the rivalling factions.

Hence, “the rapid expansion of Protestantism coincided with the marked deterioration of political stability” (Mentzer, 2000, 324) and fast resulted in the period of constant fighting that was to plague France in the next forty years. During this period the “royal house of Valois remained Catholic, although it repeatedly sought a middle course amid the religious turmoil.” (Mentzer, 2000, 325)




The wars
I. The first war
As previously mentioned, though fighting never really ceased, the French Religious Wars were marked by eight main conflicts. The first war took place in 1562 “when Francis, the duke of Guise, (1519 – 1563) ordered the execution of Huguenots whom he and his men had found worshipping on his land.” (Merriman, 1996, 144)

The end to this first full-scaled conflict only ended when a Huguenot assassinated the Duke in 1563. As a result of this war, the Edict of Amboise was decreed, whereby Huguenots were granted the “right to worship in one designated town in each region, as well as in places where the Calvinist congregations had already been established.” (Merriman, 1996, 144)

II. The second war
The second war started in 1567 and lasted till 1568. It had started “over Huguenots apprehensions that a Spanish army marching along the eastern frontier of France would be diverted from its announced goal of suppressing the revolts of the Netherlands.” (Mentzer, 2000, 329) These apprehensions prompted the Prince of Condé from the Bourbon family and Admiral Coligny, a Protestant from the family of Montmercy, to attempt a kidnapping of the king. That was the spark that ignited the fighting though it ended quickly within a year. The result was the Edict of Longjumeau, which “mostly reiterated the earlier Edict of Amboise.” (Mentzer, 2000, 329)



III. The third war
The third war was a logical result of the second war. After the failed kidnapping of the king, “the Cardinal of Lorraine persuaded the royal council to seek the arrest” (Mentzer, 2000, 329) of the two Protestant leaders. The war took place from 1568 till 1569 and ended with the death of Condé. As it was with the previous wars, the end of the war was marked by an edict, in this case the Edict of Saint-Germain, which calls for limited freedom for Protestant worships.

IV. The fourth war
The preceding wars had taken a toll on the rivalling factions as it led to the deaths of the major factional leaders. This gave Catherine de Medici, the Queen Mother, an opportunity to return “to her policy of restraint and reconciliation.” (Mentzer, 2000, 330) Consequently, she tried to forge peace by arranging for the marriage between her daughter Marguerite of Valois and Henry of Navarre, who was the leader of the House of Bourbon and “nominal leader of the Huguenots forces.” (Mentzer, 2000, 330) This marriage was to result in the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, one of the “most famous bloodbath of the sixteenth century.” [sic] (Mentzer, 2000, 330)

The St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in 1572 began with the murder of Admiral Coligny, on the orders of the Queen Mother after she felt that he was holding too much influence over King Charles IX (Dunn, 1970), and Huguenots guests who were in Paris to attend the wedding. From here on it spread to other French cities that were under Catholic control. In the end it resulted in the “frightful murder of thousands of French Protestants.” (Mentzer, 2000, 330) It was also a decisive point in the Reformation in France, as Mentzer noted,
“The initial confidence, dramatic growth and euphoric expectation of converting France to the true religion vanished. Exhilaration gave way to despair. Numbers declined, energies dissipated and enthusiasm waned. The events of August 1572 marked a decisive point in the French Reformation.” (Mentzer, 2000, 332)


More importantly, the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre also marked the beginning of the fourth war of religion. The fourth war did not deviate markedly from the previous ones. It was short, lasting from 1572 to 1573. Secondly, it was inconclusive as it once again ended in a settlement, the Peace of La Rochelle, which “resembled the 1570 Peace of Saint-Germain with the notable exception of the toleration clauses.” (Mentzer, 2000, 332)

V. The fifth war
In 1574, King Charles IX died and was succeeded by his brother, Henry III. The death of Charles IX immediately plunged France into another war. France at this point of time was “on the verge of splintering and the king, while intelligent and cultured, lacked the requisite strength and experience . . . to provide the leadership to restore harmony and unity.” (Mentzer, 2000, 334) His coronation also brought about challenges from his ambitious younger brother Francis, duke of Alençon, who led a group of discontented Catholics and joined forces with united Huguenot forces aided by the German Calvinist Elector of Palatinate.

“Faced with mounting opposition, Henry III and Catherine de Medici yielded and agreed to the Edict of Beaulieu in May 1576 . . . which concluded the fifth war of religion by granting the Huguenots generous concession.” (Mentzer, 2000, 334) This new edict gave Protestants the rights “to worship openly and to build temples anywhere in France except Paris. It also called for the creation of special law courts for Protestant litigants so that they might avoid prejudiced Catholic judges and it awarded the Huguenots eight surety towns, chiefly in southern France.” (Mentzer, 2000, 334)

VI. The sixth war
The sixth war was another short war that began in 1576 and ended quickly in 1577. The most important event that surrounded the sixth was the formation of a Catholic League led by the Guise family. It was formed by Catholics that were unhappy with the king for his compromise with the Huguenots. It was under the pressure of the League that the king went into battle with the Huguenots that began the war.

The end of the war was brought about by the Peace of Bergerac, issued in September 1577, which rolled back the generous terms accorded to the Huguenots in the previous Edict of Beaulieu. However it was not sufficient to placate the “stern demands of dedicated Catholics” (Mentzer, 2000, 335) from the League and only temporarily eased the tension.

VI. The seventh war
The seventh war stemmed from the attempt by Henry of Navarre to capture Catholic cities. Nevertheless, “neither side possessed sufficient resources to maintained a sustained offensive and a truce was arranged by November” (Mentzer, 2000, 335) in 1580, the same year that the war started. This time the end of the war was marked by the Peace of Fleix, which “did little more than confirm existing Protestant political and religious privileges.” (Mentzer, 2000, 335)

VIII. The eighth war
In between the time of the seventh and the eighth war, the heir to the throne, Francis, previously Duke of Alençon and now Duke of Anjou, passed away. This puts Henry of Navarre the leader of the Protestant factions next in line for the throne. This development received a great deal of opposition from the Catholics, as they could not accept a Protestant as king of France. Facing this great unrest, “King Henry attempted unsuccessfully to steer a course between the Huguenots under Navarre’s command and the Catholic League dominated by Duke of Guise.” (Mentzer, 2000, 336)

Following this, the war began again in 1585 with King Henry III of France allied with Henry, Duke of Guise against Henry of Navarre. Things took a turn in 1588 when the king turned on his ally and assassinated Henry of Guise in his chateau at Blois, after the latter lost the support of his patron, Philip II of Spain who was defeat in his own battle against England. (Dunn, 1970) He then allied with Henry of Navarre and turned on the Catholics. The Catholics, infuriated over the death of their leader assassinated the king in his royal camp near Paris in 1589.

With the king now dead, Henry of Navarre successfully ascended the throne and became King Henry IV of France. The war did not end with the death of the Catholic leaders and continued till 1598, when the successes of Henry IV on the battlefield and his conversion to Catholicism finally brought it to a halt. The Edict of Nantes was proclaimed with elaborated details of religious and political structures for both Catholics and Protestants. “While the edict did not give Protestantism complete parity with Catholicism, it did provided a coherent framework for adherents of the two faiths to live together in a semblance of peace.” (Mentzer, 2000, 340)

Analysis of the French Religious Wars
The French collapse in the sixteenth century was “many-faceted. Huguenots battled Catholics, aristocratic factions joined together to opposed the crown, the bourgeoisie strove for new political and religious rights, the Paris mob went wild, and the outer provinces reverted to their medieval autonomy.” (Dunn, 1970, 20) In this section, this paper will now discuss some of the more obvious and important aspects of the French Religious Wars.

The first observation that arose from the study of the French Religious Wars is the recurring pattern in each of the eight conflicts. Firstly, with the exception of the eighth war, all the other wars were short skirmishes that spanned between a few months to about two years. Secondly, each of them ended with a compromised settlement, which satisfied neither side and set the stage for the next round of conflicts. As Mentzer commented, “the peace was at best temporary, a truce or interim that allowed each camp to regroup and renew the fight at a later date.” (Mentzer, 2000, 329)

Another interesting point to note about the French Religious Wars was the role played by foreign powers. “Both Catholics and Protestants sought and received aid in the form of money and troops from their respective foreign supporters: Philip II of Spain on the Catholic side; for the Huguenots Elizabeth of England, various German princes and other lesser powers.” (Mentzer, 2000, 329) More apparently, it was the fear of intervention from the Spanish that the Huguenots started the second war and it was with the support of the Germans that they were able to pose a serious opposition in the fifth. “Although fought on French soil, the wars became the focus of a European clash.” (Mentzer, 2000, 329) Interestingly, it was also the possible of a foreign monarch ascending to the throne of France that had prevented further opposition and helped Henry IV bring peace and the end to forty years of conflict.

In addition, the wars saw the springing up of various ideological developments on both sides in a bid to justify their cause for it. Among the more notable “resistance theories” of the Protestants were “the anonymous Reveille-Matin (1574), François Hotman’s Francogallia (1573), Theodore Beza’s Du droits des magistrates (1574) and the pseudonymous Vindiciae contra tyrannos (1579), probably written by Philippe Duplessis-Mornay.” (Mentzer, 2000, 333) These theories argued that the government was based on a contract made between the king and his subjects and the monarchy had degenerated into a tyranny, hence violating the contract. In its place, they called for a republican system, which would replace the monarchy and bring justice back to the people. “The theory of contract between the king and his people is, beyond any doubt, one of the most fundamental contributions the religious wars made to matters of political law.” (Goosens, 2001, 171)



Conclusion
In the end, the juxtaposition of religion, politics and ideology would point out that the wars, though it began as religious was not all about religion. In the face of pragmatism, King Henry IV had oscillated many times between Catholicism and Protestantism, first when he was held captive in the French court, in his younger days and lastly when he became King, though he was the leader of the Protestant movement. Secondly, there were often times when the Huguenots led by the House of Bourbon counted in their ranks Catholics who were dissatisfied with the monarchy or repelled by the extremist view of the Guise faction. Thirdly, Henry III had himself first allied with the Catholics to fight against the Huguenots before joining forces with the latter to defeat the rising Catholic forces following his successful assassination of Henry of Guise. This implied that religion was not the utmost important considerations since the conflicts were always drawn along religious lines.

Furthermore, even in the field or ideology we saw a similar fashion of oscillation according to political developments. Following the ascension of Henry IV, supporters of his Protestant movement changed the tone of their resistance theories from clamouring for a republican system to supporting the notions of a strong dynastic monarchy.

These brings us to the question of whether the French Religious Wars that had plague France for almost forty years and resulted in the death of thousands of French lives were truly about religion. At the end of the day, it appears that religion, though symptomatic of the wars, was only the justification for political infighting between the three Houses of Valois, Guise and Bourbon for the ultimate political authority of France. The French Religious Wars might have begun as a result of religion, but religion was not to play the most important role in the events that ensued, it was politics.

Lastly, as Richard Dunn posits, “the chief lesson of the French Religious Wars was a political one, that strongly centralized government was the only possible alternative to rebellion and social chaos.” (Dunn, 1970, 31)

References
Dunn, Richard S. 1970. The Age of Religious Wars: 1559-1689. New York: W.W. Norton & Company

Goosens, Aline. 2001. “Wars of Religion: The Examples of France, Spain and the Low Countries in the Sixteenth Century” in Wars, Peace and World Order in European History. eds Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser. pp.160-173. London: Routledge

Mentzer, Raymond A. 2000. “The French Wars of Religion” in The Reformation World. ed. Andrew Pettegree. pp.323-343. London: Routledge

Merriman, John. 1996. A History of Modern Europe: From the Renaissance to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton & Company

Europeanization of French Foreign Policy in Africa

Abstract
Membership in the European Union has brought about profound effects in the national policies of member states. An inherently nationalistic aspect of politics with a state centric view of world politics, foreign policy cannot prevent these effects from materializing. This paper will now employ the categorization of Wong (2006) and the example of French foreign military policy as well as European-African relations to illustrate the process of Europeanization in Africa. In doing so, it seeks to provide a clear picture of actual application of Europeanization theory in real life situations. From here on, it provides a first step to the application of Europeanization in a broader sense of economics and other issues.

Introduction
From the outset, it is necessary to define the objectives of this paper. It is to illustrate the Europeanization of French foreign policy in terms of its military aspects, in the continent of Africa. “The notion of ‘foreign policy’ often carries with it the conceptual assumptions of the state centric view of world politics.” (Wong, 2006, 2) However, it is this paper’s objectives to point out that even in foreign policy, a nationalistic dimension of politics, a member state, in this case France, of the European Union (EU) cannot avoid the influence that their membership could possibly have on itself. More specifically, it is this paper’s objective to show the impact of EU membership and the extent of this impact on a France’s foreign military policy.

To contextualize this illustration, it is necessary to provide a setting in which we can more concretely examine the actual developments of France’s foreign military policy. For the purpose of this paper, I have chosen to study Africa in this context. It is simple to justify this. Africa, particularly North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, has had a long history of interaction with France. For the most part of the nineteenth and twentieth century, much of Africa remained under the French sphere of influence as its colonies. However, French interest in Africa did not end with the decolonization process in the fifties and sixties. As Utley (2002) posits, “major French interest in the region stems from the country’s past as a colonial power but it did not end with decolonization.” (Utley, 2002:129)

Since Africa provides such an interesting specimen, it will be best to conduct a thorough examination of the Europeanization of the French foreign policy in Africa. However, academic limitations dictates that this paper provide a more focused exploration of one aspect of the Franco-African interaction. Hence, the focus of this paper will be on the military aspect of French foreign policy in Africa since “the most overt aspect of France’s residual tie with Africa . . . was the application of defence and military agreements,” [sic] (Utley, 2002:130) which earned the former the name of the “gendarme of Africa” (Utley, 2002:130)

The study of the Europeanization of French foreign policy in Africa is worthy of note because there is a need to substantiate the study of Europeanization theories with concrete applications to real life situations. Thus this paper contributes to the discussion of the application of the Europeanization theory in explaining the effects of membership in the EU on French foreign policy, which Wong (2006) had previously illustrated extensively with regards to East Asia. By first examining the development of French foreign military policy in Africa and subsequently EU’s military policy in Africa, this paper will establish the causal link between the two and in consequence present a picture of convergence. Hence, this will prove the existence of the Europeanization process and also demonstrate the extent to which French foreign policy has been Europeanized.

Europeanization
“Europeanization is a relatively new, fashionable and ill-defined concept in the scholarly literature of European Studies/ International Relations” (Wong, 2006:6). Compared to Europeanization, “traditional foreign policy analysis focuses on the state as a unitary actor with given interests, understood mostly with material terms. However, this approach basically ignores the importance of norms, values or other social factors, such as culture and identity.” (Rieker, 2006:513) Amongst the many Europeanization scholars, Pernille Rieker, for example, looks at “two forms of Europeanization: adaptation and learning” (Rieker, 2006:514), as socialization processes and Wong classifies Europeanization into three schools: national adaptation, national projection and identity reconstruction (Wong, 2006). While the different definitions of Europeanization have similarities and differences, as well as strengths and weaknesses, it is not the aim of this paper to discuss which is better. Instead, it suffices to acknowledge that this paper will employ Wong’s three schools of Europeanization as its working definition because of its more encompassing range, which often incorporates the other scholars.

Since it is the working definition employed in this paper, it is necessary to briefly discuss here what Wong (2006) means by Europeanization. As previously mentioned, Wong classifies Europeanization into three schools of thought: national adaptation, national projection and identity construction. For him, national adaptation is a “top-down process in which the states is reactive, and where the state adapts and makes adjustment in its domestic politics and policy in compliance with the restraints and requirements of European institutions.” (Wong, 2006:8) In this aspect, Europeanization is most clearly seen in the economic realm, whereby the Euro zone, the common market, and various economic policies such as Common Competition Policy have shifted decision-making powers from the national governments to the European Commission. However, Wong also pointed out that other than economic policies, the national foreign policies of member states are under increasing pressure from the “cumulative weight of the aquis of EPC/ CFSP/ CESDP” (Wong, 2006:8), EU’s foreign policies, to converge.

The second school of Europeanization, national projection, works seemingly in opposition to the first school of national adaptation. As Wong puts it, the second school, “at first glance provides a countervailing antithesis to the national adaptation/ policy convergence school.” (Wong, 2006:9) For the second school, Europeanization is a state-centric concept that looks at the exportation of previously national policies “onto a larger European stage.” (Wong, 2006:9) Therefore, in this sense, Europeanization is a bottom-up process that serves to use the EU as a tool for advancing national interests.

The third school of Europeanization, identity reconstruction, is a constructivist argument that looks at EU as a socialization agent. Membership in the EU exposes member states to “sociological institutions” such as “unwritten rules, norms and practices” (Wong, 2006:10) as well as prolonged involvement in European policy-making. These exposures then serve to reorient government officials into acquiring both a common European identity as well as their national identity, resulting in the convergence of policies.
France, power and Africa
In addition to the previous section that broadly explained the working definition of Europeanization in this paper, this section will now go on to give a background summary of Franco-African relations. Franco-African relations are founded on the beliefs in the eyes of the French that France is a world power. The role of Africa in these beliefs is one of a supporting role. As John Chipman (1989) argues,
“ . . . for successive French republics continued French influence in Africa has been an essential aim. Accomplishment of this aim has been linked to maintaining the strength of the state, to assuring some measure of success in implicit or explicit geopolitical struggles, and to improving the image of French power on the world stage. The fact of overseas influence, particularly in Africa, has helped to sustain the idea that the values of the French republic were universal. The maintenance of different degrees of influence in Africa and the French capacity to preserve independent and unique ties on that continent has helped to bolster claims to great power status.” (Chipman, 1989:1)

To further substantiate his point, Chipman gave the two following examples. Firstly, French influence in North Africa gave “shape and substance to the idea that France was a European power with strengths on both sides of the Mediterranean.” (Chipman, 1989:2) By extending its influence beyond Europe, France was able to demonstrate its strength. This is because “for a power to retain its position in international society, it must undertake a degree of activity which has implications for those living beyond its borders.” (Chipman, 1989:24)

Secondly, French power in Africa was also linked to French power in Europe. As Chipman postulates, “the power of the French state in Europe was still seen by some as giving it regional power in Africa and the Mediterranean.” (Chipman, 1989:7) This implies that the strength of France in Europe and in Africa was directly related. The stronger France was in Europe, the stronger it was in Africa and vice versa. Thus Africa became a gauge of French power.

Other than the ideological link between French power and Africa, it is also necessary to know the actual historical French activities in Africa, so as to provide a context for understanding French policy in Africa. “The French have had a long association with Africa, which dates back (in the case of Senegal) at least to the seventeenth century.” (Chipman, 1989:1) More recently, French colonialism in the nineteenth and twentieth century resulted in the bringing of North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, or Black Africa, under French influence. In this period, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco were among the acquisitions to come under French influence, which “came to form a coherent geographical whole whose links with France were immensely important for those who wished to nurture the image of a ‘Greater France’.” (Chipman, 1989:2)

Compared to its northern neighbours, Black Africa, as explained by Chipman (1989), was originally to have less importance. However, it came to have more relevance as France participated in the “Scramble of Africa” in a bid to increase her influence as well as deprive others of theirs in the region. In effect, Black Africa’s importance to France was most highlighted during the two World Wars as it contributed to the French war efforts, consequently increasing its standing within France.

From this section, we have come to understand briefly Franco-African in the light of the idea of French power. Both North Africa and Black Africa’s importance stemmed from their part in playing to the notion of French power since Chipman (1989) also postulated that neither of the two had any real economic consequences for France.

France’s foreign military policy in Africa since decolonization
This section will now proceed to continue the examination of French military involvement in Africa from the time of decolonization till present day. It is this section that will subsequently provide the materials that will be used in comparison with EU’s policy in Africa to determine convergence between the two. The policies of post-decolonization France would be appropriate because it was also around the same time that France became a member of EU as a member of the founding six.

After decolonization, “French leaders, and particularly de Gaulle saw in . . . Africa the one area where France’s military power could still be relevant.” (Chipman, 1989:115) Hence, to continue having its influence overseas and at the same time maintain its great power status, France started signing and concluding defense as well as military assistance agreements with African states. In the two decades spanning the sixties and seventies, France signed around thirty such agreements. (Chipman, 1989)

Other than for the reason of maintaining French power, in the period after the war, the French foreign policy in part was marked by considerations of Cold War tensions, which came to be the defining feature of external politics. With Europe divided into two camps between the Western democratic countries and the Eastern communist countries under Soviet leadership, Africa because of its close proximity just at the south of Europe, was the next possible battleground for proxy conflicts. Therefore, while “France’s military power in . . . Africa has only occasionally been related to general military strategic aims . . . it has certainly made it very difficult for the Soviet Union to establish herself in West and Central Africa.” In the same manner, just like it was in the Scramble for Africa, France presence in the former denied the other powers of their presence. This policy was successful as can be seen that “while the USSR was able to exploit the vacuum created by Portugal’s withdrawal from southern Africa in 1975, she has not sought directly to oppose Western influence when it was well established.” (Chipman, 1989:166)

Following the end of the Cold War in the nineties, French foreign military policy in Africa faced another important impetus for change. “The reasons for this were varied, encompassing political, economic and military factors, and were inextricably linked to the reorientation and adaptation of France’s external policy to the new realities of the post-Cold War era.” (Utley, 2002:131) Up to this point, “it would be difficult to find another region in the world in which the presence and the determining influence of a previous colonial power remains so extensive and so lasting.” (Brüne, 1994:45) Statistically speaking, up till 1994, there were still around “135000 French people living in Africa . . . where France keeps permanent military bases” and “there are about 10000 French soldiers still stationed in the sub-Saharan Africa where the Grande Nation has intervened militarily – both openly and covertly.” [sic] (Brüne, 1994:45)

However all these were changing as France entered the new post-Cold War era. One of the first examples of change was the turn towards multilateralism and the link between humanitarian goals with military intervention. Rwanda, one of the countries that France had signed a military agreement with in 1975, had fallen in a civil war in 1994. In the genocide that ensued, French forces on the ground were defeated, resulting in the consideration of further French actions. “Although the government was divided, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur found a compromise: French military invention would be authorized, but only under strict conditions. The operation had to be explicitly sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council; it was to be of limited duration; and it was to have primarily humanitarian goals” (Utley, 2002: 132) This event displayed a marked change of directions for the French. Autonomy in foreign affairs, previously so precious to France, gave way to multilateralism, at least in terms of decision-making, in terms of UN sanctions. The aim of the operation was also important as a demonstration of French power was no longer the primary reason for intervention but rather, as Utley (2002) pointed out, the operation was to have primary humanitarian goals.

To add on to that, continuously poor economic showings have resulted in a need to tighten the purse strings. On top of that, “France struggled to meet the economic convergence criteria for the single European currency,” (Utley, 2002: 135) meaning that defense budget had to be reduced and more importantly, the stationing of troops in Africa became unsustainable. In addition, President Chirac’s decision in 1996 to reorganize the military by replacing a conscripted army with a “wholly professional armed forces” (Utley, 2002, 134) also made the stationing of troops in Africa more and more difficult. The conscripted French army was not suitable for the types of military operations that France would be involved in while the newly reformed professional forces would. “The problem, however, was that it was hard to develop a state-of-the-art military dependent on expensive technologies at a time of declining budget, which made France’s cooperation in a system of European defense all the more important.” (Kramer, 2002:63) Consequently there was a decrease in the importance of Africa. In its place was the increasing focus towards Europe.

Here we see a direct consequence on the French foreign military policy as a result of the indirect action of France’s participation in the Euro zone. Although the EU did not have a directive that required France to reduce its military involvement in Africa, or rather it could not since at this point of time as it did not have a coherent military nor external policy, France nevertheless had to do so because of the obligations it had under as a member of EU to revise its economy in the impending implementation of the Euro. These led to a significant change in French foreign military policy in terms of the reduction in quantitative figure of French troops in Africa as well as the qualitative change in the agreements between France and its African partners from defense agreements to cooperation agreements. (Utley, 2002) The result is a revision of the agreements made between France and its African partners,
“France would no longer take the primary role in ensuring relative stability in Africa, even on behalf of its former colonies. Troops number would fall, and bases would close. Defence agreements and military cooperation would change – in most cases would diminish. The focus of France’s security commitment in Africa would increasingly be emphasize on multilateral terms, with the onus on African states to develop regional approaches to stability, security and conflict resolution.” (Utley, 2002:136)

From here, we can also see a development of France’s foreign military policy in Africa calling for increased regionalism and responsibility on the part of the Africans. This is also linked to the previous point on multilateralism. France was gradually looking at multilateralism, both from the position of giver, the UN and EU, and receiver, the African states, of military assistance. Multilateralism nonetheless would not result in a reduction of French influence as it would not “prevent an interpretation of future European security in a way that would devolve to individual member-states substantial prerogatives in their traditional areas of influence,” (Bowen, 2005:96) as will be demonstrated later.

European military policy in Africa
EU’s African policy is split into two different regional groupings. Northern African states such Algeria and Tunisia falls under the Mediterranean grouping, while other states such as Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania falls under African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states grouping. “However, at the beginning of the new millennium, the EU launched a new dialogue with Africa to build a strategic partnership with the entire continent which would strengthen existing measures.” (SCADPlus, 2008) Even so, EU’s African policy is “not clear-cut and may lack total consistency and coherence, largely because policy towards Africa has been changing significantly since the end of the Cold War, and is still in a state of flux.” (Olsen, 2004: 425) Despite this, this paper will attempt to trace out the military aspects of the African policy of the EU. In doing so, much of the focus will be on the sub-Saharan Africa since the majority of the military interventions on the continent is in this area.

A close examination of the prevailing literature on EU and African relations would point towards a great emphasis placed on economic development as well as aid and assistance. These were also the focus of the four Lomé Conventions concluded between the ACP countries and the EU. However, Olsen (2004) posits that with the end of the Cold War, the objectives of the EU have change in two main ways,
First, the aims of the European African policy widened from the original goal of promoting economic and social development increasingly towards giving priority to the promotion of stability, security and democracy. Second, the low priority of the region manifested itself very clearly in the continuous reduction in the aid transfers from the EC/ EU during the 1990s.” (Olsen, 2004:426)

One of the reasons for these changes was the frustration with the EU with the “lack of positive results after so many years of development assistance to Africa.” (Olsen, 2004, 429) In addition, there was also the recognition with EU that the three objectives of stability, security and democracy are needed as a foundation to cater for real growth and development.

Interestingly, as mentioned in the previous section, this period was also the same time that France recognized a limit on its ability to continuously sustain a credible military force in Africa. France’s downsizing of its military force and military establishments in Africa and shift towards a “long-term European focus to its external policies, including defence” [sic] (Utley, 2002:134) coincided with EU’s shift in focus towards stability and security in Africa. This paper therefore postulates that, there was a displacement of French objectives in Africa from the national stage to the European stage. This bottom-up Europeanization process saw France use the EU as a tool to carry out and continue having influence in Africa at a time when France could no longer by herself sustain military interventions and operations in the continent.

To facilitate this change of objectives in the European policy on Africa, EU needed real military capabilities and this translated itself into the European discourse calling for military capabilities that match its economic clout and international standing. As Deighton (2002) commented, “a state of military dependence on others should not be compatible with the dignity of nations like those in Western Europe, which should seek to be come more militarily self sufficient in their homeland defence and security.” (Deighton, 2002:721) Notably, in 1998, the leaders of France and Britain came together and called for “EU itself to acquire the capacity for autonomous action backed by credible military forces” (Howorth and Keeler, 2003:10) in the St. Malo’s Declaration. The result is the formation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whose key roles included the Petersberg Tasks of “humanitarian and rescue task, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” (Lindstrom, 2007:1)

It would then come as no surprise that ESDP’s first operation outside Europe happened in Africa. Operation Artemis in Congo involved France as the “framework nation . . . meaning it deployed most of the troops and the commander.” (Olsen, 2004:432) Even though Operation Artemis was a EU operation, France nevertheless was the leading country. By using the EU as a platform, France was able to direct the operation, achieve international recognition, since Artemis was also UN-sanctioned, as well as utilized EU resources in an African state that was its former colony and with which it had military agreements.

Conclusion
It is the objective of this paper to show the Europeanization of French foreign military policy in Africa. It has done so by first defining Europeanization and understanding the historical context of the subject matter at hand. Europeanization in this case is the categorization of Wong (2006) in which there appeared three schools of thought depending on the direction of influence.

This paper has attempted to outline the developments in the military policy of both France and EU in Africa, in doing so it highlighted the reasons for change as well as the changes that took place. I have shown that developments in French policy and EU policy are intrinsically linked and one affects the other. Hence it demonstrated the process of Europeanization in both the national and regional level.

The section on France’s military policy has clearly demonstrated a shift in focus due to the former’s membership in EU. Not only did participation in the Economic Monetary Union indirectly force it to reexamine its military policy, there was also a shift in its international conduct from unilateral to multilateralism, which was often linked with EU. Therefore, they presented evidences of the third school of Europeanization of learning and adaptation. On the other hand, the examination on the European Union’s military policy showed clearly a shift of objectives as well as the creation of a concrete ESDP. I postulate that this is an evidence of bottom-up Europeanization, whereby a member state, in this case France, uses the EU as a tool to project national interest that it could by itself no longer keep up.

In itself, this paper only provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate of Europeanization. However, it also serves as a good starting point in further exploring the evolution of national policies in the face of EU membership. It is my wish that this work represents a stepping-stone for others to look at the effects of the Europeanization process with regards to other areas of French foreign policy in Africa.

Bibliography
Blunden, Magaret. 2000. “France” in The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States. eds Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman. Pp. 2-43. Manchester: Manchester University Press

Bowen, Norman. 2005. “Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Regionalism: The French Foreign Policy Discourse” Mediterranean Quarterly Winter 2005. Pp. 94-116

Brüne, Stefan. 1994. “Under Pressure for Reform: French Policies South of the Sahara” in Africa and Europe: Relations of Two Continents in Transition. eds. Stefan Brüne et al. Pp.45-58. Münster: Lit

Chipman, John. 1989. French Power in Africa. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Deighton, Anne. 2002. “The European Security and Defence Policy”. Journal of Common Market Studies 40-4. Pp. 719-741

Howorth, Jolyon and Keeler, John T.S. 2003. “The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy” in Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy. eds. Howorth, Jolyon and Keeler, John T.S. Pp. 3-24. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kramer, Steven P. 2002. “French Foreign Policy: The Wager on Europe” in Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior. eds. Ryan K. Beasley et al. Pp.49-71. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press

Krause, Alexandra. 2003. “The European Union’s Africa Policy: The Commission as Policy Entrepreneur in the CFSP” European Foreign Affairs Review 8, Pp. 221-237

Lindstrom, Gustav. 2007. “The Headline Goal”. Institute for Security Studies.


Olsen, Gorm Rye. 2004. “Challenges to Traditional Policy Options, Opportunities for New Choices: The African Policy of the EU”. The Round Table. 93-375. Pp. 425-436

Rieker, Pernille. 2006. “From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards the Europeanization of French Foreign and Security Policy?” Security Dialogue. 37. Pp. 509-528

SCADPlus. 2008. “EU-Africa Partnership” on http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12106.htm. Accessed 10 April 2008

Utley, Rachel. 2002. “Not to do less but to do better: French military policy in Africa”. International Affairs. 78-1. Pp. 129-146

Wong, Reuben Y. 2006. The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Finally

Finally, after more than 3 and a half years of university education, I produced my first A grade term paper. It's been a long time coming.

Not including the term paper last semester co-authored with Isabelle, I have never managed to get an A for a term paper. Mediocrity has followed me through thick and think in NUS. Finally I see a little glimpse of light in the distance.

A comparison of Max Weber and Carl Schmitt

Introduction
In their essays “Politics as a Vocation” and “The Concept of the Political”, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt respectively shed light on what they conceive as constituting a political life. In this paper, I will attempt to compare and contrast their conceptions, drawing areas of similarities as well as highlighting the differences found in their writings. This is achieved in three parts. The first part is exploring and outlining how Schmitt defines the political in his “The Concept of the Political”. For the second part, the attention turns to Weber, as I will place his “Politics as a Vocation” under the same form of examination. The first two parts are necessary because a comparison between the two writers cannot be accomplished without first understanding their works. Subsequently in the third but no less important part, I will attempt to carry out the comparison central to this paper.

I. The Concept of the Political
The concept of the political is, in Schmitt’s view, an important concept that needs to be clarified, as it is necessary for the understanding of the state, since “the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political” and is “incomprehensible when the nature of the political is misunderstood.” Even so, Schmitt believes that despite its importance, the definition of the political has seldom been clear and has often been employed in antitheses without giving it a specific understanding. For him, such a treatment of the political is only “justifiable” when the state “possesses the monopoly on politics” and he proceeds to give examples of the times when such conditions are available, in the eighteenth century and Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

This condition ceased to exist in the twentieth century, a time that Schmitt terms as the “total state twentieth” where “the equation state = politics becomes erroneous and deceptive” . In such a time, the state is no longer “distinct from society and higher from it” but the latter has “itself integrated into the state” and the state “no longer knows anything absolutely non-political” . Since the condition for a vague definition of the political is no longer present, it can be implied that a specific definition is required. This “definition of the political can be obtained by discovering and defining the specifically political categories” and it must “rest on its own ultimate distinctions” . This distinction, when reduced to its simplest and most empirical form, is for Schmitt, “that between friend and enemy.”

Since it is the most empirical form, the distinction of friend and enemy is not founded upon, nor motivated by other antitheses. As Schmitt puts it:
“The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation. It can exist theoretically and practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon those moral, aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions.”

This distinction denotes the presence of “the other” whose very nature is in a “specially intense way, existentially different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.” In turn, in the most extreme case, the conflicts call for war to be waged against the enemy and war, in Schmitt’s understanding, is “to be understood in its existential sense” , which is to say the physical killing of human beings. It is important to note here that the political does not desire war, or necessary lead to war. However, war as a possibility cannot be denied. Schmitt also pointed out, “The definition of the political suggested here neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism” and “war is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics.” Its presence as a possibility, however, “creates a specifically political behaviour.”

Having defined the political, the friend-enemy distinction, as well as highlighted its result in the most extreme case, war, Schmitt also singles out the people that can make such a distinction. He explains that it is the people as a whole who make this friend-enemy distinction. The enemy, according to Schmitt, is “not the private adversary” of one individual. The enemy is instead the “public enemy” of the entire “collectivity of people” . This implies that the enemy cannot be determined by one person but has to be regarded as such by the whole group. To add on to that, since it is the collectivity of people that decides who is the enemy, it is by extension that only the people directly involved and no other outsiders who can determine the friend-enemy distinction. “Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict.” In this sense, the distinction is autonomous.

In essence, the political, for Schmitt, is the distinction of friend and enemy, made only possible by an entity of people against another entity, without the judgement of outsiders, and the enmity between the two would in the most intense situation lead to the existential killing of one another.



II. Politics as a Vocation
From the outset, Max Weber establishes the perimeter of his discussion of politics as “the leadership, or the influencing of the leadership of a political association” , in other words, a state. Furthermore, Weber defines the state by its “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” . Hence politics can be deduced to be for Weber “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power either among states or among groups within a state” , brought about by the right to use violence. This right to violence is in turn legitimised in three ways, namely “traditional,” “charismatic,” and “legal” and it is the “charismatic”, that according to Weber we find the calling of politics due to its focus on the individual.

In support of the sustenance of power for the individual charismatic political leader, Weber postulates an “organised domination”, which “requires controls of the personal executive staff and the material implements of administration” needed as rewards for the followers of the charismatic leader. It is in the service of the charismatic leaders, among his followers, that one finds the “professional politicians” who make politics their vocation.

In order to make politics a vocation, for Weber, one “either lives for” or “lives off politics” . In basic terms, in living for politics, politics is an end in itself, while in living off politics, politics is a means to an end, namely, the end being economics well being. However, Weber says that the two are not mutually exclusive, and “the rule is, rather, that man does both, at least in thought and certainly he also does both in practice.” The reason for this undertaking is that only
“rentiers”, wealthy men who are not preoccupied with making a living can really live for politics without living off the latter. Even in this case, Weber believes that “there has never been such a stratum that has not somehow lived off politics”, as they would then “exploit their political domination in their own economic interest.”

Having explained the professional politicians, Weber proceeds to give examples the conditions and the sources of their emergence – “politically exploitable strata outside of the order of the estates” – and the roles that they play, and their development in the history of politics in America and Europe – in the formation of a “leaderless democracy, namely the rule of professional politicians without a calling,” as opposed to a charismatic leader. These are some examples, to name a few.

More importantly, Weber highlights “three pre-eminent qualities that are decisive for the politician: passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion.” These qualities are decisive and necessary in order to justify the huge influence that a political position allocates to the person occupying it. The first of the three, passion, is required as a “devotion to a cause” , providing an objective for the politician, while the latter two, a feeling of responsibility and a sense of proportion work hand in hand in keeping the politician in check, preventing the politician from losing sight of his objective. These qualities are necessary because the position of power also brings along with it great temptations, especially vanity, which Weber thinks is especially damaging in the field of politics as a result of the potential harm that it entails.

Also highlighted by Weber is the link between ethics and politics. Weber believes that politics, like other matters, cannot escape ethical examination. In the ethical examination of politics, Weber proposes down “two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims”, “the ethic of ultimate ends” and the “ethic of responsibility” as guide. The ethic of ultimate ends postulates that the ends justify the means while the ethics of responsibility concerns itself with the possible consequences of the means. These ethical paradoxes, as Weber calls them, are what he believes to be essential knowledge for anyone who wishes to engage in politics, especially as a vocation. Though initially claimed as irreconcilable, Weber believes that a man who possesses the two is a true man with the calling for politics.

In sum, Weber describes two main kinds of politicians in his essay. The first kind is the leader whose domination of politics is justified in three ways, namely the traditional, the legal and the charismatic authority. It is in the last one that he focuses on, as he believes that to possess “the calling for politics in its highest expression.” The second kind is the profession politician who developed concurrently with the first. For both of these kinds, Weber lays out the meaning of engaging politics as a vocation and the dangers of such an engagement and the qualities need to overcome these dangers.



III. Comparison of Weber and Schmitt
After summarising Carl Schmitt and Max Weber’s conception of the political, the third part of this paper will now proceed to carry out a comparison of the two and attempt to point out the similarities and differences present in their conception. First and foremost, both Schmitt and Weber understand the relation between politics and violence. For Schmitt, violence as war, in the sense of existential negation of the enemy, is the “most extreme political means (which) discloses the possibility which underlies every political idea, namely, the distinction of friend and enemy.” In a similar manner, for Weber, violence and politics are undeniable linked. For him, politics is about the strive for power within and outside a state and this power is based on violence since he stated that one of the main characteristics of the state is its monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.

Secondly, for Schmitt, the concept of the political is a domain of an entity of people, a collectivity. This is expressed in the way he theorises in “macro” terms, whereby the enemy must be confronted by a “fighting collectivity of people” as well as “in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction.” Weber, on the other hand, looks at politics in “micro” terms, in terms of the individual, the leaders and the professional politicians, outlining the various aspects for the person who wishes to engage politics as a vocation. This difference in perspective is to influence heavily their views on different aspects of life such as economics and ethics.

Schmitt, in his essay, repeatedly emphasise the separation of economics and ethics, from the political. In his words, the political is “in any event independent, not in the sense of a distinct new domain, but in that it can neither be based on any one antithesis or any combination of other antitheses, nor can it be traced to these.” On the contrary, Weber links politics to economics in the discussion of the potential rewards for engaging in politics and he further links politics to ethics, ethics of ultimate ends and responsibility based on religion, as guidelines for the conduct of politics.

Conclusion
Through the reading of Carl Schmitt’s “The Concept of the Political” and Max Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation”, we see two important and different takes on what distinguishes a political life. The first two parts of this essay give us a general understanding of each of their conception, while the third attempted to juxtapose the two in an effort to understand the similarities and differences present in the two essays. A closer look at the third part reveals that the two thinkers differ markedly in their conception of the political, with more differences than similarities having surfaced. These differences are in a way, shaped by the different position and viewpoint that they take in looking at politics. However, it is important to note that the list was but no means complete but could serve as a starting in understanding synthesising the Schmitt and Weber in a more holistic manner. As far as this is true, the two are not absolute contrast but rather supplements, which in unison allow us to better understand the political life.

References
Schmitt, Carl. (2007). The Concept of the Political. In The Concept of the Political. ed. George Schwab, 19-79. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Weber, Max. (1958). Politics as a Vocation. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. ed. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press

Le groupe de motorists

Félicitations à mon amie Malwina qui a reussi son test de TP. Elle a envie d'achéter une MTT - moto tout-terrain comme sa première moto mais je l'ai conseillé de faire autrement. Comme les roues de MTT sont adaptées pour la course de sable, elles ne sont pas adaptées pour la surface de goudrons. Ça va poser des riques.


Voici le modèle de ma moto dont j'ai depuis le juin dernier. Mais la mienne est en noir et elle est dans une condition un peu plus mauvaise. Elle a déjà 18 ans et à cause de son âge, elle n'est pas très vite et déjà coute moi quelques cent dollar pour les réparations.


Voici une image de R6. C'est une moto de course avec une capacité de 600cc. C'est aussi la modèle de la nouvelle moto dont mon meilleur ami, Shi An, vient d'achèter. Même si je suis aussi inclus sous l'assurance et autorisé de la conduire, je n'ai pas essayé de rouler cette bête.

Europe

We are going on a trip, to Europe. This time it's to make up to the many places that I regretted not going. Being in France for 6 months I had only visited Paris. This time the trip will include Nice, Marseille and maybe Lyon.

Ça fait longtemps que je sois en France. J'espère que cette fois sera plus agréable. Ce n'est pas à dire que la dernière fois l'expérience était mauvais, mais le sentiment était different quand on est étudiant.

Ich glaube dass, wir auch nach Deutschland fahren. Wir gehen sicher nach Berlin, weil wir der Vater des Potatoes kaufen wollten. Diese Mal ist die dritten Mal, dass ich nach Berlin gehe. Ich wünschte gerne, dass ich besser Deutsch sprechen und verstehen kann.


谢谢依莎贝儿让这一次的背包旅行能够成功。除了法国和德国之外，我们也回到意大利与英国。这一次我们会设法参加阿绅纳球队所举办的参观团。上一次到伦敦，在阿绅纳对垒利物浦的大赛之际，我们只能够在场外感染那紧张的气氛而不能入内观看实况，令我感到常懊恼。

I have to admit, it's amazing how she managed to come up with the money for this trip. It just shows that with some effort, things are possible. (Applause, applause) Estoy Feliz!

Free Internet Content

The advance of media and technology has truely benefited poor folks like me who used to splash money weekly at the movie theatres, catching our favourite blockbusters. Time has come for the shows to come to our doorstep. Introducing the following websites for the best and latest movies, tv series:

www.tvokay.com
www.alluc.org
www.tudou.com

For live football and other sports, check out:

livefooty.doctor-serv.com

But while we indulge in entertainment and sports that quickly numb our mind and insult our intelligence, do not forget to once in a while look back at the classics, to provide fuel for progress. Free books, such as fictional classics like Pride and Prejudice, The Picture of Dorian Grey, and more serious works such as Beyond Good and Evil by Nietzsche and Politics by Aristotle can be found here:

www.planetebook.com
www.readprint.com
classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/index.php

Happy Valentine's Day

I wish to wish my 宝贝a happy Valentine's Day! Surprise!


Here's a rose for you. One that will never wither and never fade. Thank you for being my Valentine.

Happy Birthday to All

Yesterday the 13th of February happens to be the 7th day of the first month of the Chinese Lunar Calender.

According to traditions we call this day 人日 (rén rì), or the day of the people. On this day, all of us celebrate our birthday. Therefore I would like to wish all my family and friends a Happy Birthday.

Chinese traditions call for us to celebrate today by having a bowl of vermicelli. The long never-ending vermicelli supposedly symbolises longevity and good health. In Singapore, however, we have a localised way of celebration. On this day, the family would gather around and 捞鱼生 (lāo yú shēng). 鱼生 meaning raw fish and 捞 meaning to scope. The higher we scope , the better.


The dish actually includes more than raw fish. Other ingredients include shredded carrot, radish, and cucumber, grinded peanuts, a sweet sauce and others. Each ingredient symbolises a wish for the coming year. For example, 鱼生 sounds like and symbolises 年年有余 (nían nían yŏu yú)，风升水起 (fēng shēng shuĭ qĭ), which translate into abundance and prosperity.

Therefore, in addition to good health and a happy birthday, I hope we all have a great and abundant year ahead!
　

The End: Hollywood's writer strike over

This is the headlines on Yahoo! News today.

The scriptwriters strike over the past 3 months is finally over. The strike cripple the American television production and cost billions of dollars. Most importantly, it rendered me without my favourite TV series, keeping me ins suspense over what's happening next in Boston Legal and Grey's Anatomy.

To recall, the issue was over remunerations of the scriptwriters for the distribution of their work via online media. Previously they were not paid, from now on they will be.

A joyous result for a joyous festival.

Happy Chinese New Year

I would like to wish all my family and friends a very Happy Chinese New Year.

In accordance to our customs, I hope the new year brings forth happiness, luck, wealth and good health.

Past years saw me send out tons of SMSes wishing eveyone that mattered a holiday greeting. This year I did not send out any, except to reply those who sent me. However, nothing's change and all you family and friends are still in my heart, less the formality.

As we all grow older, please remember to take care of yourself, as I have sadly, fallen under the weather before and now, during the holiday season. Unlike what my friend Dan says, we can do without the constant boozing. Moderation is better and makes drinking much more enjoyable.

I am sorry my dear friends that I have not been out with you guys for this new year. It is a busy year and I am typing this in school on a Sunday afternoon on the fourth day of new year. I also took this time to rest well, making up for lost sleep, which seems to be a luxury nowadays.

Short is the holiday, so make good use of this last day before work resumes tomorrow. Though the holiday is ending I hope the enjoyment will not.

With love from Loon

We are on top again

Presenting the current league leader: Arsenal

After a wonderful 3-1 victory beating Manchester City at their home ground, Arsenal has overtaken Manchester United to lead the EPL. This win follows a series of matches where Arsenal scores 3 goals in each match. The previous being 2 3-0 wins over Newcastle.

In addition, this is the first time this season that the blue side of Manchester lost at their home ground, Eastlands.

The weekend also saw the red side of Manchester held to a 1-1 draw, thanks to luck, for Carlos Tevez had scored with literally the last touch for Manchester United. To top it off it was arch-rival Tottenham who had held Man U to the draw. It was sweet to see the 2 teams tear each other apart. For once Man U's talismanic winger Cristiano Ronaldo was not able to save it as Tottenham was the better team throughout the night, with Robbie Keane wasting wonderful chances.

At the end of the night it was a well-deserved win by Arsenal as both Chelsea and Man U could not keep up.

How to read a newspaper

Today in my War and Diplomacy class, my professor told us a story of the most important lesson he ever had during his university days. According to him, the name of the module was "How to read a newspaper".

For this module, he and his classmates each had to read a newspaper daily for a certain period of time. During this time, they made observations of the presentation of the news in the papers. He told us that this lesson taught him a lot and is still pertinent today, many years later. In fact, according to him, our local papers still use the same methods, intentionally or otherwise.

The methods of writing/ publishing are:
1) The juxtaposition of opposition.
The example he raised was the recent article in the Straits Time about fees hike for the public transportation due to rising fuel price. Right next to that article on the same page, there was another article that said something to the effect of SIA record profits due to falling fuel price. On the same page here you have 2 different articles stating the exact opposite. According to him, this method was often used deliberating by editors to make a point about current issues in society. By giving 2 contrasting stories, the editors of the newspaper are telling the readers to think about what is happening and go figure, not taking things at face value.

2) Discontinuity of argument
He told us that he had been in Singapore for quite a few years and there was once, if anyone can remember, when the Suzhou Industrial Park was everything that you could read about in the local papers. Then suddenly, one day, Suzhou disappeared from the face of Singapore. From that moment on, he knew something was wrong. True enough, it was soon revealed that Suzhou was going very badly. The telling sign was the change in the plane of the argument. So next time when you read papers, look out for any changes in the argument to know that something is wrong.

3) Locutional-intentionalist
In short, locutional-intentionalist means the opposite of whatever said is true. Locutional-intentionalist statements are often prescriptive and not descriptive. That is to say, they do not reflect the actual state of society but what it should be. By extension, whatever is stated in a locutional-intentionalist is not present in the society and therefore not true. His example was the "Speak Mandarin Campaign". Looking at a banner with his friend, his friend exclaimed to the slogan of "Speak Mandarin, Use It Don't Lose It", "How do I lose something that I don't even have to begin with." In short, many Singaporean Chinese can't speak Mandarin here in Singapore though we should be able to.

4) Don't believe anything until it's officially denied
If a thing is not true, there is no need to deny it. The moment you deny it, it signals that the incident is plausible, but "not" true. Case in point. So next time look out for official denials.

Another post on food hygiene

If you read the previous post, you would know how disgusted I was with the level of food hygiene at the Muslim coffee shop in Bedok Reservoir. However, an incident yesterday let me feel that hope is not lost.

You know how you often see food sellers handle both food and money with the same pair of gloves?

Ever since a few years ago (maybe more, I can't remember), when the government decided to start improving the standard of hygiene in the food handling industry, we started seeing stalls and restaurants getting graded for the level of cleanliness of their food preparation area. Typically, restaurants get As and stalls in food centres and coffee shops get Bs, with a few Cs and seldom Ds. They later introduced the rule that required food handlers to wear gloves.

The irony is, despite the goodwill and intention of improving food safety standards, the plan was not well thought out enough. In the implementation of these regulations, the authorities forgot about the most important aspect, proper education for the food sellers.

What we got instead, were food sellers who followed the regulations blindly. So very often I have seen the sellers preparing my orders with gloves on, then went on to collect money with the same pair of gloves. Other times I saw them put on their gloves and never removed them till the end of the day, in the meantime wearing it to eat, shit and do everything else. What then may I ask, is the purpose of having the gloves on? In the end, instead of ensuring that the food is clean, it seems more like they are ensuring that their hands are clean.

So what's the hope-reigniting incident that I encountered?

Yesterday I was introduced to a stall in Bukit Panjang that sells excellent rojak. But this is no ordinary stall. It was run by an elderly uncle whose stall included nothing more than 2 tables under the covered walkway of a HDB estate.

The thing is, this uncle, running an illegal stall, under no supervision or administration of any authorities, was nonetheless using gloves while preparing his rojak. Unlike the regulated stalls in coffee shops and food centres, he was, in a sense not required to do so. Even more delighting, was the fact that he understood the rational behind the usage of gloves. As I stood there waiting for my turn to be served, I witnessed the uncle use his gloves only for food handling and nothing else. What's more, he changed his pair of gloves for every packet of rojak that he dished out. In addition, every once in a short while, he would turn around and wash his hands in a bucket of water that he had prepared earlier. A quick survey of his "stall" also found it to be no messier or dirtier than the average food stall.

This may only be a little thing, that people might not usually noticed, but for us, in a time when so many food handlers out there still do not have the common sense of using a simple pair of gloves properly and are consistently endangering consumers' lives with their unhygienic habits, I found the uncle's behaviour reassuring, refreshing and uplifting.

I am not asking all food handlers' to follow in his footstep, using more than a hundred pairs of gloves everyday. All I am asking for is that they use their gloves only for handling food, and not money, which is the foulest thing. Or wearing it and walking around. Some simple common sense and a little effort are all that's required.

Dennis Bergkamp

Before there was Cesc Fabregas and Thierry Henry, there was another man, who made the difference in Arsenal. His name was Dennis Bergkamp. There might have been others like him, or even better before. Ian Wright was the big name and once held the record for the most number of goals scored, but for me, Bergkamp was the person.

I remember him fondly, his passes, his shots, his assists, and his partnerships with the other players. I remember the times when he would put the ball through and a young Nicolas Anelka would outrun the defenders to latch on to the ball and score.

Dennis Bergkamp was such a gentle-looking man, his movements ever so graceful, his passes ever so weighted, yet his shots ever so powerful. Such was the delight of seeing him play that I became an Arsenal fan.

I was so delighted when I came across this video on Youtube that pays a tribute to the man as a player that I would like to share it with everyone. For the love of our beautiful game.

Questionable food-handling hygiene

Friends and family please take note the next time you visit NIAKMATH RESTAURANT PTE LTD: MUSLIM FOOD OF ORIGINAL TASTE at BLK 632 Bedok Reservoir Road. Many of us remember it fondly by the name of the former restaurant occupying the same unit: TMK.

I was having my supper there this morning after a studying session at a nearby McDonald's restaurant at the same block. Craving for some pratas, I settled for this familiar Muslim restaurant that I frequent often with my close friends who live nearby.

Halfway through the meal, which comprised of a glass of bandung, a glass of teh peng, a plaster prata and a mushroom cheese prata, I found myself biting at a peculiar object that had the texture of compressed wet tissue paper. I proceed to spit out the object, which at first sight look perfectly normal as part of the mushroom cheese prata that it came from. Upon closer examination I was dumbfounded to find a fibrous piece of what I can only assume to be a filter of a cigarette.

In disbelief, I approached the staff and highlighted my finding. Feigning ignorance, the restaurant nonetheless offered to remove the item from my bill. I was at a loss as to what I should do in this predicament. In the end I decided to brush it off as the restaurant staff were generally nice and they did not deny wrongdoings.

I then took a cigarette to calm myself and as I finished my cigarette, I removed the filter and compared the 2 items. I could not be sure but it seemed as though my guess was correct, that the thing inside the prata was indeed a cigarette filter.

What puzzled me more was how it got there in the first place. It was mixed and cooked with the ingredients and one would not realise its existence without careful chewing. If it was indeed a cigarette filter, there was no paper present. As is the case normally, for a filter to be wrapped in the paper bearing the brand of the cigarette. Assuming that the person in charge of preparing the food was smoking while cooking, how is it possible that he would drop the filter into the prata, since it was on the inside and not the outside. Would it also meant that I might have ingested paper and ashes together with the prata?

I do not wish to think about it anymore, as more thinking only disgusts me further. I do, however, wish to highlight this to everyone out there, just so that everyone would think twice about patronising this shop again, or at least check the next time, before you eat. I regret not having the pictures to illustrate my concerns.

The real class of Arsenal

The match against Newcastle was of paramount importance to Arsenal after its youngsters' abysmal display the previous week against Tottenham in the Carling Cup semi-final.

With one less silverware possible, Arsenal must win against Newcastle to continue its journey towards a treble-winning season, with all the other competitions still en-route. As the fixture set up to play Newcastle back to back in both the FA Cup and the Premier League, a win at the Emirates will send Newcastle back with a dip in confidence to ensure that the Gunners can keep up the title race with Manchester United as the 2 teams are currently level on points with United ahead on goal difference.

With Manchester United set to play Tottenham the next day (United won 3-1 despite Tottenham taking the lead through Robbie Keane), a win here will send the right message to Ferguson and team that the 5-1 loss was by the reserve team, hardly in the same class as the regular 11, and they should expect nothing less from the latter when they meet next. More importantly, it will also send the right message to United, who was to become their adversary in the next round of the FA Cup.

Despite a slow start in the first half against a revitalised Newcastle under new old manager Kevin Keegan, Emmanuel Adebayor finally broke the deadlock in the 51st min and added a second in the 83rd min. Nicky Butt ended Keegan's dream first return to Arsenal's Emirates Stadium when he headed in an own-goal with Eduardo applying pressure.

Despite the win, Arsenal was not playing to their best as they seemed to lack urgency as was the case in the previous few matches. Newcastle, on the other hand, was determined to present their alleged saviour with a welcoming gift and never hit the brake, even though they were 3-0 down. They continued fighting till the final whistle but in the end Arsenal was simply too much for them to handle.

With a tight and difficult schedule ahead, Newcastle (Tuesday), Man City (Saturday), Blackburn (Monday), Man Utd (Sat), AC Milan (Wednesday) and Birmingham (Sat), with 2 matches per week for the next 3 weeks, Arsène Wenger had to select his players carefully. Still missing key players through the African Nations' Cup and injury, the Arsenal team saw Lehmann come in for Almunia in goal, Justin Hoyte and Philippe Senderos for Kolo Toure and Bacary Sagna in defence Abou Diaby for Helb in midfield and Theo Walcott for Van Persie in attack. To add salt to injury, Tomas Rosicky limped off in the 9th min to add to the injury list and was replaced by the in-form Eduardo.

The next 3 weeks will put Arsenal to the mettle as they sought to reclaim the title after 3 seasons and break the record of getting a Treble win.

Bike circuit opens in Singapore

Slightly more than a week ago, a motocross circuit in Tuas, Singapore officially opened, to the applause of local biking fans.

Previously, Singaporean bikers, motocross or otherwise, cross the borders over to Malaysia in search of racing grounds. Pasir Gudang and Sepang are among the most well-known in Singapore, especially in the circle of sportsbikers.

I suspect this new circuit is riding on the wave of the impending inaugural F1 race in Singapore, banking on the racing fervour in anticipation of the races in September. Already hotels, and the yet-to-open Singapore Eye are pushing up the prices for a first-hand view of the race.

In addition to the motocross track and the F1 street track, the circuit at Tuas is poised to open a tarmac track for the racing of another kind of motorbike. To my disappointment, the other bikes they were talking about were the Super Motards, a motocross b*****d with road wheels, according to CNA news. Sadly, it looks like sportsbikers still have to cross over to Malaysia to enjoy that sense of speed and thrill, though the possibility of sportsbike racing is still possible in Tuas.

Now I can only hope that the F1 races will enjoy immense success to encourage the authorities to introduce the Motor Grand Prix, F1's 2-wheeled brother.

Long road ahead for Arsenal's Youngsters

As an Arsenal fan since the time I started watching soccer seriously, yesterday's match against arch-rival Tottenham was crushing, ending in a dismal 5-1 loss.

Arsène Wenger followed a policy of fielding a young side in the Carling Cup and yesterday's semi-final second leg was no exception. In a line-up of youngsters, only skipper William Gallas, fullback Bacary Sagna and winger Hleb were regular features of the Arsenal first team.

The young Arsenal squad was clearly lacking in experience as Tottenham managed to repeatedly pry them open. Only the post and the lack of of finishing prevented the difference from becoming bigger as Berbatov hit the post and Jermaine Defoe missed a sitter, splurging his rare chance to play and impress.

On the other side of the field, Arsenal was unable to put anything together other than pass the ball around. Gilberto was clearly lacking sharpness and fitness while Diaby forever looked clumsy and slow. Denilson was injured early but his replacement Fabregas was a shadow of his usual self, showing rooms of improvement. The strike was no better as the only goal that young Dane Bendtner was pass his own goalkeeper Fabianski.

Although Adebayor managed to pull one back in the later stages of the game, the game was then already over as Arsenal fans were seen leaving White Hart Lane early. The inexperience of the young Arsenal squad was exposed further as they let their frustration show, with defender Justin Hoyte picking up a booking for a rash challenge and Bendtner squabbling with his own teammates Adebayor and Gallas.

Wenger, on the other hand, did not seemed very disturbed as he sat calmly in the dugout, despite throwing in Adebayor and Eduardo to try and salvage a result. He later justified his tactics by claiming that the Carling Cup remains the least of Arsenal's priority in a season that sees them still chasing for the league title, the Champion's League and the FA Cup.

Next week will see Arsenal go back to back against Newcastle in both the league and the fourth round of the FA cup. Arsenal will need to put up a strong performance following yesterday's incredulous showing.

American Scriptwriters on strike

I have to admit, that I am a huge fan of American TV series. From F.R.I.E.N.D.S, which happens to be my all-time favourite, to Sex in the City, Gilmore girls, Ally McBeal, Grey's Anatomy, Boston Legal, Nip-Tuck and many others, you name it, I have probably watched it.

And now I am trying to catch up on my work so that I can continue the much-applauded Heroes, Prison Break, plus a few that my friends recommended such as House. In addition to that, I can now watch them all online, without paying a single cent. I strongly recommend tudou.com and fanpop.com. They have allowed to find almost all the serials that I am interested in watching.

Recently, I found something very strong going on. Season 4 of the current series Boston Legal and Grey's Anatomy, which I am watching, have stopped mid-season. I was shocked to find out that the scriptwriters in America are currently on strike! It turns out that their contract ran out in October and they were not able to negotiate a satisfactory increase in the remunerations for their work.

Picture from WGA website.

I sincerely hope that they are able to work out something quickly so that we can all have our favourite TV shows back on.

For more information, visit the Writers Guild of American website.
For a summary, see BBC news.