Introduction
Sixteenth-century France was a place of strife as factions of Catholics and Protestants fought a series of wars in the name of their religion. As a result, “France was nearly torn apart by forty years of agonizing, destructive civil war.” (Dunn, 1970, 20) This civil war, termed by historians as the French Wars of Religions, or the French Religious Wars, lasted between 1562 and 1598. It consisted of eight major conflicts although fighting never really ceased. While some historians put the end of the wars in 1598 with the conclusion of the Edict of Nantes, Mentzer postulates that “the last of the . . . war of religion centred on the Protestant fortress of La Rochelle” (Mentzer, 2000, 341) in 1629 and ended with the Peace of Alais.
This paper will now attempt to give a context to the wars by looking at the events leading up to them. In doing so, it will also point out the social and political circumstances in France at the point of the outbreak of the first war. Subsequently, this paper will also give a chronological summary of how each of the eight major conflicts began, the important events as well as how it ended. Lastly, the focus will turn to the discussion of the core of the issues, questioning whether the wars were truly about religion, as well as important consequences of the war. In the end, it concludes that while the wars may have begun as a result of religious conflicts, the latter was not the driving force behind the continuous conflicts. It was more a war of politics and power, than of religion.
Background of the wars
“The confessional tensions arising from the Reformation led to conflict in France, as elsewhere throughout Europe.” (Mentzer, 2000, 323) From the early sixteenth century onwards, Lutheranism and later Calvinism started making headways into France and was beginning to attract converts, both in the lower ranks of society as well as within the ranks of nobility. The Calvinist movement provided an avenue for “some nobles . . . wary of the extending reach of the Valois monarchy” (Merriman, 1996, 142) to express their dissent with the monarchy, “which had vigorously embraced the Catholic Reformation.” (Merriman, 1996, 142)
At the same time, the death of the king, Henry II, in a jousting accident in 1559 set the stage for a power struggle between the monarchy and the nobles from the House of Guise and House of Bourbon who represented the Catholics and the Huguenots, as the French protestants came to be known as, respectively. “Religious differences sharpened the rivalry between them for influence.” (Merriman, 1996, 143) Furthermore, France had just ended a war with Spain and with the successors of Henry II, Francis II and Charles IX being only fifteen and ten years old, the monarchy was in no position to control the rivalling factions.
Hence, “the rapid expansion of Protestantism coincided with the marked deterioration of political stability” (Mentzer, 2000, 324) and fast resulted in the period of constant fighting that was to plague France in the next forty years. During this period the “royal house of Valois remained Catholic, although it repeatedly sought a middle course amid the religious turmoil.” (Mentzer, 2000, 325)
The wars
I. The first war
As previously mentioned, though fighting never really ceased, the French Religious Wars were marked by eight main conflicts. The first war took place in 1562 “when Francis, the duke of Guise, (1519 – 1563) ordered the execution of Huguenots whom he and his men had found worshipping on his land.” (Merriman, 1996, 144)
The end to this first full-scaled conflict only ended when a Huguenot assassinated the Duke in 1563. As a result of this war, the Edict of Amboise was decreed, whereby Huguenots were granted the “right to worship in one designated town in each region, as well as in places where the Calvinist congregations had already been established.” (Merriman, 1996, 144)
II. The second war
The second war started in 1567 and lasted till 1568. It had started “over Huguenots apprehensions that a Spanish army marching along the eastern frontier of France would be diverted from its announced goal of suppressing the revolts of the Netherlands.” (Mentzer, 2000, 329) These apprehensions prompted the Prince of Condé from the Bourbon family and Admiral Coligny, a Protestant from the family of Montmercy, to attempt a kidnapping of the king. That was the spark that ignited the fighting though it ended quickly within a year. The result was the Edict of Longjumeau, which “mostly reiterated the earlier Edict of Amboise.” (Mentzer, 2000, 329)
III. The third war
The third war was a logical result of the second war. After the failed kidnapping of the king, “the Cardinal of Lorraine persuaded the royal council to seek the arrest” (Mentzer, 2000, 329) of the two Protestant leaders. The war took place from 1568 till 1569 and ended with the death of Condé. As it was with the previous wars, the end of the war was marked by an edict, in this case the Edict of Saint-Germain, which calls for limited freedom for Protestant worships.
IV. The fourth war
The preceding wars had taken a toll on the rivalling factions as it led to the deaths of the major factional leaders. This gave Catherine de Medici, the Queen Mother, an opportunity to return “to her policy of restraint and reconciliation.” (Mentzer, 2000, 330) Consequently, she tried to forge peace by arranging for the marriage between her daughter Marguerite of Valois and Henry of Navarre, who was the leader of the House of Bourbon and “nominal leader of the Huguenots forces.” (Mentzer, 2000, 330) This marriage was to result in the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, one of the “most famous bloodbath of the sixteenth century.” [sic] (Mentzer, 2000, 330)
The St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in 1572 began with the murder of Admiral Coligny, on the orders of the Queen Mother after she felt that he was holding too much influence over King Charles IX (Dunn, 1970), and Huguenots guests who were in Paris to attend the wedding. From here on it spread to other French cities that were under Catholic control. In the end it resulted in the “frightful murder of thousands of French Protestants.” (Mentzer, 2000, 330) It was also a decisive point in the Reformation in France, as Mentzer noted,
“The initial confidence, dramatic growth and euphoric expectation of converting France to the true religion vanished. Exhilaration gave way to despair. Numbers declined, energies dissipated and enthusiasm waned. The events of August 1572 marked a decisive point in the French Reformation.” (Mentzer, 2000, 332)
More importantly, the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre also marked the beginning of the fourth war of religion. The fourth war did not deviate markedly from the previous ones. It was short, lasting from 1572 to 1573. Secondly, it was inconclusive as it once again ended in a settlement, the Peace of La Rochelle, which “resembled the 1570 Peace of Saint-Germain with the notable exception of the toleration clauses.” (Mentzer, 2000, 332)
V. The fifth war
In 1574, King Charles IX died and was succeeded by his brother, Henry III. The death of Charles IX immediately plunged France into another war. France at this point of time was “on the verge of splintering and the king, while intelligent and cultured, lacked the requisite strength and experience . . . to provide the leadership to restore harmony and unity.” (Mentzer, 2000, 334) His coronation also brought about challenges from his ambitious younger brother Francis, duke of Alençon, who led a group of discontented Catholics and joined forces with united Huguenot forces aided by the German Calvinist Elector of Palatinate.
“Faced with mounting opposition, Henry III and Catherine de Medici yielded and agreed to the Edict of Beaulieu in May 1576 . . . which concluded the fifth war of religion by granting the Huguenots generous concession.” (Mentzer, 2000, 334) This new edict gave Protestants the rights “to worship openly and to build temples anywhere in France except Paris. It also called for the creation of special law courts for Protestant litigants so that they might avoid prejudiced Catholic judges and it awarded the Huguenots eight surety towns, chiefly in southern France.” (Mentzer, 2000, 334)
VI. The sixth war
The sixth war was another short war that began in 1576 and ended quickly in 1577. The most important event that surrounded the sixth was the formation of a Catholic League led by the Guise family. It was formed by Catholics that were unhappy with the king for his compromise with the Huguenots. It was under the pressure of the League that the king went into battle with the Huguenots that began the war.
The end of the war was brought about by the Peace of Bergerac, issued in September 1577, which rolled back the generous terms accorded to the Huguenots in the previous Edict of Beaulieu. However it was not sufficient to placate the “stern demands of dedicated Catholics” (Mentzer, 2000, 335) from the League and only temporarily eased the tension.
VI. The seventh war
The seventh war stemmed from the attempt by Henry of Navarre to capture Catholic cities. Nevertheless, “neither side possessed sufficient resources to maintained a sustained offensive and a truce was arranged by November” (Mentzer, 2000, 335) in 1580, the same year that the war started. This time the end of the war was marked by the Peace of Fleix, which “did little more than confirm existing Protestant political and religious privileges.” (Mentzer, 2000, 335)
VIII. The eighth war
In between the time of the seventh and the eighth war, the heir to the throne, Francis, previously Duke of Alençon and now Duke of Anjou, passed away. This puts Henry of Navarre the leader of the Protestant factions next in line for the throne. This development received a great deal of opposition from the Catholics, as they could not accept a Protestant as king of France. Facing this great unrest, “King Henry attempted unsuccessfully to steer a course between the Huguenots under Navarre’s command and the Catholic League dominated by Duke of Guise.” (Mentzer, 2000, 336)
Following this, the war began again in 1585 with King Henry III of France allied with Henry, Duke of Guise against Henry of Navarre. Things took a turn in 1588 when the king turned on his ally and assassinated Henry of Guise in his chateau at Blois, after the latter lost the support of his patron, Philip II of Spain who was defeat in his own battle against England. (Dunn, 1970) He then allied with Henry of Navarre and turned on the Catholics. The Catholics, infuriated over the death of their leader assassinated the king in his royal camp near Paris in 1589.
With the king now dead, Henry of Navarre successfully ascended the throne and became King Henry IV of France. The war did not end with the death of the Catholic leaders and continued till 1598, when the successes of Henry IV on the battlefield and his conversion to Catholicism finally brought it to a halt. The Edict of Nantes was proclaimed with elaborated details of religious and political structures for both Catholics and Protestants. “While the edict did not give Protestantism complete parity with Catholicism, it did provided a coherent framework for adherents of the two faiths to live together in a semblance of peace.” (Mentzer, 2000, 340)
Analysis of the French Religious Wars
The French collapse in the sixteenth century was “many-faceted. Huguenots battled Catholics, aristocratic factions joined together to opposed the crown, the bourgeoisie strove for new political and religious rights, the Paris mob went wild, and the outer provinces reverted to their medieval autonomy.” (Dunn, 1970, 20) In this section, this paper will now discuss some of the more obvious and important aspects of the French Religious Wars.
The first observation that arose from the study of the French Religious Wars is the recurring pattern in each of the eight conflicts. Firstly, with the exception of the eighth war, all the other wars were short skirmishes that spanned between a few months to about two years. Secondly, each of them ended with a compromised settlement, which satisfied neither side and set the stage for the next round of conflicts. As Mentzer commented, “the peace was at best temporary, a truce or interim that allowed each camp to regroup and renew the fight at a later date.” (Mentzer, 2000, 329)
Another interesting point to note about the French Religious Wars was the role played by foreign powers. “Both Catholics and Protestants sought and received aid in the form of money and troops from their respective foreign supporters: Philip II of Spain on the Catholic side; for the Huguenots Elizabeth of England, various German princes and other lesser powers.” (Mentzer, 2000, 329) More apparently, it was the fear of intervention from the Spanish that the Huguenots started the second war and it was with the support of the Germans that they were able to pose a serious opposition in the fifth. “Although fought on French soil, the wars became the focus of a European clash.” (Mentzer, 2000, 329) Interestingly, it was also the possible of a foreign monarch ascending to the throne of France that had prevented further opposition and helped Henry IV bring peace and the end to forty years of conflict.
In addition, the wars saw the springing up of various ideological developments on both sides in a bid to justify their cause for it. Among the more notable “resistance theories” of the Protestants were “the anonymous Reveille-Matin (1574), François Hotman’s Francogallia (1573), Theodore Beza’s Du droits des magistrates (1574) and the pseudonymous Vindiciae contra tyrannos (1579), probably written by Philippe Duplessis-Mornay.” (Mentzer, 2000, 333) These theories argued that the government was based on a contract made between the king and his subjects and the monarchy had degenerated into a tyranny, hence violating the contract. In its place, they called for a republican system, which would replace the monarchy and bring justice back to the people. “The theory of contract between the king and his people is, beyond any doubt, one of the most fundamental contributions the religious wars made to matters of political law.” (Goosens, 2001, 171)
Conclusion
In the end, the juxtaposition of religion, politics and ideology would point out that the wars, though it began as religious was not all about religion. In the face of pragmatism, King Henry IV had oscillated many times between Catholicism and Protestantism, first when he was held captive in the French court, in his younger days and lastly when he became King, though he was the leader of the Protestant movement. Secondly, there were often times when the Huguenots led by the House of Bourbon counted in their ranks Catholics who were dissatisfied with the monarchy or repelled by the extremist view of the Guise faction. Thirdly, Henry III had himself first allied with the Catholics to fight against the Huguenots before joining forces with the latter to defeat the rising Catholic forces following his successful assassination of Henry of Guise. This implied that religion was not the utmost important considerations since the conflicts were always drawn along religious lines.
Furthermore, even in the field or ideology we saw a similar fashion of oscillation according to political developments. Following the ascension of Henry IV, supporters of his Protestant movement changed the tone of their resistance theories from clamouring for a republican system to supporting the notions of a strong dynastic monarchy.
These brings us to the question of whether the French Religious Wars that had plague France for almost forty years and resulted in the death of thousands of French lives were truly about religion. At the end of the day, it appears that religion, though symptomatic of the wars, was only the justification for political infighting between the three Houses of Valois, Guise and Bourbon for the ultimate political authority of France. The French Religious Wars might have begun as a result of religion, but religion was not to play the most important role in the events that ensued, it was politics.
Lastly, as Richard Dunn posits, “the chief lesson of the French Religious Wars was a political one, that strongly centralized government was the only possible alternative to rebellion and social chaos.” (Dunn, 1970, 31)
References
Dunn, Richard S. 1970. The Age of Religious Wars: 1559-1689. New York: W.W. Norton & Company
Goosens, Aline. 2001. “Wars of Religion: The Examples of France, Spain and the Low Countries in the Sixteenth Century” in Wars, Peace and World Order in European History. eds Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser. pp.160-173. London: Routledge
Mentzer, Raymond A. 2000. “The French Wars of Religion” in The Reformation World. ed. Andrew Pettegree. pp.323-343. London: Routledge
Merriman, John. 1996. A History of Modern Europe: From the Renaissance to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton & Company
Showing posts with label Essay. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Essay. Show all posts
Sunday, April 20, 2008
Europeanization of French Foreign Policy in Africa
Abstract
Membership in the European Union has brought about profound effects in the national policies of member states. An inherently nationalistic aspect of politics with a state centric view of world politics, foreign policy cannot prevent these effects from materializing. This paper will now employ the categorization of Wong (2006) and the example of French foreign military policy as well as European-African relations to illustrate the process of Europeanization in Africa. In doing so, it seeks to provide a clear picture of actual application of Europeanization theory in real life situations. From here on, it provides a first step to the application of Europeanization in a broader sense of economics and other issues.
Introduction
From the outset, it is necessary to define the objectives of this paper. It is to illustrate the Europeanization of French foreign policy in terms of its military aspects, in the continent of Africa. “The notion of ‘foreign policy’ often carries with it the conceptual assumptions of the state centric view of world politics.” (Wong, 2006, 2) However, it is this paper’s objectives to point out that even in foreign policy, a nationalistic dimension of politics, a member state, in this case France, of the European Union (EU) cannot avoid the influence that their membership could possibly have on itself. More specifically, it is this paper’s objective to show the impact of EU membership and the extent of this impact on a France’s foreign military policy.
To contextualize this illustration, it is necessary to provide a setting in which we can more concretely examine the actual developments of France’s foreign military policy. For the purpose of this paper, I have chosen to study Africa in this context. It is simple to justify this. Africa, particularly North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, has had a long history of interaction with France. For the most part of the nineteenth and twentieth century, much of Africa remained under the French sphere of influence as its colonies. However, French interest in Africa did not end with the decolonization process in the fifties and sixties. As Utley (2002) posits, “major French interest in the region stems from the country’s past as a colonial power but it did not end with decolonization.” (Utley, 2002:129)
Since Africa provides such an interesting specimen, it will be best to conduct a thorough examination of the Europeanization of the French foreign policy in Africa. However, academic limitations dictates that this paper provide a more focused exploration of one aspect of the Franco-African interaction. Hence, the focus of this paper will be on the military aspect of French foreign policy in Africa since “the most overt aspect of France’s residual tie with Africa . . . was the application of defence and military agreements,” [sic] (Utley, 2002:130) which earned the former the name of the “gendarme of Africa” (Utley, 2002:130)
The study of the Europeanization of French foreign policy in Africa is worthy of note because there is a need to substantiate the study of Europeanization theories with concrete applications to real life situations. Thus this paper contributes to the discussion of the application of the Europeanization theory in explaining the effects of membership in the EU on French foreign policy, which Wong (2006) had previously illustrated extensively with regards to East Asia. By first examining the development of French foreign military policy in Africa and subsequently EU’s military policy in Africa, this paper will establish the causal link between the two and in consequence present a picture of convergence. Hence, this will prove the existence of the Europeanization process and also demonstrate the extent to which French foreign policy has been Europeanized.
Europeanization
“Europeanization is a relatively new, fashionable and ill-defined concept in the scholarly literature of European Studies/ International Relations” (Wong, 2006:6). Compared to Europeanization, “traditional foreign policy analysis focuses on the state as a unitary actor with given interests, understood mostly with material terms. However, this approach basically ignores the importance of norms, values or other social factors, such as culture and identity.” (Rieker, 2006:513) Amongst the many Europeanization scholars, Pernille Rieker, for example, looks at “two forms of Europeanization: adaptation and learning” (Rieker, 2006:514), as socialization processes and Wong classifies Europeanization into three schools: national adaptation, national projection and identity reconstruction (Wong, 2006). While the different definitions of Europeanization have similarities and differences, as well as strengths and weaknesses, it is not the aim of this paper to discuss which is better. Instead, it suffices to acknowledge that this paper will employ Wong’s three schools of Europeanization as its working definition because of its more encompassing range, which often incorporates the other scholars.
Since it is the working definition employed in this paper, it is necessary to briefly discuss here what Wong (2006) means by Europeanization. As previously mentioned, Wong classifies Europeanization into three schools of thought: national adaptation, national projection and identity construction. For him, national adaptation is a “top-down process in which the states is reactive, and where the state adapts and makes adjustment in its domestic politics and policy in compliance with the restraints and requirements of European institutions.” (Wong, 2006:8) In this aspect, Europeanization is most clearly seen in the economic realm, whereby the Euro zone, the common market, and various economic policies such as Common Competition Policy have shifted decision-making powers from the national governments to the European Commission. However, Wong also pointed out that other than economic policies, the national foreign policies of member states are under increasing pressure from the “cumulative weight of the aquis of EPC/ CFSP/ CESDP” (Wong, 2006:8), EU’s foreign policies, to converge.
The second school of Europeanization, national projection, works seemingly in opposition to the first school of national adaptation. As Wong puts it, the second school, “at first glance provides a countervailing antithesis to the national adaptation/ policy convergence school.” (Wong, 2006:9) For the second school, Europeanization is a state-centric concept that looks at the exportation of previously national policies “onto a larger European stage.” (Wong, 2006:9) Therefore, in this sense, Europeanization is a bottom-up process that serves to use the EU as a tool for advancing national interests.
The third school of Europeanization, identity reconstruction, is a constructivist argument that looks at EU as a socialization agent. Membership in the EU exposes member states to “sociological institutions” such as “unwritten rules, norms and practices” (Wong, 2006:10) as well as prolonged involvement in European policy-making. These exposures then serve to reorient government officials into acquiring both a common European identity as well as their national identity, resulting in the convergence of policies.
France, power and Africa
In addition to the previous section that broadly explained the working definition of Europeanization in this paper, this section will now go on to give a background summary of Franco-African relations. Franco-African relations are founded on the beliefs in the eyes of the French that France is a world power. The role of Africa in these beliefs is one of a supporting role. As John Chipman (1989) argues,
“ . . . for successive French republics continued French influence in Africa has been an essential aim. Accomplishment of this aim has been linked to maintaining the strength of the state, to assuring some measure of success in implicit or explicit geopolitical struggles, and to improving the image of French power on the world stage. The fact of overseas influence, particularly in Africa, has helped to sustain the idea that the values of the French republic were universal. The maintenance of different degrees of influence in Africa and the French capacity to preserve independent and unique ties on that continent has helped to bolster claims to great power status.” (Chipman, 1989:1)
To further substantiate his point, Chipman gave the two following examples. Firstly, French influence in North Africa gave “shape and substance to the idea that France was a European power with strengths on both sides of the Mediterranean.” (Chipman, 1989:2) By extending its influence beyond Europe, France was able to demonstrate its strength. This is because “for a power to retain its position in international society, it must undertake a degree of activity which has implications for those living beyond its borders.” (Chipman, 1989:24)
Secondly, French power in Africa was also linked to French power in Europe. As Chipman postulates, “the power of the French state in Europe was still seen by some as giving it regional power in Africa and the Mediterranean.” (Chipman, 1989:7) This implies that the strength of France in Europe and in Africa was directly related. The stronger France was in Europe, the stronger it was in Africa and vice versa. Thus Africa became a gauge of French power.
Other than the ideological link between French power and Africa, it is also necessary to know the actual historical French activities in Africa, so as to provide a context for understanding French policy in Africa. “The French have had a long association with Africa, which dates back (in the case of Senegal) at least to the seventeenth century.” (Chipman, 1989:1) More recently, French colonialism in the nineteenth and twentieth century resulted in the bringing of North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, or Black Africa, under French influence. In this period, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco were among the acquisitions to come under French influence, which “came to form a coherent geographical whole whose links with France were immensely important for those who wished to nurture the image of a ‘Greater France’.” (Chipman, 1989:2)
Compared to its northern neighbours, Black Africa, as explained by Chipman (1989), was originally to have less importance. However, it came to have more relevance as France participated in the “Scramble of Africa” in a bid to increase her influence as well as deprive others of theirs in the region. In effect, Black Africa’s importance to France was most highlighted during the two World Wars as it contributed to the French war efforts, consequently increasing its standing within France.
From this section, we have come to understand briefly Franco-African in the light of the idea of French power. Both North Africa and Black Africa’s importance stemmed from their part in playing to the notion of French power since Chipman (1989) also postulated that neither of the two had any real economic consequences for France.
France’s foreign military policy in Africa since decolonization
This section will now proceed to continue the examination of French military involvement in Africa from the time of decolonization till present day. It is this section that will subsequently provide the materials that will be used in comparison with EU’s policy in Africa to determine convergence between the two. The policies of post-decolonization France would be appropriate because it was also around the same time that France became a member of EU as a member of the founding six.
After decolonization, “French leaders, and particularly de Gaulle saw in . . . Africa the one area where France’s military power could still be relevant.” (Chipman, 1989:115) Hence, to continue having its influence overseas and at the same time maintain its great power status, France started signing and concluding defense as well as military assistance agreements with African states. In the two decades spanning the sixties and seventies, France signed around thirty such agreements. (Chipman, 1989)
Other than for the reason of maintaining French power, in the period after the war, the French foreign policy in part was marked by considerations of Cold War tensions, which came to be the defining feature of external politics. With Europe divided into two camps between the Western democratic countries and the Eastern communist countries under Soviet leadership, Africa because of its close proximity just at the south of Europe, was the next possible battleground for proxy conflicts. Therefore, while “France’s military power in . . . Africa has only occasionally been related to general military strategic aims . . . it has certainly made it very difficult for the Soviet Union to establish herself in West and Central Africa.” In the same manner, just like it was in the Scramble for Africa, France presence in the former denied the other powers of their presence. This policy was successful as can be seen that “while the USSR was able to exploit the vacuum created by Portugal’s withdrawal from southern Africa in 1975, she has not sought directly to oppose Western influence when it was well established.” (Chipman, 1989:166)
Following the end of the Cold War in the nineties, French foreign military policy in Africa faced another important impetus for change. “The reasons for this were varied, encompassing political, economic and military factors, and were inextricably linked to the reorientation and adaptation of France’s external policy to the new realities of the post-Cold War era.” (Utley, 2002:131) Up to this point, “it would be difficult to find another region in the world in which the presence and the determining influence of a previous colonial power remains so extensive and so lasting.” (Brüne, 1994:45) Statistically speaking, up till 1994, there were still around “135000 French people living in Africa . . . where France keeps permanent military bases” and “there are about 10000 French soldiers still stationed in the sub-Saharan Africa where the Grande Nation has intervened militarily – both openly and covertly.” [sic] (Brüne, 1994:45)
However all these were changing as France entered the new post-Cold War era. One of the first examples of change was the turn towards multilateralism and the link between humanitarian goals with military intervention. Rwanda, one of the countries that France had signed a military agreement with in 1975, had fallen in a civil war in 1994. In the genocide that ensued, French forces on the ground were defeated, resulting in the consideration of further French actions. “Although the government was divided, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur found a compromise: French military invention would be authorized, but only under strict conditions. The operation had to be explicitly sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council; it was to be of limited duration; and it was to have primarily humanitarian goals” (Utley, 2002: 132) This event displayed a marked change of directions for the French. Autonomy in foreign affairs, previously so precious to France, gave way to multilateralism, at least in terms of decision-making, in terms of UN sanctions. The aim of the operation was also important as a demonstration of French power was no longer the primary reason for intervention but rather, as Utley (2002) pointed out, the operation was to have primary humanitarian goals.
To add on to that, continuously poor economic showings have resulted in a need to tighten the purse strings. On top of that, “France struggled to meet the economic convergence criteria for the single European currency,” (Utley, 2002: 135) meaning that defense budget had to be reduced and more importantly, the stationing of troops in Africa became unsustainable. In addition, President Chirac’s decision in 1996 to reorganize the military by replacing a conscripted army with a “wholly professional armed forces” (Utley, 2002, 134) also made the stationing of troops in Africa more and more difficult. The conscripted French army was not suitable for the types of military operations that France would be involved in while the newly reformed professional forces would. “The problem, however, was that it was hard to develop a state-of-the-art military dependent on expensive technologies at a time of declining budget, which made France’s cooperation in a system of European defense all the more important.” (Kramer, 2002:63) Consequently there was a decrease in the importance of Africa. In its place was the increasing focus towards Europe.
Here we see a direct consequence on the French foreign military policy as a result of the indirect action of France’s participation in the Euro zone. Although the EU did not have a directive that required France to reduce its military involvement in Africa, or rather it could not since at this point of time as it did not have a coherent military nor external policy, France nevertheless had to do so because of the obligations it had under as a member of EU to revise its economy in the impending implementation of the Euro. These led to a significant change in French foreign military policy in terms of the reduction in quantitative figure of French troops in Africa as well as the qualitative change in the agreements between France and its African partners from defense agreements to cooperation agreements. (Utley, 2002) The result is a revision of the agreements made between France and its African partners,
“France would no longer take the primary role in ensuring relative stability in Africa, even on behalf of its former colonies. Troops number would fall, and bases would close. Defence agreements and military cooperation would change – in most cases would diminish. The focus of France’s security commitment in Africa would increasingly be emphasize on multilateral terms, with the onus on African states to develop regional approaches to stability, security and conflict resolution.” (Utley, 2002:136)
From here, we can also see a development of France’s foreign military policy in Africa calling for increased regionalism and responsibility on the part of the Africans. This is also linked to the previous point on multilateralism. France was gradually looking at multilateralism, both from the position of giver, the UN and EU, and receiver, the African states, of military assistance. Multilateralism nonetheless would not result in a reduction of French influence as it would not “prevent an interpretation of future European security in a way that would devolve to individual member-states substantial prerogatives in their traditional areas of influence,” (Bowen, 2005:96) as will be demonstrated later.
European military policy in Africa
EU’s African policy is split into two different regional groupings. Northern African states such Algeria and Tunisia falls under the Mediterranean grouping, while other states such as Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania falls under African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states grouping. “However, at the beginning of the new millennium, the EU launched a new dialogue with Africa to build a strategic partnership with the entire continent which would strengthen existing measures.” (SCADPlus, 2008) Even so, EU’s African policy is “not clear-cut and may lack total consistency and coherence, largely because policy towards Africa has been changing significantly since the end of the Cold War, and is still in a state of flux.” (Olsen, 2004: 425) Despite this, this paper will attempt to trace out the military aspects of the African policy of the EU. In doing so, much of the focus will be on the sub-Saharan Africa since the majority of the military interventions on the continent is in this area.
A close examination of the prevailing literature on EU and African relations would point towards a great emphasis placed on economic development as well as aid and assistance. These were also the focus of the four Lomé Conventions concluded between the ACP countries and the EU. However, Olsen (2004) posits that with the end of the Cold War, the objectives of the EU have change in two main ways,
First, the aims of the European African policy widened from the original goal of promoting economic and social development increasingly towards giving priority to the promotion of stability, security and democracy. Second, the low priority of the region manifested itself very clearly in the continuous reduction in the aid transfers from the EC/ EU during the 1990s.” (Olsen, 2004:426)
One of the reasons for these changes was the frustration with the EU with the “lack of positive results after so many years of development assistance to Africa.” (Olsen, 2004, 429) In addition, there was also the recognition with EU that the three objectives of stability, security and democracy are needed as a foundation to cater for real growth and development.
Interestingly, as mentioned in the previous section, this period was also the same time that France recognized a limit on its ability to continuously sustain a credible military force in Africa. France’s downsizing of its military force and military establishments in Africa and shift towards a “long-term European focus to its external policies, including defence” [sic] (Utley, 2002:134) coincided with EU’s shift in focus towards stability and security in Africa. This paper therefore postulates that, there was a displacement of French objectives in Africa from the national stage to the European stage. This bottom-up Europeanization process saw France use the EU as a tool to carry out and continue having influence in Africa at a time when France could no longer by herself sustain military interventions and operations in the continent.
To facilitate this change of objectives in the European policy on Africa, EU needed real military capabilities and this translated itself into the European discourse calling for military capabilities that match its economic clout and international standing. As Deighton (2002) commented, “a state of military dependence on others should not be compatible with the dignity of nations like those in Western Europe, which should seek to be come more militarily self sufficient in their homeland defence and security.” (Deighton, 2002:721) Notably, in 1998, the leaders of France and Britain came together and called for “EU itself to acquire the capacity for autonomous action backed by credible military forces” (Howorth and Keeler, 2003:10) in the St. Malo’s Declaration. The result is the formation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whose key roles included the Petersberg Tasks of “humanitarian and rescue task, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” (Lindstrom, 2007:1)
It would then come as no surprise that ESDP’s first operation outside Europe happened in Africa. Operation Artemis in Congo involved France as the “framework nation . . . meaning it deployed most of the troops and the commander.” (Olsen, 2004:432) Even though Operation Artemis was a EU operation, France nevertheless was the leading country. By using the EU as a platform, France was able to direct the operation, achieve international recognition, since Artemis was also UN-sanctioned, as well as utilized EU resources in an African state that was its former colony and with which it had military agreements.
Conclusion
It is the objective of this paper to show the Europeanization of French foreign military policy in Africa. It has done so by first defining Europeanization and understanding the historical context of the subject matter at hand. Europeanization in this case is the categorization of Wong (2006) in which there appeared three schools of thought depending on the direction of influence.
This paper has attempted to outline the developments in the military policy of both France and EU in Africa, in doing so it highlighted the reasons for change as well as the changes that took place. I have shown that developments in French policy and EU policy are intrinsically linked and one affects the other. Hence it demonstrated the process of Europeanization in both the national and regional level.
The section on France’s military policy has clearly demonstrated a shift in focus due to the former’s membership in EU. Not only did participation in the Economic Monetary Union indirectly force it to reexamine its military policy, there was also a shift in its international conduct from unilateral to multilateralism, which was often linked with EU. Therefore, they presented evidences of the third school of Europeanization of learning and adaptation. On the other hand, the examination on the European Union’s military policy showed clearly a shift of objectives as well as the creation of a concrete ESDP. I postulate that this is an evidence of bottom-up Europeanization, whereby a member state, in this case France, uses the EU as a tool to project national interest that it could by itself no longer keep up.
In itself, this paper only provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate of Europeanization. However, it also serves as a good starting point in further exploring the evolution of national policies in the face of EU membership. It is my wish that this work represents a stepping-stone for others to look at the effects of the Europeanization process with regards to other areas of French foreign policy in Africa.
Bibliography
Blunden, Magaret. 2000. “France” in The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States. eds Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman. Pp. 2-43. Manchester: Manchester University Press
Bowen, Norman. 2005. “Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Regionalism: The French Foreign Policy Discourse” Mediterranean Quarterly Winter 2005. Pp. 94-116
Brüne, Stefan. 1994. “Under Pressure for Reform: French Policies South of the Sahara” in Africa and Europe: Relations of Two Continents in Transition. eds. Stefan Brüne et al. Pp.45-58. Münster: Lit
Chipman, John. 1989. French Power in Africa. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Deighton, Anne. 2002. “The European Security and Defence Policy”. Journal of Common Market Studies 40-4. Pp. 719-741
Howorth, Jolyon and Keeler, John T.S. 2003. “The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy” in Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy. eds. Howorth, Jolyon and Keeler, John T.S. Pp. 3-24. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kramer, Steven P. 2002. “French Foreign Policy: The Wager on Europe” in Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior. eds. Ryan K. Beasley et al. Pp.49-71. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press
Krause, Alexandra. 2003. “The European Union’s Africa Policy: The Commission as Policy Entrepreneur in the CFSP” European Foreign Affairs Review 8, Pp. 221-237
Lindstrom, Gustav. 2007. “The Headline Goal”. Institute for Security Studies.
Olsen, Gorm Rye. 2004. “Challenges to Traditional Policy Options, Opportunities for New Choices: The African Policy of the EU”. The Round Table. 93-375. Pp. 425-436
Rieker, Pernille. 2006. “From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards the Europeanization of French Foreign and Security Policy?” Security Dialogue. 37. Pp. 509-528
SCADPlus. 2008. “EU-Africa Partnership” on http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12106.htm. Accessed 10 April 2008
Utley, Rachel. 2002. “Not to do less but to do better: French military policy in Africa”. International Affairs. 78-1. Pp. 129-146
Wong, Reuben Y. 2006. The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
Membership in the European Union has brought about profound effects in the national policies of member states. An inherently nationalistic aspect of politics with a state centric view of world politics, foreign policy cannot prevent these effects from materializing. This paper will now employ the categorization of Wong (2006) and the example of French foreign military policy as well as European-African relations to illustrate the process of Europeanization in Africa. In doing so, it seeks to provide a clear picture of actual application of Europeanization theory in real life situations. From here on, it provides a first step to the application of Europeanization in a broader sense of economics and other issues.
Introduction
From the outset, it is necessary to define the objectives of this paper. It is to illustrate the Europeanization of French foreign policy in terms of its military aspects, in the continent of Africa. “The notion of ‘foreign policy’ often carries with it the conceptual assumptions of the state centric view of world politics.” (Wong, 2006, 2) However, it is this paper’s objectives to point out that even in foreign policy, a nationalistic dimension of politics, a member state, in this case France, of the European Union (EU) cannot avoid the influence that their membership could possibly have on itself. More specifically, it is this paper’s objective to show the impact of EU membership and the extent of this impact on a France’s foreign military policy.
To contextualize this illustration, it is necessary to provide a setting in which we can more concretely examine the actual developments of France’s foreign military policy. For the purpose of this paper, I have chosen to study Africa in this context. It is simple to justify this. Africa, particularly North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, has had a long history of interaction with France. For the most part of the nineteenth and twentieth century, much of Africa remained under the French sphere of influence as its colonies. However, French interest in Africa did not end with the decolonization process in the fifties and sixties. As Utley (2002) posits, “major French interest in the region stems from the country’s past as a colonial power but it did not end with decolonization.” (Utley, 2002:129)
Since Africa provides such an interesting specimen, it will be best to conduct a thorough examination of the Europeanization of the French foreign policy in Africa. However, academic limitations dictates that this paper provide a more focused exploration of one aspect of the Franco-African interaction. Hence, the focus of this paper will be on the military aspect of French foreign policy in Africa since “the most overt aspect of France’s residual tie with Africa . . . was the application of defence and military agreements,” [sic] (Utley, 2002:130) which earned the former the name of the “gendarme of Africa” (Utley, 2002:130)
The study of the Europeanization of French foreign policy in Africa is worthy of note because there is a need to substantiate the study of Europeanization theories with concrete applications to real life situations. Thus this paper contributes to the discussion of the application of the Europeanization theory in explaining the effects of membership in the EU on French foreign policy, which Wong (2006) had previously illustrated extensively with regards to East Asia. By first examining the development of French foreign military policy in Africa and subsequently EU’s military policy in Africa, this paper will establish the causal link between the two and in consequence present a picture of convergence. Hence, this will prove the existence of the Europeanization process and also demonstrate the extent to which French foreign policy has been Europeanized.
Europeanization
“Europeanization is a relatively new, fashionable and ill-defined concept in the scholarly literature of European Studies/ International Relations” (Wong, 2006:6). Compared to Europeanization, “traditional foreign policy analysis focuses on the state as a unitary actor with given interests, understood mostly with material terms. However, this approach basically ignores the importance of norms, values or other social factors, such as culture and identity.” (Rieker, 2006:513) Amongst the many Europeanization scholars, Pernille Rieker, for example, looks at “two forms of Europeanization: adaptation and learning” (Rieker, 2006:514), as socialization processes and Wong classifies Europeanization into three schools: national adaptation, national projection and identity reconstruction (Wong, 2006). While the different definitions of Europeanization have similarities and differences, as well as strengths and weaknesses, it is not the aim of this paper to discuss which is better. Instead, it suffices to acknowledge that this paper will employ Wong’s three schools of Europeanization as its working definition because of its more encompassing range, which often incorporates the other scholars.
Since it is the working definition employed in this paper, it is necessary to briefly discuss here what Wong (2006) means by Europeanization. As previously mentioned, Wong classifies Europeanization into three schools of thought: national adaptation, national projection and identity construction. For him, national adaptation is a “top-down process in which the states is reactive, and where the state adapts and makes adjustment in its domestic politics and policy in compliance with the restraints and requirements of European institutions.” (Wong, 2006:8) In this aspect, Europeanization is most clearly seen in the economic realm, whereby the Euro zone, the common market, and various economic policies such as Common Competition Policy have shifted decision-making powers from the national governments to the European Commission. However, Wong also pointed out that other than economic policies, the national foreign policies of member states are under increasing pressure from the “cumulative weight of the aquis of EPC/ CFSP/ CESDP” (Wong, 2006:8), EU’s foreign policies, to converge.
The second school of Europeanization, national projection, works seemingly in opposition to the first school of national adaptation. As Wong puts it, the second school, “at first glance provides a countervailing antithesis to the national adaptation/ policy convergence school.” (Wong, 2006:9) For the second school, Europeanization is a state-centric concept that looks at the exportation of previously national policies “onto a larger European stage.” (Wong, 2006:9) Therefore, in this sense, Europeanization is a bottom-up process that serves to use the EU as a tool for advancing national interests.
The third school of Europeanization, identity reconstruction, is a constructivist argument that looks at EU as a socialization agent. Membership in the EU exposes member states to “sociological institutions” such as “unwritten rules, norms and practices” (Wong, 2006:10) as well as prolonged involvement in European policy-making. These exposures then serve to reorient government officials into acquiring both a common European identity as well as their national identity, resulting in the convergence of policies.
France, power and Africa
In addition to the previous section that broadly explained the working definition of Europeanization in this paper, this section will now go on to give a background summary of Franco-African relations. Franco-African relations are founded on the beliefs in the eyes of the French that France is a world power. The role of Africa in these beliefs is one of a supporting role. As John Chipman (1989) argues,
“ . . . for successive French republics continued French influence in Africa has been an essential aim. Accomplishment of this aim has been linked to maintaining the strength of the state, to assuring some measure of success in implicit or explicit geopolitical struggles, and to improving the image of French power on the world stage. The fact of overseas influence, particularly in Africa, has helped to sustain the idea that the values of the French republic were universal. The maintenance of different degrees of influence in Africa and the French capacity to preserve independent and unique ties on that continent has helped to bolster claims to great power status.” (Chipman, 1989:1)
To further substantiate his point, Chipman gave the two following examples. Firstly, French influence in North Africa gave “shape and substance to the idea that France was a European power with strengths on both sides of the Mediterranean.” (Chipman, 1989:2) By extending its influence beyond Europe, France was able to demonstrate its strength. This is because “for a power to retain its position in international society, it must undertake a degree of activity which has implications for those living beyond its borders.” (Chipman, 1989:24)
Secondly, French power in Africa was also linked to French power in Europe. As Chipman postulates, “the power of the French state in Europe was still seen by some as giving it regional power in Africa and the Mediterranean.” (Chipman, 1989:7) This implies that the strength of France in Europe and in Africa was directly related. The stronger France was in Europe, the stronger it was in Africa and vice versa. Thus Africa became a gauge of French power.
Other than the ideological link between French power and Africa, it is also necessary to know the actual historical French activities in Africa, so as to provide a context for understanding French policy in Africa. “The French have had a long association with Africa, which dates back (in the case of Senegal) at least to the seventeenth century.” (Chipman, 1989:1) More recently, French colonialism in the nineteenth and twentieth century resulted in the bringing of North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, or Black Africa, under French influence. In this period, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco were among the acquisitions to come under French influence, which “came to form a coherent geographical whole whose links with France were immensely important for those who wished to nurture the image of a ‘Greater France’.” (Chipman, 1989:2)
Compared to its northern neighbours, Black Africa, as explained by Chipman (1989), was originally to have less importance. However, it came to have more relevance as France participated in the “Scramble of Africa” in a bid to increase her influence as well as deprive others of theirs in the region. In effect, Black Africa’s importance to France was most highlighted during the two World Wars as it contributed to the French war efforts, consequently increasing its standing within France.
From this section, we have come to understand briefly Franco-African in the light of the idea of French power. Both North Africa and Black Africa’s importance stemmed from their part in playing to the notion of French power since Chipman (1989) also postulated that neither of the two had any real economic consequences for France.
France’s foreign military policy in Africa since decolonization
This section will now proceed to continue the examination of French military involvement in Africa from the time of decolonization till present day. It is this section that will subsequently provide the materials that will be used in comparison with EU’s policy in Africa to determine convergence between the two. The policies of post-decolonization France would be appropriate because it was also around the same time that France became a member of EU as a member of the founding six.
After decolonization, “French leaders, and particularly de Gaulle saw in . . . Africa the one area where France’s military power could still be relevant.” (Chipman, 1989:115) Hence, to continue having its influence overseas and at the same time maintain its great power status, France started signing and concluding defense as well as military assistance agreements with African states. In the two decades spanning the sixties and seventies, France signed around thirty such agreements. (Chipman, 1989)
Other than for the reason of maintaining French power, in the period after the war, the French foreign policy in part was marked by considerations of Cold War tensions, which came to be the defining feature of external politics. With Europe divided into two camps between the Western democratic countries and the Eastern communist countries under Soviet leadership, Africa because of its close proximity just at the south of Europe, was the next possible battleground for proxy conflicts. Therefore, while “France’s military power in . . . Africa has only occasionally been related to general military strategic aims . . . it has certainly made it very difficult for the Soviet Union to establish herself in West and Central Africa.” In the same manner, just like it was in the Scramble for Africa, France presence in the former denied the other powers of their presence. This policy was successful as can be seen that “while the USSR was able to exploit the vacuum created by Portugal’s withdrawal from southern Africa in 1975, she has not sought directly to oppose Western influence when it was well established.” (Chipman, 1989:166)
Following the end of the Cold War in the nineties, French foreign military policy in Africa faced another important impetus for change. “The reasons for this were varied, encompassing political, economic and military factors, and were inextricably linked to the reorientation and adaptation of France’s external policy to the new realities of the post-Cold War era.” (Utley, 2002:131) Up to this point, “it would be difficult to find another region in the world in which the presence and the determining influence of a previous colonial power remains so extensive and so lasting.” (Brüne, 1994:45) Statistically speaking, up till 1994, there were still around “135000 French people living in Africa . . . where France keeps permanent military bases” and “there are about 10000 French soldiers still stationed in the sub-Saharan Africa where the Grande Nation has intervened militarily – both openly and covertly.” [sic] (Brüne, 1994:45)
However all these were changing as France entered the new post-Cold War era. One of the first examples of change was the turn towards multilateralism and the link between humanitarian goals with military intervention. Rwanda, one of the countries that France had signed a military agreement with in 1975, had fallen in a civil war in 1994. In the genocide that ensued, French forces on the ground were defeated, resulting in the consideration of further French actions. “Although the government was divided, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur found a compromise: French military invention would be authorized, but only under strict conditions. The operation had to be explicitly sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council; it was to be of limited duration; and it was to have primarily humanitarian goals” (Utley, 2002: 132) This event displayed a marked change of directions for the French. Autonomy in foreign affairs, previously so precious to France, gave way to multilateralism, at least in terms of decision-making, in terms of UN sanctions. The aim of the operation was also important as a demonstration of French power was no longer the primary reason for intervention but rather, as Utley (2002) pointed out, the operation was to have primary humanitarian goals.
To add on to that, continuously poor economic showings have resulted in a need to tighten the purse strings. On top of that, “France struggled to meet the economic convergence criteria for the single European currency,” (Utley, 2002: 135) meaning that defense budget had to be reduced and more importantly, the stationing of troops in Africa became unsustainable. In addition, President Chirac’s decision in 1996 to reorganize the military by replacing a conscripted army with a “wholly professional armed forces” (Utley, 2002, 134) also made the stationing of troops in Africa more and more difficult. The conscripted French army was not suitable for the types of military operations that France would be involved in while the newly reformed professional forces would. “The problem, however, was that it was hard to develop a state-of-the-art military dependent on expensive technologies at a time of declining budget, which made France’s cooperation in a system of European defense all the more important.” (Kramer, 2002:63) Consequently there was a decrease in the importance of Africa. In its place was the increasing focus towards Europe.
Here we see a direct consequence on the French foreign military policy as a result of the indirect action of France’s participation in the Euro zone. Although the EU did not have a directive that required France to reduce its military involvement in Africa, or rather it could not since at this point of time as it did not have a coherent military nor external policy, France nevertheless had to do so because of the obligations it had under as a member of EU to revise its economy in the impending implementation of the Euro. These led to a significant change in French foreign military policy in terms of the reduction in quantitative figure of French troops in Africa as well as the qualitative change in the agreements between France and its African partners from defense agreements to cooperation agreements. (Utley, 2002) The result is a revision of the agreements made between France and its African partners,
“France would no longer take the primary role in ensuring relative stability in Africa, even on behalf of its former colonies. Troops number would fall, and bases would close. Defence agreements and military cooperation would change – in most cases would diminish. The focus of France’s security commitment in Africa would increasingly be emphasize on multilateral terms, with the onus on African states to develop regional approaches to stability, security and conflict resolution.” (Utley, 2002:136)
From here, we can also see a development of France’s foreign military policy in Africa calling for increased regionalism and responsibility on the part of the Africans. This is also linked to the previous point on multilateralism. France was gradually looking at multilateralism, both from the position of giver, the UN and EU, and receiver, the African states, of military assistance. Multilateralism nonetheless would not result in a reduction of French influence as it would not “prevent an interpretation of future European security in a way that would devolve to individual member-states substantial prerogatives in their traditional areas of influence,” (Bowen, 2005:96) as will be demonstrated later.
European military policy in Africa
EU’s African policy is split into two different regional groupings. Northern African states such Algeria and Tunisia falls under the Mediterranean grouping, while other states such as Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania falls under African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states grouping. “However, at the beginning of the new millennium, the EU launched a new dialogue with Africa to build a strategic partnership with the entire continent which would strengthen existing measures.” (SCADPlus, 2008) Even so, EU’s African policy is “not clear-cut and may lack total consistency and coherence, largely because policy towards Africa has been changing significantly since the end of the Cold War, and is still in a state of flux.” (Olsen, 2004: 425) Despite this, this paper will attempt to trace out the military aspects of the African policy of the EU. In doing so, much of the focus will be on the sub-Saharan Africa since the majority of the military interventions on the continent is in this area.
A close examination of the prevailing literature on EU and African relations would point towards a great emphasis placed on economic development as well as aid and assistance. These were also the focus of the four Lomé Conventions concluded between the ACP countries and the EU. However, Olsen (2004) posits that with the end of the Cold War, the objectives of the EU have change in two main ways,
First, the aims of the European African policy widened from the original goal of promoting economic and social development increasingly towards giving priority to the promotion of stability, security and democracy. Second, the low priority of the region manifested itself very clearly in the continuous reduction in the aid transfers from the EC/ EU during the 1990s.” (Olsen, 2004:426)
One of the reasons for these changes was the frustration with the EU with the “lack of positive results after so many years of development assistance to Africa.” (Olsen, 2004, 429) In addition, there was also the recognition with EU that the three objectives of stability, security and democracy are needed as a foundation to cater for real growth and development.
Interestingly, as mentioned in the previous section, this period was also the same time that France recognized a limit on its ability to continuously sustain a credible military force in Africa. France’s downsizing of its military force and military establishments in Africa and shift towards a “long-term European focus to its external policies, including defence” [sic] (Utley, 2002:134) coincided with EU’s shift in focus towards stability and security in Africa. This paper therefore postulates that, there was a displacement of French objectives in Africa from the national stage to the European stage. This bottom-up Europeanization process saw France use the EU as a tool to carry out and continue having influence in Africa at a time when France could no longer by herself sustain military interventions and operations in the continent.
To facilitate this change of objectives in the European policy on Africa, EU needed real military capabilities and this translated itself into the European discourse calling for military capabilities that match its economic clout and international standing. As Deighton (2002) commented, “a state of military dependence on others should not be compatible with the dignity of nations like those in Western Europe, which should seek to be come more militarily self sufficient in their homeland defence and security.” (Deighton, 2002:721) Notably, in 1998, the leaders of France and Britain came together and called for “EU itself to acquire the capacity for autonomous action backed by credible military forces” (Howorth and Keeler, 2003:10) in the St. Malo’s Declaration. The result is the formation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whose key roles included the Petersberg Tasks of “humanitarian and rescue task, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” (Lindstrom, 2007:1)
It would then come as no surprise that ESDP’s first operation outside Europe happened in Africa. Operation Artemis in Congo involved France as the “framework nation . . . meaning it deployed most of the troops and the commander.” (Olsen, 2004:432) Even though Operation Artemis was a EU operation, France nevertheless was the leading country. By using the EU as a platform, France was able to direct the operation, achieve international recognition, since Artemis was also UN-sanctioned, as well as utilized EU resources in an African state that was its former colony and with which it had military agreements.
Conclusion
It is the objective of this paper to show the Europeanization of French foreign military policy in Africa. It has done so by first defining Europeanization and understanding the historical context of the subject matter at hand. Europeanization in this case is the categorization of Wong (2006) in which there appeared three schools of thought depending on the direction of influence.
This paper has attempted to outline the developments in the military policy of both France and EU in Africa, in doing so it highlighted the reasons for change as well as the changes that took place. I have shown that developments in French policy and EU policy are intrinsically linked and one affects the other. Hence it demonstrated the process of Europeanization in both the national and regional level.
The section on France’s military policy has clearly demonstrated a shift in focus due to the former’s membership in EU. Not only did participation in the Economic Monetary Union indirectly force it to reexamine its military policy, there was also a shift in its international conduct from unilateral to multilateralism, which was often linked with EU. Therefore, they presented evidences of the third school of Europeanization of learning and adaptation. On the other hand, the examination on the European Union’s military policy showed clearly a shift of objectives as well as the creation of a concrete ESDP. I postulate that this is an evidence of bottom-up Europeanization, whereby a member state, in this case France, uses the EU as a tool to project national interest that it could by itself no longer keep up.
In itself, this paper only provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate of Europeanization. However, it also serves as a good starting point in further exploring the evolution of national policies in the face of EU membership. It is my wish that this work represents a stepping-stone for others to look at the effects of the Europeanization process with regards to other areas of French foreign policy in Africa.
Bibliography
Blunden, Magaret. 2000. “France” in The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States. eds Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman. Pp. 2-43. Manchester: Manchester University Press
Bowen, Norman. 2005. “Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Regionalism: The French Foreign Policy Discourse” Mediterranean Quarterly Winter 2005. Pp. 94-116
Brüne, Stefan. 1994. “Under Pressure for Reform: French Policies South of the Sahara” in Africa and Europe: Relations of Two Continents in Transition. eds. Stefan Brüne et al. Pp.45-58. Münster: Lit
Chipman, John. 1989. French Power in Africa. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Deighton, Anne. 2002. “The European Security and Defence Policy”. Journal of Common Market Studies 40-4. Pp. 719-741
Howorth, Jolyon and Keeler, John T.S. 2003. “The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy” in Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy. eds. Howorth, Jolyon and Keeler, John T.S. Pp. 3-24. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kramer, Steven P. 2002. “French Foreign Policy: The Wager on Europe” in Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior. eds. Ryan K. Beasley et al. Pp.49-71. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press
Krause, Alexandra. 2003. “The European Union’s Africa Policy: The Commission as Policy Entrepreneur in the CFSP” European Foreign Affairs Review 8, Pp. 221-237
Lindstrom, Gustav. 2007. “The Headline Goal”. Institute for Security Studies.
Olsen, Gorm Rye. 2004. “Challenges to Traditional Policy Options, Opportunities for New Choices: The African Policy of the EU”. The Round Table. 93-375. Pp. 425-436
Rieker, Pernille. 2006. “From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards the Europeanization of French Foreign and Security Policy?” Security Dialogue. 37. Pp. 509-528
SCADPlus. 2008. “EU-Africa Partnership” on http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12106.htm. Accessed 10 April 2008
Utley, Rachel. 2002. “Not to do less but to do better: French military policy in Africa”. International Affairs. 78-1. Pp. 129-146
Wong, Reuben Y. 2006. The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
Monday, March 31, 2008
A comparison of Max Weber and Carl Schmitt
Introduction
In their essays “Politics as a Vocation” and “The Concept of the Political”, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt respectively shed light on what they conceive as constituting a political life. In this paper, I will attempt to compare and contrast their conceptions, drawing areas of similarities as well as highlighting the differences found in their writings. This is achieved in three parts. The first part is exploring and outlining how Schmitt defines the political in his “The Concept of the Political”. For the second part, the attention turns to Weber, as I will place his “Politics as a Vocation” under the same form of examination. The first two parts are necessary because a comparison between the two writers cannot be accomplished without first understanding their works. Subsequently in the third but no less important part, I will attempt to carry out the comparison central to this paper.
I. The Concept of the Political
The concept of the political is, in Schmitt’s view, an important concept that needs to be clarified, as it is necessary for the understanding of the state, since “the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political” and is “incomprehensible when the nature of the political is misunderstood.” Even so, Schmitt believes that despite its importance, the definition of the political has seldom been clear and has often been employed in antitheses without giving it a specific understanding. For him, such a treatment of the political is only “justifiable” when the state “possesses the monopoly on politics” and he proceeds to give examples of the times when such conditions are available, in the eighteenth century and Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
This condition ceased to exist in the twentieth century, a time that Schmitt terms as the “total state twentieth” where “the equation state = politics becomes erroneous and deceptive” . In such a time, the state is no longer “distinct from society and higher from it” but the latter has “itself integrated into the state” and the state “no longer knows anything absolutely non-political” . Since the condition for a vague definition of the political is no longer present, it can be implied that a specific definition is required. This “definition of the political can be obtained by discovering and defining the specifically political categories” and it must “rest on its own ultimate distinctions” . This distinction, when reduced to its simplest and most empirical form, is for Schmitt, “that between friend and enemy.”
Since it is the most empirical form, the distinction of friend and enemy is not founded upon, nor motivated by other antitheses. As Schmitt puts it:
“The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation. It can exist theoretically and practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon those moral, aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions.”
This distinction denotes the presence of “the other” whose very nature is in a “specially intense way, existentially different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.” In turn, in the most extreme case, the conflicts call for war to be waged against the enemy and war, in Schmitt’s understanding, is “to be understood in its existential sense” , which is to say the physical killing of human beings. It is important to note here that the political does not desire war, or necessary lead to war. However, war as a possibility cannot be denied. Schmitt also pointed out, “The definition of the political suggested here neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism” and “war is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics.” Its presence as a possibility, however, “creates a specifically political behaviour.”
Having defined the political, the friend-enemy distinction, as well as highlighted its result in the most extreme case, war, Schmitt also singles out the people that can make such a distinction. He explains that it is the people as a whole who make this friend-enemy distinction. The enemy, according to Schmitt, is “not the private adversary” of one individual. The enemy is instead the “public enemy” of the entire “collectivity of people” . This implies that the enemy cannot be determined by one person but has to be regarded as such by the whole group. To add on to that, since it is the collectivity of people that decides who is the enemy, it is by extension that only the people directly involved and no other outsiders who can determine the friend-enemy distinction. “Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict.” In this sense, the distinction is autonomous.
In essence, the political, for Schmitt, is the distinction of friend and enemy, made only possible by an entity of people against another entity, without the judgement of outsiders, and the enmity between the two would in the most intense situation lead to the existential killing of one another.
II. Politics as a Vocation
From the outset, Max Weber establishes the perimeter of his discussion of politics as “the leadership, or the influencing of the leadership of a political association” , in other words, a state. Furthermore, Weber defines the state by its “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” . Hence politics can be deduced to be for Weber “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power either among states or among groups within a state” , brought about by the right to use violence. This right to violence is in turn legitimised in three ways, namely “traditional,” “charismatic,” and “legal” and it is the “charismatic”, that according to Weber we find the calling of politics due to its focus on the individual.
In support of the sustenance of power for the individual charismatic political leader, Weber postulates an “organised domination”, which “requires controls of the personal executive staff and the material implements of administration” needed as rewards for the followers of the charismatic leader. It is in the service of the charismatic leaders, among his followers, that one finds the “professional politicians” who make politics their vocation.
In order to make politics a vocation, for Weber, one “either lives for” or “lives off politics” . In basic terms, in living for politics, politics is an end in itself, while in living off politics, politics is a means to an end, namely, the end being economics well being. However, Weber says that the two are not mutually exclusive, and “the rule is, rather, that man does both, at least in thought and certainly he also does both in practice.” The reason for this undertaking is that only
“rentiers”, wealthy men who are not preoccupied with making a living can really live for politics without living off the latter. Even in this case, Weber believes that “there has never been such a stratum that has not somehow lived off politics”, as they would then “exploit their political domination in their own economic interest.”
Having explained the professional politicians, Weber proceeds to give examples the conditions and the sources of their emergence – “politically exploitable strata outside of the order of the estates” – and the roles that they play, and their development in the history of politics in America and Europe – in the formation of a “leaderless democracy, namely the rule of professional politicians without a calling,” as opposed to a charismatic leader. These are some examples, to name a few.
More importantly, Weber highlights “three pre-eminent qualities that are decisive for the politician: passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion.” These qualities are decisive and necessary in order to justify the huge influence that a political position allocates to the person occupying it. The first of the three, passion, is required as a “devotion to a cause” , providing an objective for the politician, while the latter two, a feeling of responsibility and a sense of proportion work hand in hand in keeping the politician in check, preventing the politician from losing sight of his objective. These qualities are necessary because the position of power also brings along with it great temptations, especially vanity, which Weber thinks is especially damaging in the field of politics as a result of the potential harm that it entails.
Also highlighted by Weber is the link between ethics and politics. Weber believes that politics, like other matters, cannot escape ethical examination. In the ethical examination of politics, Weber proposes down “two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims”, “the ethic of ultimate ends” and the “ethic of responsibility” as guide. The ethic of ultimate ends postulates that the ends justify the means while the ethics of responsibility concerns itself with the possible consequences of the means. These ethical paradoxes, as Weber calls them, are what he believes to be essential knowledge for anyone who wishes to engage in politics, especially as a vocation. Though initially claimed as irreconcilable, Weber believes that a man who possesses the two is a true man with the calling for politics.
In sum, Weber describes two main kinds of politicians in his essay. The first kind is the leader whose domination of politics is justified in three ways, namely the traditional, the legal and the charismatic authority. It is in the last one that he focuses on, as he believes that to possess “the calling for politics in its highest expression.” The second kind is the profession politician who developed concurrently with the first. For both of these kinds, Weber lays out the meaning of engaging politics as a vocation and the dangers of such an engagement and the qualities need to overcome these dangers.
III. Comparison of Weber and Schmitt
After summarising Carl Schmitt and Max Weber’s conception of the political, the third part of this paper will now proceed to carry out a comparison of the two and attempt to point out the similarities and differences present in their conception. First and foremost, both Schmitt and Weber understand the relation between politics and violence. For Schmitt, violence as war, in the sense of existential negation of the enemy, is the “most extreme political means (which) discloses the possibility which underlies every political idea, namely, the distinction of friend and enemy.” In a similar manner, for Weber, violence and politics are undeniable linked. For him, politics is about the strive for power within and outside a state and this power is based on violence since he stated that one of the main characteristics of the state is its monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.
Secondly, for Schmitt, the concept of the political is a domain of an entity of people, a collectivity. This is expressed in the way he theorises in “macro” terms, whereby the enemy must be confronted by a “fighting collectivity of people” as well as “in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction.” Weber, on the other hand, looks at politics in “micro” terms, in terms of the individual, the leaders and the professional politicians, outlining the various aspects for the person who wishes to engage politics as a vocation. This difference in perspective is to influence heavily their views on different aspects of life such as economics and ethics.
Schmitt, in his essay, repeatedly emphasise the separation of economics and ethics, from the political. In his words, the political is “in any event independent, not in the sense of a distinct new domain, but in that it can neither be based on any one antithesis or any combination of other antitheses, nor can it be traced to these.” On the contrary, Weber links politics to economics in the discussion of the potential rewards for engaging in politics and he further links politics to ethics, ethics of ultimate ends and responsibility based on religion, as guidelines for the conduct of politics.
Conclusion
Through the reading of Carl Schmitt’s “The Concept of the Political” and Max Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation”, we see two important and different takes on what distinguishes a political life. The first two parts of this essay give us a general understanding of each of their conception, while the third attempted to juxtapose the two in an effort to understand the similarities and differences present in the two essays. A closer look at the third part reveals that the two thinkers differ markedly in their conception of the political, with more differences than similarities having surfaced. These differences are in a way, shaped by the different position and viewpoint that they take in looking at politics. However, it is important to note that the list was but no means complete but could serve as a starting in understanding synthesising the Schmitt and Weber in a more holistic manner. As far as this is true, the two are not absolute contrast but rather supplements, which in unison allow us to better understand the political life.
References
Schmitt, Carl. (2007). The Concept of the Political. In The Concept of the Political. ed. George Schwab, 19-79. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Weber, Max. (1958). Politics as a Vocation. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. ed. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press
In their essays “Politics as a Vocation” and “The Concept of the Political”, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt respectively shed light on what they conceive as constituting a political life. In this paper, I will attempt to compare and contrast their conceptions, drawing areas of similarities as well as highlighting the differences found in their writings. This is achieved in three parts. The first part is exploring and outlining how Schmitt defines the political in his “The Concept of the Political”. For the second part, the attention turns to Weber, as I will place his “Politics as a Vocation” under the same form of examination. The first two parts are necessary because a comparison between the two writers cannot be accomplished without first understanding their works. Subsequently in the third but no less important part, I will attempt to carry out the comparison central to this paper.
I. The Concept of the Political
The concept of the political is, in Schmitt’s view, an important concept that needs to be clarified, as it is necessary for the understanding of the state, since “the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political” and is “incomprehensible when the nature of the political is misunderstood.” Even so, Schmitt believes that despite its importance, the definition of the political has seldom been clear and has often been employed in antitheses without giving it a specific understanding. For him, such a treatment of the political is only “justifiable” when the state “possesses the monopoly on politics” and he proceeds to give examples of the times when such conditions are available, in the eighteenth century and Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
This condition ceased to exist in the twentieth century, a time that Schmitt terms as the “total state twentieth” where “the equation state = politics becomes erroneous and deceptive” . In such a time, the state is no longer “distinct from society and higher from it” but the latter has “itself integrated into the state” and the state “no longer knows anything absolutely non-political” . Since the condition for a vague definition of the political is no longer present, it can be implied that a specific definition is required. This “definition of the political can be obtained by discovering and defining the specifically political categories” and it must “rest on its own ultimate distinctions” . This distinction, when reduced to its simplest and most empirical form, is for Schmitt, “that between friend and enemy.”
Since it is the most empirical form, the distinction of friend and enemy is not founded upon, nor motivated by other antitheses. As Schmitt puts it:
“The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation. It can exist theoretically and practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon those moral, aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions.”
This distinction denotes the presence of “the other” whose very nature is in a “specially intense way, existentially different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.” In turn, in the most extreme case, the conflicts call for war to be waged against the enemy and war, in Schmitt’s understanding, is “to be understood in its existential sense” , which is to say the physical killing of human beings. It is important to note here that the political does not desire war, or necessary lead to war. However, war as a possibility cannot be denied. Schmitt also pointed out, “The definition of the political suggested here neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism” and “war is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics.” Its presence as a possibility, however, “creates a specifically political behaviour.”
Having defined the political, the friend-enemy distinction, as well as highlighted its result in the most extreme case, war, Schmitt also singles out the people that can make such a distinction. He explains that it is the people as a whole who make this friend-enemy distinction. The enemy, according to Schmitt, is “not the private adversary” of one individual. The enemy is instead the “public enemy” of the entire “collectivity of people” . This implies that the enemy cannot be determined by one person but has to be regarded as such by the whole group. To add on to that, since it is the collectivity of people that decides who is the enemy, it is by extension that only the people directly involved and no other outsiders who can determine the friend-enemy distinction. “Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict.” In this sense, the distinction is autonomous.
In essence, the political, for Schmitt, is the distinction of friend and enemy, made only possible by an entity of people against another entity, without the judgement of outsiders, and the enmity between the two would in the most intense situation lead to the existential killing of one another.
II. Politics as a Vocation
From the outset, Max Weber establishes the perimeter of his discussion of politics as “the leadership, or the influencing of the leadership of a political association” , in other words, a state. Furthermore, Weber defines the state by its “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” . Hence politics can be deduced to be for Weber “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power either among states or among groups within a state” , brought about by the right to use violence. This right to violence is in turn legitimised in three ways, namely “traditional,” “charismatic,” and “legal” and it is the “charismatic”, that according to Weber we find the calling of politics due to its focus on the individual.
In support of the sustenance of power for the individual charismatic political leader, Weber postulates an “organised domination”, which “requires controls of the personal executive staff and the material implements of administration” needed as rewards for the followers of the charismatic leader. It is in the service of the charismatic leaders, among his followers, that one finds the “professional politicians” who make politics their vocation.
In order to make politics a vocation, for Weber, one “either lives for” or “lives off politics” . In basic terms, in living for politics, politics is an end in itself, while in living off politics, politics is a means to an end, namely, the end being economics well being. However, Weber says that the two are not mutually exclusive, and “the rule is, rather, that man does both, at least in thought and certainly he also does both in practice.” The reason for this undertaking is that only
“rentiers”, wealthy men who are not preoccupied with making a living can really live for politics without living off the latter. Even in this case, Weber believes that “there has never been such a stratum that has not somehow lived off politics”, as they would then “exploit their political domination in their own economic interest.”
Having explained the professional politicians, Weber proceeds to give examples the conditions and the sources of their emergence – “politically exploitable strata outside of the order of the estates” – and the roles that they play, and their development in the history of politics in America and Europe – in the formation of a “leaderless democracy, namely the rule of professional politicians without a calling,” as opposed to a charismatic leader. These are some examples, to name a few.
More importantly, Weber highlights “three pre-eminent qualities that are decisive for the politician: passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion.” These qualities are decisive and necessary in order to justify the huge influence that a political position allocates to the person occupying it. The first of the three, passion, is required as a “devotion to a cause” , providing an objective for the politician, while the latter two, a feeling of responsibility and a sense of proportion work hand in hand in keeping the politician in check, preventing the politician from losing sight of his objective. These qualities are necessary because the position of power also brings along with it great temptations, especially vanity, which Weber thinks is especially damaging in the field of politics as a result of the potential harm that it entails.
Also highlighted by Weber is the link between ethics and politics. Weber believes that politics, like other matters, cannot escape ethical examination. In the ethical examination of politics, Weber proposes down “two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims”, “the ethic of ultimate ends” and the “ethic of responsibility” as guide. The ethic of ultimate ends postulates that the ends justify the means while the ethics of responsibility concerns itself with the possible consequences of the means. These ethical paradoxes, as Weber calls them, are what he believes to be essential knowledge for anyone who wishes to engage in politics, especially as a vocation. Though initially claimed as irreconcilable, Weber believes that a man who possesses the two is a true man with the calling for politics.
In sum, Weber describes two main kinds of politicians in his essay. The first kind is the leader whose domination of politics is justified in three ways, namely the traditional, the legal and the charismatic authority. It is in the last one that he focuses on, as he believes that to possess “the calling for politics in its highest expression.” The second kind is the profession politician who developed concurrently with the first. For both of these kinds, Weber lays out the meaning of engaging politics as a vocation and the dangers of such an engagement and the qualities need to overcome these dangers.
III. Comparison of Weber and Schmitt
After summarising Carl Schmitt and Max Weber’s conception of the political, the third part of this paper will now proceed to carry out a comparison of the two and attempt to point out the similarities and differences present in their conception. First and foremost, both Schmitt and Weber understand the relation between politics and violence. For Schmitt, violence as war, in the sense of existential negation of the enemy, is the “most extreme political means (which) discloses the possibility which underlies every political idea, namely, the distinction of friend and enemy.” In a similar manner, for Weber, violence and politics are undeniable linked. For him, politics is about the strive for power within and outside a state and this power is based on violence since he stated that one of the main characteristics of the state is its monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.
Secondly, for Schmitt, the concept of the political is a domain of an entity of people, a collectivity. This is expressed in the way he theorises in “macro” terms, whereby the enemy must be confronted by a “fighting collectivity of people” as well as “in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction.” Weber, on the other hand, looks at politics in “micro” terms, in terms of the individual, the leaders and the professional politicians, outlining the various aspects for the person who wishes to engage politics as a vocation. This difference in perspective is to influence heavily their views on different aspects of life such as economics and ethics.
Schmitt, in his essay, repeatedly emphasise the separation of economics and ethics, from the political. In his words, the political is “in any event independent, not in the sense of a distinct new domain, but in that it can neither be based on any one antithesis or any combination of other antitheses, nor can it be traced to these.” On the contrary, Weber links politics to economics in the discussion of the potential rewards for engaging in politics and he further links politics to ethics, ethics of ultimate ends and responsibility based on religion, as guidelines for the conduct of politics.
Conclusion
Through the reading of Carl Schmitt’s “The Concept of the Political” and Max Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation”, we see two important and different takes on what distinguishes a political life. The first two parts of this essay give us a general understanding of each of their conception, while the third attempted to juxtapose the two in an effort to understand the similarities and differences present in the two essays. A closer look at the third part reveals that the two thinkers differ markedly in their conception of the political, with more differences than similarities having surfaced. These differences are in a way, shaped by the different position and viewpoint that they take in looking at politics. However, it is important to note that the list was but no means complete but could serve as a starting in understanding synthesising the Schmitt and Weber in a more holistic manner. As far as this is true, the two are not absolute contrast but rather supplements, which in unison allow us to better understand the political life.
References
Schmitt, Carl. (2007). The Concept of the Political. In The Concept of the Political. ed. George Schwab, 19-79. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Weber, Max. (1958). Politics as a Vocation. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. ed. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press
Friday, January 18, 2008
How does the ‘hierarchisation’ of castes influence everyday village life?
By Ng Wee Loon
Introduction
There are many societies that employ a certain form of caste system. In the region of South Asia, these caste systems are usually in one way or the other, extensions of the Indian caste system. In India itself, the system is not restricted exclusively to the Hindu communities, though it is the most pervasive. The caste system is the fabric of the Hindu society, especially in the rural areas, namely the villages, yet to be touched by foreign influences. It is a hierarchical social system, which will be discussed in greater details. We will look at how this form of hierarchy, itself dictated by the concepts of soul transmigration, karma and dharma, dictates the daily life in a typical Indian village through purity and pollution. For the sake of discussion, this essay will look at some of the more important and apparent aspects of an otherwise elaborated system. Also worth noting is the difference between the caste system in theory and the caste system in practice. This will be explored further using the village of Korkkadu in South India as a case study. “Social hierarchy is most deeply rooted in Indic Civilisation and remains vital to India’s Hindu majority.”
The caste system
The caste system is a social system base on Hinduism. At the heart of this social system is the notion of purity and pollution, which governs the way that the Hindus behave. Other than this notion of purity and pollution, other important concepts of the caste system are that of transmigration of souls, karma and dharma . Together, these account for and direct the hierarchisation of the caste system. As we explore the system in depths, we will soon realise that many characteristics of the systems is in one way or another, a cause or result of these concepts.
The caste system is a hierarchical social system; that is to say, there are different levels or groups within the system that occupy different roles and importance. There is first and foremost, an Indian wide system known as the varna system which spells out the hierarchy and divides the Hindus into 4 varnas based traditionally on colour and occupation. The 4 varnas are, in descending order, Brahmins, traditionally priests and scholars; Kshatriyas, kings and warriors; Vaishyas, farmers and merchants; and Shudras, workers and servants. Outside of this system stands another group, the Untouchables, who are the outcastes associated with religiously polluting jobs, jobs dealing with the dead for example, and are generally despied by the rest of the varnas.
Within the varna system, there is a more region-base and specific jati system. The jati system is a system of sub-communities. The jatis are region based in a sense that each jati is quite different from another. The make up of one jati might not make sense to a person from another village. These jatis are also hierarchical in nature and they serve to define the varnas more specifically. Between the varna of Brahmins in a specific village, there could be an indefinite amount of jatis which ranks one above the other. One example of this is the Kanyabuja in south India. The Kanyabujas are assigned Biswas according to their ascribed attributes on a twenty-point scale. The higher the number of Biswas, the higher the rank of the segment possessing them.
Transmigration of souls, karma and dharma
The most important concept in the caste system is the concept of purity and pollution. But before we discuss the notion of purity and pollution and how it affects the caste system, which affects the daily life, we shall first discuss the three concepts of transmigration of souls, karma and dharma.
Transmigration of soul, in simple terms, means that the Hindus believe that one’s soul is an immortal being and the lives of the individual are but the physical manifestations. Just like the same person who changes his clothes from time to time but he himself remain unchanged, the Hindus believe that the same soul transmigrates from body to body through reincarnations without changing itself.
Karma is the cosmic law that governs the transmigration of souls. A person with good karma will be born into a better life in his next incarnation while a person who has bad karma will be relegated to a worse life in his next incarnation. Therefore karma is about retribution, and this is more apparent when we look at the word itself. The word karma is from the Sanskrit root kri, meaning ‘to do’. Literally, the word karma means ‘that which is done’ or ‘action’. The doctrine has for its basis the very popular notion that all action has its reaction, and that the type of reaction is causally connected to the type of actions.
Dharma is all that is good and righteous while conversely, a-dharma represents all that is bad and wrong. Dharma can be classified into three broad categories. One, positive rules and injunctions which should be followed in order to have a normal and healthy life in the community. Two, rules of behaviour and rites the aims of which is the acquisition of extra merit and moral advancement for the individual whose practises them. Three, rules that are considered essential for a person to follow.
Together, these 3 concepts combine to give the caste system its backbone and justification for its structure. In other words, an individual of a certain rank in a certain caste is there because of his soul transmigrated to this life and his position was determined by the karma that he accumulated in his previous life by doing either dharma or a-dharma. Therefore an individual, for example, a Brahmin was able to reincarnate into this life as a Brahmin probably because he had fulfilled his duties in his past life according to the dharma and accumulated enough good karma. “Different castes have different designated codes of proper conduct (dharma), according to their ranks on the hierarchy that they are obligated to perform to contribute to their society. For example, Brahman's proper behavior will be to be nonviolent, religious and have a vegetarian diet; Kshatriyas are expected to be aggressive warriors who fight and defend and consume meat and alcohol. The mass population believe that the suffering in their present life is a result of the bad deeds they committed in their past life. The karma that they accumulate is the deciding factor as to which position in the caste hierarchy they will belong to in their next lives. They believe that the faithful execution of the duties obligated in their position in life, thus good karma performed, will be a promise to raise them up through the different classes in reincarnation until they reach the top of the ranks and take the next proceeding step to liberation (moksha). The rigid caste system is justified by this belief and it is thus possible to see why the masses stay muted and accept their suffering in life.”
Purity and pollution
Purity and pollution is another important principle of the caste that explains why the various varnas and jatis interact in the way that they do. One point to note here is that the purity and pollution are not necessary in the physical sense but more of a ritual sense. The members of the higher varnas and jatis, such as the Brahmins, are considered purer than members of the lower caste, with the Untouchables, being at the bottom of the hierarchy, considered the least pure. The pollution occurs when a member of a higher interacts with a member of a lower caste. Hence, to prevent pollution, many stringent rules of conduct are put in place in everyday life. We will now examine these rules of conduct in a few selected aspects.
Commensality
Commensality literally means eating together. However commensality in the Hindu caste system signifies a lot more. Not only are members of the higher caste not allowed to dine with members of the lower class, they are also not allow to receive food and water from the lower castes. Consuming such items would result in pollution, which would require purifying rituals to rectify. Even when circumstances require a higher caste member to receive food from a lower caste member, it can only be “cooked” (pukka) grain, well parched and thus perhaps cleansed enough by Agni’s fire to prove palatable. Never “raw” (kucha) food, however, nor water!
Restrictions in regard to eating are generally speaking more severe than those which govern drinking, but do not depend, as in that case, on who supplies the food but rather on who cooks it. The cooking is very important, and a stranger’s shadow, even the glance of a man of low caste, falling on the cooking pot may necessitate throwing away the contents. Members of the same exogamous unit can, of course, share each other’s food. Certain exceptions hold. For example, only members of the Waterbearer caste who are employed to supply water from wells to homes can offer water by hand to all castes without polluting them.
Marriage
Jatis are endogamous groups. That simply means that members of a jati can only marry within their own jati. Inter-caste marriages may result in the members of the caste being polluted. This especially true if the difference between the two parties involved are from very different jatis in the system, such as a Brahmin and an Untouchable in the most extreme of cases. Therefore in cases of inter-caste marriages, the parties involved are ostracised from the their jatis and become Untouchables. Given that even the issue of dining has so many regulations, marriage and consummation issues are under even heavier scrutiny. Marriages are traditionally arranged and within one's own caste. The background of each bride and groom are thoroughly studied to make sure they fit. Caste is the key qualification sought, and like how it affects basic socialisation of society, is a filter system when seeking potential life partners. Marriage within caste is such a strong factor that there are directories that publish a list of eligible Indians and what caste groups they belong to. An example is this web site: www.marriage.com.
There are however also cases of hypergamous unions, which are marriages between different castes. The point to note here is that hypergamous unions are almost always between a woman of a lower caste and a man of a higher caste. A man can marry a girl from an approved range of lower jatis. The progeny carries no stigma and is given full membership of the jati. The reason for this, according to M.N. Srinivas, could be an exchange; the man’s family increases its wealth from the receipt of dowry while the woman’s family increases its status through affiliation with an upper caste.
Division of labour
As mentioned in the earlier part of the essay, the various castes are based traditionally on occupations. Each caste is designated specific jobs and these jobs are usually related to the level of purity. Therefore in a village community, no caste is self-sufficient and all have to rely on each another for daily affairs. Given the strictures of his caste, a Brahmin cannot therefore, engage in activities that are polluting. Therefore he must depend on the members of Vaishyas for food and members of Kshatriyas for protection. In the same way, work such as sweeping and removal of carcass can only be handle by members of Untouchables as they are the only ones that will not be polluted as it is part of their duties. As such, the caste system provided a well-knitted system of division labour that ensures that the village functions like a well-oiled machine.
Looking at it from another point of view, it can be said that it is the “clean” and “noble” occupation that gives a jati its higher ritual and social status, and “unclean” and “polluting” occupation relegates it to a lower status. The acquisition of learning, imparting knowledge, and priestly functions are “pure” and “noble”; they are thus supposed to give the Brahmins the highest. And the converse holds true with regard to the lower castes. Therefore the notions of clean and unclean, purity and pollution enter into intra- and inter-caste behaviour and interaction.
The difference between theory and practice
Though the Indian wide varna system places the Brahmins at the top of the hierarchy and the subsequent varnas in the prescribed order, and ordained that the various varnas and jatis behave accordingly, it is worthy to note that it may not be the case in reality.
Using the village of Korkkadu in south India as a case study, we can see that in a non-Brahminical village, the Brahmins do not necessary occupy the highest position. In this case instead, it is the landowner caste of the Reddiyars that occupies the highest position. And because Korkkadu is an agricultural village, the practiced hierarchy in the village depends largely on the involvement of the agricultural activities.
One thing to note however, the main difference is present in the higher castes. Even in the village of Korkkadu, there remains the segregation of the Untouchables who are responsible still, for the polluting and unclean jobs. Even so, as industrialisation and outside influences, like the international effort to clean up the lake in Korkkadu, come into play, we begin to see the declining influence of the caste system. None is more significant in the working together of various castes, in a communal participation in the Lake-clearing Project, and the high reverence of the MLA by all castes, eventhough he was from the Untouchable caste.
Conclusion
The caste system is an old age system that holds high importance in the Hindu society. To this day it is still very pervasive in rural Indian. Its comprehensiveness can be felt in its influence in almost of parts of the village life, often the most important parts. We can however observe an increase in strength of the counter-forces. As more and more of rural Indian comes into contact with outside influences, more importantly concepts of modernity and equality, such as that of which Korkkadu experienced, it is almost certain that sooner or later the caste system will lose its place, as it already had in urban India.
References
Dube S.C.. Indian Society. (New Delhi: National Book Trust, India, 1996)
Hutton, J.H.. Caste in India: Its Nature, Function, and Origins. (Oxford University Press, 1963)
Mathur, K.S.. Hindu Values of Life: Karma and Dharma in Madan, T.N et als ed. Religion in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000)
Wolpert, Stanley. India. (University of California Press, 1999)
Dictionary.com <>. (accessed 7/11/05)
Srinivas, M.N.. Some Reflections on Dowry. (Havard School of Public Health). (accessed 7/11/05)
The Caste System in India.
Lecture materials provided by Dr. Niklas in lectures.
Introduction
There are many societies that employ a certain form of caste system. In the region of South Asia, these caste systems are usually in one way or the other, extensions of the Indian caste system. In India itself, the system is not restricted exclusively to the Hindu communities, though it is the most pervasive. The caste system is the fabric of the Hindu society, especially in the rural areas, namely the villages, yet to be touched by foreign influences. It is a hierarchical social system, which will be discussed in greater details. We will look at how this form of hierarchy, itself dictated by the concepts of soul transmigration, karma and dharma, dictates the daily life in a typical Indian village through purity and pollution. For the sake of discussion, this essay will look at some of the more important and apparent aspects of an otherwise elaborated system. Also worth noting is the difference between the caste system in theory and the caste system in practice. This will be explored further using the village of Korkkadu in South India as a case study. “Social hierarchy is most deeply rooted in Indic Civilisation and remains vital to India’s Hindu majority.”
The caste system
The caste system is a social system base on Hinduism. At the heart of this social system is the notion of purity and pollution, which governs the way that the Hindus behave. Other than this notion of purity and pollution, other important concepts of the caste system are that of transmigration of souls, karma and dharma . Together, these account for and direct the hierarchisation of the caste system. As we explore the system in depths, we will soon realise that many characteristics of the systems is in one way or another, a cause or result of these concepts.
The caste system is a hierarchical social system; that is to say, there are different levels or groups within the system that occupy different roles and importance. There is first and foremost, an Indian wide system known as the varna system which spells out the hierarchy and divides the Hindus into 4 varnas based traditionally on colour and occupation. The 4 varnas are, in descending order, Brahmins, traditionally priests and scholars; Kshatriyas, kings and warriors; Vaishyas, farmers and merchants; and Shudras, workers and servants. Outside of this system stands another group, the Untouchables, who are the outcastes associated with religiously polluting jobs, jobs dealing with the dead for example, and are generally despied by the rest of the varnas.
Within the varna system, there is a more region-base and specific jati system. The jati system is a system of sub-communities. The jatis are region based in a sense that each jati is quite different from another. The make up of one jati might not make sense to a person from another village. These jatis are also hierarchical in nature and they serve to define the varnas more specifically. Between the varna of Brahmins in a specific village, there could be an indefinite amount of jatis which ranks one above the other. One example of this is the Kanyabuja in south India. The Kanyabujas are assigned Biswas according to their ascribed attributes on a twenty-point scale. The higher the number of Biswas, the higher the rank of the segment possessing them.
Transmigration of souls, karma and dharma
The most important concept in the caste system is the concept of purity and pollution. But before we discuss the notion of purity and pollution and how it affects the caste system, which affects the daily life, we shall first discuss the three concepts of transmigration of souls, karma and dharma.
Transmigration of soul, in simple terms, means that the Hindus believe that one’s soul is an immortal being and the lives of the individual are but the physical manifestations. Just like the same person who changes his clothes from time to time but he himself remain unchanged, the Hindus believe that the same soul transmigrates from body to body through reincarnations without changing itself.
Karma is the cosmic law that governs the transmigration of souls. A person with good karma will be born into a better life in his next incarnation while a person who has bad karma will be relegated to a worse life in his next incarnation. Therefore karma is about retribution, and this is more apparent when we look at the word itself. The word karma is from the Sanskrit root kri, meaning ‘to do’. Literally, the word karma means ‘that which is done’ or ‘action’. The doctrine has for its basis the very popular notion that all action has its reaction, and that the type of reaction is causally connected to the type of actions.
Dharma is all that is good and righteous while conversely, a-dharma represents all that is bad and wrong. Dharma can be classified into three broad categories. One, positive rules and injunctions which should be followed in order to have a normal and healthy life in the community. Two, rules of behaviour and rites the aims of which is the acquisition of extra merit and moral advancement for the individual whose practises them. Three, rules that are considered essential for a person to follow.
Together, these 3 concepts combine to give the caste system its backbone and justification for its structure. In other words, an individual of a certain rank in a certain caste is there because of his soul transmigrated to this life and his position was determined by the karma that he accumulated in his previous life by doing either dharma or a-dharma. Therefore an individual, for example, a Brahmin was able to reincarnate into this life as a Brahmin probably because he had fulfilled his duties in his past life according to the dharma and accumulated enough good karma. “Different castes have different designated codes of proper conduct (dharma), according to their ranks on the hierarchy that they are obligated to perform to contribute to their society. For example, Brahman's proper behavior will be to be nonviolent, religious and have a vegetarian diet; Kshatriyas are expected to be aggressive warriors who fight and defend and consume meat and alcohol. The mass population believe that the suffering in their present life is a result of the bad deeds they committed in their past life. The karma that they accumulate is the deciding factor as to which position in the caste hierarchy they will belong to in their next lives. They believe that the faithful execution of the duties obligated in their position in life, thus good karma performed, will be a promise to raise them up through the different classes in reincarnation until they reach the top of the ranks and take the next proceeding step to liberation (moksha). The rigid caste system is justified by this belief and it is thus possible to see why the masses stay muted and accept their suffering in life.”
Purity and pollution
Purity and pollution is another important principle of the caste that explains why the various varnas and jatis interact in the way that they do. One point to note here is that the purity and pollution are not necessary in the physical sense but more of a ritual sense. The members of the higher varnas and jatis, such as the Brahmins, are considered purer than members of the lower caste, with the Untouchables, being at the bottom of the hierarchy, considered the least pure. The pollution occurs when a member of a higher interacts with a member of a lower caste. Hence, to prevent pollution, many stringent rules of conduct are put in place in everyday life. We will now examine these rules of conduct in a few selected aspects.
Commensality
Commensality literally means eating together. However commensality in the Hindu caste system signifies a lot more. Not only are members of the higher caste not allowed to dine with members of the lower class, they are also not allow to receive food and water from the lower castes. Consuming such items would result in pollution, which would require purifying rituals to rectify. Even when circumstances require a higher caste member to receive food from a lower caste member, it can only be “cooked” (pukka) grain, well parched and thus perhaps cleansed enough by Agni’s fire to prove palatable. Never “raw” (kucha) food, however, nor water!
Restrictions in regard to eating are generally speaking more severe than those which govern drinking, but do not depend, as in that case, on who supplies the food but rather on who cooks it. The cooking is very important, and a stranger’s shadow, even the glance of a man of low caste, falling on the cooking pot may necessitate throwing away the contents. Members of the same exogamous unit can, of course, share each other’s food. Certain exceptions hold. For example, only members of the Waterbearer caste who are employed to supply water from wells to homes can offer water by hand to all castes without polluting them.
Marriage
Jatis are endogamous groups. That simply means that members of a jati can only marry within their own jati. Inter-caste marriages may result in the members of the caste being polluted. This especially true if the difference between the two parties involved are from very different jatis in the system, such as a Brahmin and an Untouchable in the most extreme of cases. Therefore in cases of inter-caste marriages, the parties involved are ostracised from the their jatis and become Untouchables. Given that even the issue of dining has so many regulations, marriage and consummation issues are under even heavier scrutiny. Marriages are traditionally arranged and within one's own caste. The background of each bride and groom are thoroughly studied to make sure they fit. Caste is the key qualification sought, and like how it affects basic socialisation of society, is a filter system when seeking potential life partners. Marriage within caste is such a strong factor that there are directories that publish a list of eligible Indians and what caste groups they belong to. An example is this web site: www.marriage.com.
There are however also cases of hypergamous unions, which are marriages between different castes. The point to note here is that hypergamous unions are almost always between a woman of a lower caste and a man of a higher caste. A man can marry a girl from an approved range of lower jatis. The progeny carries no stigma and is given full membership of the jati. The reason for this, according to M.N. Srinivas, could be an exchange; the man’s family increases its wealth from the receipt of dowry while the woman’s family increases its status through affiliation with an upper caste.
Division of labour
As mentioned in the earlier part of the essay, the various castes are based traditionally on occupations. Each caste is designated specific jobs and these jobs are usually related to the level of purity. Therefore in a village community, no caste is self-sufficient and all have to rely on each another for daily affairs. Given the strictures of his caste, a Brahmin cannot therefore, engage in activities that are polluting. Therefore he must depend on the members of Vaishyas for food and members of Kshatriyas for protection. In the same way, work such as sweeping and removal of carcass can only be handle by members of Untouchables as they are the only ones that will not be polluted as it is part of their duties. As such, the caste system provided a well-knitted system of division labour that ensures that the village functions like a well-oiled machine.
Looking at it from another point of view, it can be said that it is the “clean” and “noble” occupation that gives a jati its higher ritual and social status, and “unclean” and “polluting” occupation relegates it to a lower status. The acquisition of learning, imparting knowledge, and priestly functions are “pure” and “noble”; they are thus supposed to give the Brahmins the highest. And the converse holds true with regard to the lower castes. Therefore the notions of clean and unclean, purity and pollution enter into intra- and inter-caste behaviour and interaction.
The difference between theory and practice
Though the Indian wide varna system places the Brahmins at the top of the hierarchy and the subsequent varnas in the prescribed order, and ordained that the various varnas and jatis behave accordingly, it is worthy to note that it may not be the case in reality.
Using the village of Korkkadu in south India as a case study, we can see that in a non-Brahminical village, the Brahmins do not necessary occupy the highest position. In this case instead, it is the landowner caste of the Reddiyars that occupies the highest position. And because Korkkadu is an agricultural village, the practiced hierarchy in the village depends largely on the involvement of the agricultural activities.
One thing to note however, the main difference is present in the higher castes. Even in the village of Korkkadu, there remains the segregation of the Untouchables who are responsible still, for the polluting and unclean jobs. Even so, as industrialisation and outside influences, like the international effort to clean up the lake in Korkkadu, come into play, we begin to see the declining influence of the caste system. None is more significant in the working together of various castes, in a communal participation in the Lake-clearing Project, and the high reverence of the MLA by all castes, eventhough he was from the Untouchable caste.
Conclusion
The caste system is an old age system that holds high importance in the Hindu society. To this day it is still very pervasive in rural Indian. Its comprehensiveness can be felt in its influence in almost of parts of the village life, often the most important parts. We can however observe an increase in strength of the counter-forces. As more and more of rural Indian comes into contact with outside influences, more importantly concepts of modernity and equality, such as that of which Korkkadu experienced, it is almost certain that sooner or later the caste system will lose its place, as it already had in urban India.
References
Dube S.C.. Indian Society. (New Delhi: National Book Trust, India, 1996)
Hutton, J.H.. Caste in India: Its Nature, Function, and Origins. (Oxford University Press, 1963)
Mathur, K.S.. Hindu Values of Life: Karma and Dharma in Madan, T.N et als ed. Religion in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000)
Wolpert, Stanley. India. (University of California Press, 1999)
Dictionary.com <>. (accessed 7/11/05)
Srinivas, M.N.. Some Reflections on Dowry. (Havard School of Public Health).
The Caste System in India.
Lecture materials provided by Dr. Niklas in lectures.
Would it be right to claim that the First World War was the beginning of the end of modern imperialism? If not, why?
By Ng Wee Loon
This question is discussed on the basis that the peace settlements, which followed, of the 'Great War' marked the end of four empires.
Introduction
The Great War marked the end of 4 European empires, namely, the German Empire, the Austria-Hungary Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire. This essay will first attempt to define the term “modern imperialism”. Subsequently, it will attempt to explain why and how did the Great War result in the demise of each the above-mentioned empires and the possible effects of the Great War and the demise of the 4 empires with regards to the beginning of the end of “modern imperialism”. The later part of the essay will highlight that while the Great War had significant effects throughout the world with regards to both economics and politics imperialism – the reason why these two aspect are highlighted will be discussed below – it is not right to claim that it marked the beginning of the end of modern imperialism.
Definition of modern imperialism
For the sake of analysis, this essay will employ the definitions of imperialism as stated by Benjamin J.Cohen, Professor of International Political Economy at the University of California. According to Benjamin J.Cohen, “imperialism refers to those particular relationships between inherently unequal nations which involve effective subjugation, the actual exercise of influence over behaviour” . More importantly, Benjamin J.Cohen referred specifically to the modern sense of imperialism in the form of political and economic imperialism. These two aspects of imperialism are given special attention because they were the most “virulent and persistent forms of imperialism” and with economic imperialism cited as “perhaps the only form of imperialism” . Modern imperialism will therefore be defined as the exertion of influence of a more powerful nation over the behaviour of a less powerful nation through either political or economic means. One other point to note is the difference between modern imperialism and previous form of imperialism, the latter characterise often by bloodshed and aggressive take-overs whenever necessary .
The End of the German Empire
The Germans were the loser in the Great War. With the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, they were, together with Austria, held responsible for starting the war and made to pay for all the war damages suffered by the Allied powers. As a result of the peace settlements, the German Empire was to give up their foreign possessions, reduce the size of their military, cede territories to France and the newly set-up Poland and maintain a demilitarised zone between herself and France, with whom she had a long-standing rivalry as a result of the Franco-Prussian War, and who had suffered greatly in the Great War because of the “Trench Warfare” along the German western front due to the death toll. With all these terms, the peace settlements ensured that the German ceased to be an empire and remained weak, therefore ensuring that it can no longer threaten its neighbours, sparking another great war.
The End of the Austria-Hungary Empire
As mentioned above, the peace settlements held the Austria-Hungary Empire responsible for the war together with the German Empire, though the settlement was not as severe as the one handed to the German Empire. With all the war-debts thrown upon the German Empire, the main losses sustained by the Austria-Hungary Empire were the loss of its territories. In place of the former Austria-Hungary Empire, the new states of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia were established, and lend was ceded to Romania and also to Yugoslavia, which was formed by a few nations with Serbia as the core. Due to these separations, the economy of Austria was torn to tatters as Czechoslovakia had consisted of some of the wealthiest land of the former empire.
The End of the Ottoman Empire
The Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side on of the Central Powers having signed the Turko-German Alliance in 1914. Being on the losing side, the Ottoman Empire suffered a similar fate as the Austria-Hungary Empire and was carved out into different new states, such as Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon. The Arabs were rewarded with their own nation as a result of assisting the Allied Powers by resisting the Ottoman campaign.
The End of the Russian Empire
The Russian Empire under the House of the Romanovs was the only empire that did not fall as a direct result of losing the war per se. In fact the Russian Empire had entered the war on the side of the winning Allied Powers. However, Russians became disillusioned and discontented with the rule of the Russian Emperor, Tzar Nicholas II, after setbacks in the earlier phase of the war and severe economic crisis at home . Because of that, two revolutions took place in Russia resulting in the fall of the Russian Empire and the ascension of Vladimir Lenin, a Marxist revolutionary, to the Russian leadership. Promising his people “Land, Bread and Peace”, Lenin subsequently pulled out of the Great War by signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the Germans.
The effects of the Great War on imperialism
Firstly, the harsh treaty imposed upon the Germans resulted in a lot of hatred within the German population. The Germans felt that they were not to be held solely accountable for the war and should not be made to fully pay for the reparations. Such circumstances culminated in the rise of Hitler’s Nazi Germany when he played on the German sentiments and promise to return Germany to its former glory and take back what the Allied Powers took through the Treaty of Versailles, more specifically land, pride and money. Hitler’s Germany was to go on and start World War Two, which was destined to be far more destructive than the Great War due to technological advancements that enabled mass destruction through improved armament. World War Two was to weaken Europe like never before as millions died and Europe no longer have the ability to sustain its overseas possessions and therefore marking the beginning of the end of its influence on the less developed and therefore weaker non-Europeans.
Secondly, following the end of the Great War, American President Woodrow Wilson suggested in his “Fourteen Points” that the people of Europe should self-determinate and all set up their own states under nationalistic lines. This sparked off a new wave of nationalism, which occurred not only in Europe but also sow its seeds in their colonies in Asia and Africa. Consequently, there was an increase in rebellious movements throughout the world “dedicated to freeing their societies from the ravages of Western colonisation” . As followed, imperialism as direct control and influence over colonial possessions begins to wane and decline.
Modern imperialism persists
The demise of the four empires did not truly result in the decline of modern imperialism. For even though the end of the empires marked the establishment of several new states as well as the loss of foreign colonial possessions, many of the colonies did not achieve independence, nor did the newly established states. For example, the Middle-eastern countries, which were products of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, saved for Saudi Arabia, were incorporated into the British and French spheres of influence. Likewise for the colonies of Germany, which were distributed amongst the various Allied Powers. Hence the Great War resulted only in a change of ownership instead of a decline in imperialism.
In a way the same argument can be applied to the fall of the Russian Empire. Though it did not occurred immediately after the Great War, the successor of the Russian Empire, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), remained an imperialist power. After World War II, the Communist government in USSR, through its military might and the spread of the communist ideology and the organisation the Third International, maintained a series of satellite states that also acted as its buffer with the capitalist Western Europe. Though these states were not under the direct control of USSR, they were under the influence of Moscow, the capital of USSR. In this way, USSR fulfilled the criteria of being a modern imperialist power both in the economic and political sense as their principle of influence; communism, was both an economic as well as a political ideology. So strong was the influence of the USSR that it emerges as one of the two superpowers in contemporary history, establishing its hegemony on one side of the Cold War, the war between the Communist ideology and the Capitalist ideology, that spanned more than half a decade of the twentieth century.
The Great War also saw the emergence of a new superpower, the United States of America (USA) at the other side of the Cold War. The devastation in Europe saw the traditional Europeans fall from grace and the Americans rise in strength. Besides, being geographically far away, American soil and society was spared the same physical and structural destruction that was the result of the Great War, despite being involved in the war. Adding on to that Europe had borrowed heavily from the Americans to rebuild itself. This gives the American a financial edge over the Europe by using the loans and its repayment as a diplomatic tool in influencing European politics and economy. Also, prior to the war, Europe was the major trading partner of regions such as Latin America and Asia as it was then the most developed economy and had the largest importing power of raw materials and agricultural products thanks to the Industrial Revolution. After the war however it lost its number one position as its own economy lay in ruins. This allowed America to step in as the new economic powerhouse taking over its trade especially with Latin America due to its proximity .
Another important development that came out of the Great War was American President Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a League of Nations:
“A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small nations alike.”
America itself however was not part of the League of Nations, as the American Congress did not give its approval to join the League of Nations, without which President Wilson could not proceed. And without the Americans in the League, the League does not have the financial and military backing necessary to carry out carry out whatever sanctions or decision it makes against its member nations that had defied collective League decisions. This is evident in the years preceding World War II when the Germans and the Japanese refused to adhere to League decisions concerning their militarisation and military expansion in Europe and East Asia respectively. Nonetheless, the League of Nations provided the foundations and precedent for the present day United Nations, which has carried out economic and political sanctions against renegade countries that in their view threaten global peace and stability, for example North Korea and Iran. This is important, as it is an example of modern imperialism whereby the strong country, or countries, exert influence upon the behaviour another independent country through economic and political means.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the above-mentioned definition of modern imperialism was chosen for the analysis of this paper, though it must be noted that it is not the only definition. The discussion of the fall of the empires with regards to the Great War reveals that both the fall of the empires and the Great War itself had effects on the trajectory of imperialism. They are however insufficient to bring about the decline of imperialism or imperialistic developments as evident in the presence of many forms of imperialistic events that occurred from the end of the war to present day.
Bibliography
Cohen, Benjamin J. “The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence”. London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1974
Duiker, William J. “Twentieth-Century World History”. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005
Hollister, C. Warren, McGee J. Sears, Stoke Gale. “The West Transformed: A History of Western Civilisation”. Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers,2000
“Revision-notes.co.uk: The Peace Settlement After World War 1”. <>
This question is discussed on the basis that the peace settlements, which followed, of the 'Great War' marked the end of four empires.
Introduction
The Great War marked the end of 4 European empires, namely, the German Empire, the Austria-Hungary Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire. This essay will first attempt to define the term “modern imperialism”. Subsequently, it will attempt to explain why and how did the Great War result in the demise of each the above-mentioned empires and the possible effects of the Great War and the demise of the 4 empires with regards to the beginning of the end of “modern imperialism”. The later part of the essay will highlight that while the Great War had significant effects throughout the world with regards to both economics and politics imperialism – the reason why these two aspect are highlighted will be discussed below – it is not right to claim that it marked the beginning of the end of modern imperialism.
Definition of modern imperialism
For the sake of analysis, this essay will employ the definitions of imperialism as stated by Benjamin J.Cohen, Professor of International Political Economy at the University of California. According to Benjamin J.Cohen, “imperialism refers to those particular relationships between inherently unequal nations which involve effective subjugation, the actual exercise of influence over behaviour” . More importantly, Benjamin J.Cohen referred specifically to the modern sense of imperialism in the form of political and economic imperialism. These two aspects of imperialism are given special attention because they were the most “virulent and persistent forms of imperialism” and with economic imperialism cited as “perhaps the only form of imperialism” . Modern imperialism will therefore be defined as the exertion of influence of a more powerful nation over the behaviour of a less powerful nation through either political or economic means. One other point to note is the difference between modern imperialism and previous form of imperialism, the latter characterise often by bloodshed and aggressive take-overs whenever necessary .
The End of the German Empire
The Germans were the loser in the Great War. With the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, they were, together with Austria, held responsible for starting the war and made to pay for all the war damages suffered by the Allied powers. As a result of the peace settlements, the German Empire was to give up their foreign possessions, reduce the size of their military, cede territories to France and the newly set-up Poland and maintain a demilitarised zone between herself and France, with whom she had a long-standing rivalry as a result of the Franco-Prussian War, and who had suffered greatly in the Great War because of the “Trench Warfare” along the German western front due to the death toll. With all these terms, the peace settlements ensured that the German ceased to be an empire and remained weak, therefore ensuring that it can no longer threaten its neighbours, sparking another great war.
The End of the Austria-Hungary Empire
As mentioned above, the peace settlements held the Austria-Hungary Empire responsible for the war together with the German Empire, though the settlement was not as severe as the one handed to the German Empire. With all the war-debts thrown upon the German Empire, the main losses sustained by the Austria-Hungary Empire were the loss of its territories. In place of the former Austria-Hungary Empire, the new states of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia were established, and lend was ceded to Romania and also to Yugoslavia, which was formed by a few nations with Serbia as the core. Due to these separations, the economy of Austria was torn to tatters as Czechoslovakia had consisted of some of the wealthiest land of the former empire.
The End of the Ottoman Empire
The Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side on of the Central Powers having signed the Turko-German Alliance in 1914. Being on the losing side, the Ottoman Empire suffered a similar fate as the Austria-Hungary Empire and was carved out into different new states, such as Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon. The Arabs were rewarded with their own nation as a result of assisting the Allied Powers by resisting the Ottoman campaign.
The End of the Russian Empire
The Russian Empire under the House of the Romanovs was the only empire that did not fall as a direct result of losing the war per se. In fact the Russian Empire had entered the war on the side of the winning Allied Powers. However, Russians became disillusioned and discontented with the rule of the Russian Emperor, Tzar Nicholas II, after setbacks in the earlier phase of the war and severe economic crisis at home . Because of that, two revolutions took place in Russia resulting in the fall of the Russian Empire and the ascension of Vladimir Lenin, a Marxist revolutionary, to the Russian leadership. Promising his people “Land, Bread and Peace”, Lenin subsequently pulled out of the Great War by signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the Germans.
The effects of the Great War on imperialism
Firstly, the harsh treaty imposed upon the Germans resulted in a lot of hatred within the German population. The Germans felt that they were not to be held solely accountable for the war and should not be made to fully pay for the reparations. Such circumstances culminated in the rise of Hitler’s Nazi Germany when he played on the German sentiments and promise to return Germany to its former glory and take back what the Allied Powers took through the Treaty of Versailles, more specifically land, pride and money. Hitler’s Germany was to go on and start World War Two, which was destined to be far more destructive than the Great War due to technological advancements that enabled mass destruction through improved armament. World War Two was to weaken Europe like never before as millions died and Europe no longer have the ability to sustain its overseas possessions and therefore marking the beginning of the end of its influence on the less developed and therefore weaker non-Europeans.
Secondly, following the end of the Great War, American President Woodrow Wilson suggested in his “Fourteen Points” that the people of Europe should self-determinate and all set up their own states under nationalistic lines. This sparked off a new wave of nationalism, which occurred not only in Europe but also sow its seeds in their colonies in Asia and Africa. Consequently, there was an increase in rebellious movements throughout the world “dedicated to freeing their societies from the ravages of Western colonisation” . As followed, imperialism as direct control and influence over colonial possessions begins to wane and decline.
Modern imperialism persists
The demise of the four empires did not truly result in the decline of modern imperialism. For even though the end of the empires marked the establishment of several new states as well as the loss of foreign colonial possessions, many of the colonies did not achieve independence, nor did the newly established states. For example, the Middle-eastern countries, which were products of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, saved for Saudi Arabia, were incorporated into the British and French spheres of influence. Likewise for the colonies of Germany, which were distributed amongst the various Allied Powers. Hence the Great War resulted only in a change of ownership instead of a decline in imperialism.
In a way the same argument can be applied to the fall of the Russian Empire. Though it did not occurred immediately after the Great War, the successor of the Russian Empire, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), remained an imperialist power. After World War II, the Communist government in USSR, through its military might and the spread of the communist ideology and the organisation the Third International, maintained a series of satellite states that also acted as its buffer with the capitalist Western Europe. Though these states were not under the direct control of USSR, they were under the influence of Moscow, the capital of USSR. In this way, USSR fulfilled the criteria of being a modern imperialist power both in the economic and political sense as their principle of influence; communism, was both an economic as well as a political ideology. So strong was the influence of the USSR that it emerges as one of the two superpowers in contemporary history, establishing its hegemony on one side of the Cold War, the war between the Communist ideology and the Capitalist ideology, that spanned more than half a decade of the twentieth century.
The Great War also saw the emergence of a new superpower, the United States of America (USA) at the other side of the Cold War. The devastation in Europe saw the traditional Europeans fall from grace and the Americans rise in strength. Besides, being geographically far away, American soil and society was spared the same physical and structural destruction that was the result of the Great War, despite being involved in the war. Adding on to that Europe had borrowed heavily from the Americans to rebuild itself. This gives the American a financial edge over the Europe by using the loans and its repayment as a diplomatic tool in influencing European politics and economy. Also, prior to the war, Europe was the major trading partner of regions such as Latin America and Asia as it was then the most developed economy and had the largest importing power of raw materials and agricultural products thanks to the Industrial Revolution. After the war however it lost its number one position as its own economy lay in ruins. This allowed America to step in as the new economic powerhouse taking over its trade especially with Latin America due to its proximity .
Another important development that came out of the Great War was American President Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a League of Nations:
“A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small nations alike.”
America itself however was not part of the League of Nations, as the American Congress did not give its approval to join the League of Nations, without which President Wilson could not proceed. And without the Americans in the League, the League does not have the financial and military backing necessary to carry out carry out whatever sanctions or decision it makes against its member nations that had defied collective League decisions. This is evident in the years preceding World War II when the Germans and the Japanese refused to adhere to League decisions concerning their militarisation and military expansion in Europe and East Asia respectively. Nonetheless, the League of Nations provided the foundations and precedent for the present day United Nations, which has carried out economic and political sanctions against renegade countries that in their view threaten global peace and stability, for example North Korea and Iran. This is important, as it is an example of modern imperialism whereby the strong country, or countries, exert influence upon the behaviour another independent country through economic and political means.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the above-mentioned definition of modern imperialism was chosen for the analysis of this paper, though it must be noted that it is not the only definition. The discussion of the fall of the empires with regards to the Great War reveals that both the fall of the empires and the Great War itself had effects on the trajectory of imperialism. They are however insufficient to bring about the decline of imperialism or imperialistic developments as evident in the presence of many forms of imperialistic events that occurred from the end of the war to present day.
Bibliography
Cohen, Benjamin J. “The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence”. London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1974
Duiker, William J. “Twentieth-Century World History”. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005
Hollister, C. Warren, McGee J. Sears, Stoke Gale. “The West Transformed: A History of Western Civilisation”. Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers,2000
“Revision-notes.co.uk: The Peace Settlement After World War 1”. <>
Friederich Wilhelm Nietzsche as a social thinker
By Ng Wee Loon
Introduction
Out of the many social thinkers and theorist that had contributed greatly to the field of sociology, this essay highlights Friederich Wilhelm Nietzsche. This essay will begin with a brief biography of Nietzsche, giving an account of his life and his works. From the works of Nietzsche, some of his concepts will be singled out and further discussed. By the discussion of his work, this essay will seek to explain why Nietzsche can be considered to be a social thinker. In the process, comparisons and associations will be made to some of his more recognized counterparts in the sociological field such as Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx. Using the differences and similarities observed in the works of Nietzsche with regards to the other thinkers, this essay will try to portray Nietzsche as a social thinker to a certain extent though not necessary a sociologist.
Biography
Friederich Nietzsche was born in Prussia in 1844 to a Lutheran minister. Coming from a well-to-do family, Nietzsche was enrolled into elite school and studied in the University of Bonn and Leipzig where he was introduced to the field of philology and subsequently went on to obtain professorship at the department of philology at the University of Basel in Switzerland at the young age of twenty-four. During this time he met Richard Wagner, a musician whose ideas he founded corresponded to those of his own. “Wagner’s music was an attack on the decadence of formalistic, regimented nineteenth-century civilization” and “for Nietzsche the theme meshed with a revolutionary possibility just emerging in his own scholarly studies”. Nietzsche had also served in the Prussian army in the Franco-Prussian War as a medical orderly. Close contact with the wounded and dead was to have repercussions on his health and consequently his works in the later part of his life. Poor health made Nietzsche resign from his work at the university and he was to have more time to focus on writing till he collapsed in 1888 and it was in this time that he wrote most of his works.
His writings
Friederich Nietzsche authored many published writings. Starting from his first book “The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music” to his last in 1888, his works included “¬¬¬¬The Gay Science”, “The Dawn”, “Beyond Good and Evil”, “The Antichrist”, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”, “On the Genealogy of Morality” and others. In these books, Nietzsche expressed his views on culture, religion, morality, values, politics and society, among others.
On morality
“To be moral, to act in accordance with custom, to be ethical means to practise obedience towards a law or tradition established from old…. How the tradition has arisen is here a matter of indifference, and has in any kind of immanent categorical imperative; it is above all directed at the preservation of a community, a people…”
Nietzsche expressed in his book “Human, All Too Human”, his understanding of morality; that it is the adherence in behaviour, to established norms and traditions. These traditions are understood by him to be for the preservation of the community in which the individual in question belongs to. Laws and traditions are set by the people in a certain community for the good of the community and those members of this community are required to abide by these rules. These regulations therefore, become a set of social norms and exert pressure on the members of the community. Deviance from these social norms, in the case when they are established laws can result in punishment.
The behaviours of members of the given community are not out of their own free will but instead imposed upon them by the society that they belong to. In this light, we can understand that they are forced to act in a certain manner and they do so whether it is out of fear of punishment or out of preserving their community as Nietzsche sees it. Morality in this scenario is a social phenomenon. We can deduced that Nietzsche is looking at morality as a result of social pressures, that it is a social fact, “ideas, feelings and ways of behaving that possess the remarkable property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual” as interpreted by Emile Durkheim. This interpretation of morality by Nietzsche is therefore one of sociological basis and by this we can understand him as a social thinker.
On religion
Nietzsche’s views are in a way very similar to Karl Marx. First he sees the existence of 2 different classes in society, the oppressive masters and the oppressed slaves, and the revolt of the slaves as they try to establish the good morality. This morality, according to Nietzsche, was that of the Christian morality. Though the form of morality was different, the revolt of an oppressed class was nonetheless similar to Marx’s revolution of the proletariat class. More importantly, Nietzsche and Marx hold the same views with regards to religion. Marx was interested in “religion’s repressive, constraining, and exploitative qualities” and “they rationalise and defend the political and economic interests of the dominant class.” In Nietzsche’s view, the revolution set up a Christian society but this society did not result in the betterment of the people. Instead, in a Christian society, “suffering people were among the most precious possessions… because it was through them that others’ salvation could be ensured. They were to be given charities…” This is similar to Marx view of religion as Nietzsche sees the sustenance of these Christian values simply as a methods for politicians to bring themselves to power.
By drawing comparisons and parallels between Nietzsche and Karl Marx, this essay had attempted to show that Nietzsche had analysed religion from the sociological perspective. Just as Karl Marx, Nietzsche had viewed religion as a tool to affect the masses into unconscious submission. Through portraying values of the dominant class as religious values of the masses, religion is used to affect the masses into docile or obedient behaviours that the dominant class prefers. Otherwise, using religion as a way to improve the image of politicians as caring care-takers, the masses helps legitimise possible oppressive powers by bringing the politicians into government.
Nietzsche not as a social thinker
Looking at Nietzsche’s work, there seems to be no defined concept of the social. Instead, often, Nietzsche was more often concern with the individual rather the society. This is illustrated in the example of the field of existentialist philosophy, which Nietzsche had helped set off. Engaging his ideas of “nihilism”, existentialist rejects “all specialised academic metaphysics and epistemology that does not derive from an immediate sense of one’s own fully engaged life.” This projects instead a more psychological than sociological aspect of his work and helps de-engage him as a social thinker.
Conclusion
Friederich Nietzsche’s works have, since his death, gone on to affect academia in various fields. Still pertaining to sociology, he had “an immediate impact on Max Weber, alerting him to the role of the emotion-disciplining Christian work ethic in powering modern capitalist society and to the iron cage of bureaucracy that makes a slave morality appropriate for all.” While in psychology and philosophy, Nietzsche had gone on to influence thinkers such as Sigmund Freund and Alfred Adler. Despite the vast influence he has on others, Nietzsche interest was in philology and some of the most important parts of his ideas were that of “nihilism”, and “The Will” which was not discussed, are not definitely sociological. Yet the sociological aspect of some of his works cannot be neglected. What needs to be noted is that given the length of the paper, Nietzsche and his ideas cannot be fully analysed. Given the similarities he had with the other social thinkers, and the impact he had on social thinkers after him, Nietzsche can be, to a certain extent, considered a social thinker.
Bibliography
Collins, Randall and Makowsky, Michael. “The Discovery of Society”. New York: McGraw-Hill. 2005
Ferrante, Joan. “Sociology: A Global Perspective”. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth. 2006
Hollingdale, R.J. “A Nietzsche Reader”. London: Penguin. 1977
Introduction
Out of the many social thinkers and theorist that had contributed greatly to the field of sociology, this essay highlights Friederich Wilhelm Nietzsche. This essay will begin with a brief biography of Nietzsche, giving an account of his life and his works. From the works of Nietzsche, some of his concepts will be singled out and further discussed. By the discussion of his work, this essay will seek to explain why Nietzsche can be considered to be a social thinker. In the process, comparisons and associations will be made to some of his more recognized counterparts in the sociological field such as Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx. Using the differences and similarities observed in the works of Nietzsche with regards to the other thinkers, this essay will try to portray Nietzsche as a social thinker to a certain extent though not necessary a sociologist.
Biography
Friederich Nietzsche was born in Prussia in 1844 to a Lutheran minister. Coming from a well-to-do family, Nietzsche was enrolled into elite school and studied in the University of Bonn and Leipzig where he was introduced to the field of philology and subsequently went on to obtain professorship at the department of philology at the University of Basel in Switzerland at the young age of twenty-four. During this time he met Richard Wagner, a musician whose ideas he founded corresponded to those of his own. “Wagner’s music was an attack on the decadence of formalistic, regimented nineteenth-century civilization” and “for Nietzsche the theme meshed with a revolutionary possibility just emerging in his own scholarly studies”. Nietzsche had also served in the Prussian army in the Franco-Prussian War as a medical orderly. Close contact with the wounded and dead was to have repercussions on his health and consequently his works in the later part of his life. Poor health made Nietzsche resign from his work at the university and he was to have more time to focus on writing till he collapsed in 1888 and it was in this time that he wrote most of his works.
His writings
Friederich Nietzsche authored many published writings. Starting from his first book “The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music” to his last in 1888, his works included “¬¬¬¬The Gay Science”, “The Dawn”, “Beyond Good and Evil”, “The Antichrist”, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”, “On the Genealogy of Morality” and others. In these books, Nietzsche expressed his views on culture, religion, morality, values, politics and society, among others.
On morality
“To be moral, to act in accordance with custom, to be ethical means to practise obedience towards a law or tradition established from old…. How the tradition has arisen is here a matter of indifference, and has in any kind of immanent categorical imperative; it is above all directed at the preservation of a community, a people…”
Nietzsche expressed in his book “Human, All Too Human”, his understanding of morality; that it is the adherence in behaviour, to established norms and traditions. These traditions are understood by him to be for the preservation of the community in which the individual in question belongs to. Laws and traditions are set by the people in a certain community for the good of the community and those members of this community are required to abide by these rules. These regulations therefore, become a set of social norms and exert pressure on the members of the community. Deviance from these social norms, in the case when they are established laws can result in punishment.
The behaviours of members of the given community are not out of their own free will but instead imposed upon them by the society that they belong to. In this light, we can understand that they are forced to act in a certain manner and they do so whether it is out of fear of punishment or out of preserving their community as Nietzsche sees it. Morality in this scenario is a social phenomenon. We can deduced that Nietzsche is looking at morality as a result of social pressures, that it is a social fact, “ideas, feelings and ways of behaving that possess the remarkable property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual” as interpreted by Emile Durkheim. This interpretation of morality by Nietzsche is therefore one of sociological basis and by this we can understand him as a social thinker.
On religion
Nietzsche’s views are in a way very similar to Karl Marx. First he sees the existence of 2 different classes in society, the oppressive masters and the oppressed slaves, and the revolt of the slaves as they try to establish the good morality. This morality, according to Nietzsche, was that of the Christian morality. Though the form of morality was different, the revolt of an oppressed class was nonetheless similar to Marx’s revolution of the proletariat class. More importantly, Nietzsche and Marx hold the same views with regards to religion. Marx was interested in “religion’s repressive, constraining, and exploitative qualities” and “they rationalise and defend the political and economic interests of the dominant class.” In Nietzsche’s view, the revolution set up a Christian society but this society did not result in the betterment of the people. Instead, in a Christian society, “suffering people were among the most precious possessions… because it was through them that others’ salvation could be ensured. They were to be given charities…” This is similar to Marx view of religion as Nietzsche sees the sustenance of these Christian values simply as a methods for politicians to bring themselves to power.
By drawing comparisons and parallels between Nietzsche and Karl Marx, this essay had attempted to show that Nietzsche had analysed religion from the sociological perspective. Just as Karl Marx, Nietzsche had viewed religion as a tool to affect the masses into unconscious submission. Through portraying values of the dominant class as religious values of the masses, religion is used to affect the masses into docile or obedient behaviours that the dominant class prefers. Otherwise, using religion as a way to improve the image of politicians as caring care-takers, the masses helps legitimise possible oppressive powers by bringing the politicians into government.
Nietzsche not as a social thinker
Looking at Nietzsche’s work, there seems to be no defined concept of the social. Instead, often, Nietzsche was more often concern with the individual rather the society. This is illustrated in the example of the field of existentialist philosophy, which Nietzsche had helped set off. Engaging his ideas of “nihilism”, existentialist rejects “all specialised academic metaphysics and epistemology that does not derive from an immediate sense of one’s own fully engaged life.” This projects instead a more psychological than sociological aspect of his work and helps de-engage him as a social thinker.
Conclusion
Friederich Nietzsche’s works have, since his death, gone on to affect academia in various fields. Still pertaining to sociology, he had “an immediate impact on Max Weber, alerting him to the role of the emotion-disciplining Christian work ethic in powering modern capitalist society and to the iron cage of bureaucracy that makes a slave morality appropriate for all.” While in psychology and philosophy, Nietzsche had gone on to influence thinkers such as Sigmund Freund and Alfred Adler. Despite the vast influence he has on others, Nietzsche interest was in philology and some of the most important parts of his ideas were that of “nihilism”, and “The Will” which was not discussed, are not definitely sociological. Yet the sociological aspect of some of his works cannot be neglected. What needs to be noted is that given the length of the paper, Nietzsche and his ideas cannot be fully analysed. Given the similarities he had with the other social thinkers, and the impact he had on social thinkers after him, Nietzsche can be, to a certain extent, considered a social thinker.
Bibliography
Collins, Randall and Makowsky, Michael. “The Discovery of Society”. New York: McGraw-Hill. 2005
Ferrante, Joan. “Sociology: A Global Perspective”. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth. 2006
Hollingdale, R.J. “A Nietzsche Reader”. London: Penguin. 1977
“Pill for Every Ill” Syndrome
By Ng Wee Loon
Introduction
The “pill for every ill” syndrome is described as “the chemical illusion” and “for many years we have been exposed to the idea that drugs are man’s companions and are capable of producing miracles”. (Lennard, 1971)
“Too often when people talk about ‘the drug problem’, they have in mind only the illicit use of drugs such as heroin.” (Edwards 1983) While academics gave due attention of the use of drugs and the problem of the “pill of the ill” syndrome, the use of quick-fixes for solution to problems and illnesses, much of the research placed emphasis on problems such as the “increased use of non-prescribed or over-the-counter medications” and prescribed drugs such as Benzodiazepines. (Cooperstock, 1983)
I feel that there is also a need to study the application of this syndrome to the use of non-medication psychoactive drugs by individuals to treat their ills, and in this paper, specifically nicotine in the form of cigarette smoking to combat stress. This study will first take into account the definition of “ill” in our society, and subsequently explain why drugs are used to increasingly applied in place of other forms of treatments in the alleviation of this “ill”. The last part of the paper will discuss the reasons for the rise of this drug-consuming culture.
Definition of the “ill”
Society is “enmeshed in an orgy of self-medication” and in a “hedonistic society, pain or discomfort are to be avoided at all cost, and this in part explains the overwhelming urge to inhale, gargle, swallow, apply or inject some medication at the slightest discomfort.” (Louria 1971) This discomfort is no longer restricted physical but also psychological manifestation, especially stress. There has been increasing emphasis on stress management because stress affects people from all walks of life regardless of age, gender or occupation and “traumatic stressful events may trigger either behavioural or biological processes that contribute to the onset of disease.” (Despues 1999)
“Pill” for the ill of Stress
As reported by the Telegraph, a British newspaper, “people are increasingly relying on medicinal cures rather than preventive methods or cheaper therapies”. (Telegraph 2005) The same can be said for stress. There are various ways of coping with stress, such as “feeling in control, approach and avoidant, appraisal and reappraisal”, (Despues 1999) yet some people choose to smoke in response to coping with stress.
According to the National Cancer Institute of the United States, one of the reasons for cited by smokers for their habit is to relieve stress. This is temporarily achieved because nicotine, the active ingredient in cigarettes causes the release of neurotransmitter in the brain such as Beta-Endorphin and Dopamine, which results in the reduction of pain and enhanced pleasure, thereby alleviating stress.
Thus, nicotine consumption is can be considered as a quick-fix “pill” for the “ill” of stress. It is chosen by the smokers over other non-drug treatment in combating stress.
The cause of this syndrome
The reason for the rise of this syndrome is as stated in the introduction, that we have “for many year been exposed to the idea that drugs are man’s companions are capable of producing miracles” and this idea was propagated “for their own reasons by the drug industry, media and self-appointed of youth spokesmen of the youth culture”. (Lennard 1971)
This is especially true in the United States where the government allows “Direct to Consumer Advertising”, a multi-billion industry that “cultivate the belief among the public that there is a pill for every ill and contribute to medicalisation of trivial ailments, leading to an even more ‘overmedicated’ society.” (Baumbach 2001) That is because these advertisements portraits drugs as miracles cures and project a false image of drug-taking models as “smiling, happy people” (Baumbach 2001) leaving out other “lifestyle changes or other nonpharmacologic interventions” (Baumbach 2001) which are just as important, if not more, for a healthy and happy lifestyle.
In the case of cigarettes smoking, advertisement plays a major role as well. “The tobacco industry spends 5 billion dollars a year on advertising and promotion.” (Kline 2000) Since the beginning of tobacco and cigarettes advertising, the industry has attempted to project smoking as healthy, for example with the introduction of the menthol cigarettes in the 1950s (Pollay et al 2001), or downplaying the harmful effects of smoking. These advertisements add on to the effects already advocated by the drug and pharmaceutical industry and influence the public into believing the therapeutic effects of cigarettes in relieving stress.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the “pill for every ill” syndrome is all but a man-made phenomenon created by the “medical profession and pharmaceutical industry” as “it is in the interest of both groups to define more and more problems as medical in order to justify both the medical model and the intervention of drugs”. (Lennard 1971)
Furthermore the advertising industry has been employed effectively to reach this end as the “industry with practically unlimited access to the mass media has been confusing the people, young and old alike, that drugs effect instant and significant changes” (Lennard 1971) and the tobacco industry jumped onto the bandwagon and ride on its wave.
With the cigarette example, this paper has illustrated how the drug industry, “in its attempt to increase the market for its products”, “is redefining and relabelling as medical problems calling for drug intervention wide range of human behaviours which, in the past, have been viewed as falling within the bounds of normal trials and tribulations of human existence”. (Lennard 1971)
Stress, which was a natural “process in which environmental demands strain an organisms adaptive capacity” (Despues 1999) now becomes pathological, an “ill” and demands a cure, using drugs. Cigarettes is the “pill” that provides for that hedonistic relief, much like many of the over drugs on the market.
Bibliography
Baumbach, Amy. “A Pill For Every Ill”, <>, (Accessed 1 April 2007)
Cooperstock, Ruth. “A Pill For Every Nervous Ill: Psychotropics As World Concern”. In Drug Use And Misuse, edited by Griffith Edwards, Awni Arif and Jerome Jaffe. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983
Despues, Desiree. “Stress And Illness”, California State University, Northridge, <>, (Accessed 1 April 2007)
Edwards, Griffith. “Drugs And Drug Abuse”. In Drug Use And Misuse, edited by Griffith Edwards, Awni Arif and Jerome Jaffe. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983
Kline, Robert L. “Tobacco Advertising After the Settlement: Where We Are and What Remains To Be Done” Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy, Volume 9, Issue 4 <>, (Accessed 1 April 2007)
Lennard, Henry L. “The Chemical Illusion”. In Drug Abuse: Psychology, Sociology, Pharmacology, edited by Brent Q. Hafen and Eugene J. Faux. Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1973
Louria, Donald B. “Drugs And Society”. In Drug Abuse: Psychology, Sociology, Pharmacology, edited by Brent Q. Hafen and Eugene J. Faux. Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1973
Pollay, Richard W. and Dewhirst, Timothy. “Marketing Cigarettes with Low Machine-Measured Yields”. In Risks Associated with Smoking Cigarettes with Low Machine-Measured Yields of Tar and Nicotine, edited by Donald R. Shopland, David M. Burns, Neal L. Benowitz and Richard H. Amacher., (Accessed 1 April 2007)
“Quitting Tobacco: Handling Stress ... Without Smoking”, National Cancer Institute,, (Accessed 1 April 2007)
“Britons believe in a pill for every ill”, The Telegraph, 8 April 2005
Introduction
The “pill for every ill” syndrome is described as “the chemical illusion” and “for many years we have been exposed to the idea that drugs are man’s companions and are capable of producing miracles”. (Lennard, 1971)
“Too often when people talk about ‘the drug problem’, they have in mind only the illicit use of drugs such as heroin.” (Edwards 1983) While academics gave due attention of the use of drugs and the problem of the “pill of the ill” syndrome, the use of quick-fixes for solution to problems and illnesses, much of the research placed emphasis on problems such as the “increased use of non-prescribed or over-the-counter medications” and prescribed drugs such as Benzodiazepines. (Cooperstock, 1983)
I feel that there is also a need to study the application of this syndrome to the use of non-medication psychoactive drugs by individuals to treat their ills, and in this paper, specifically nicotine in the form of cigarette smoking to combat stress. This study will first take into account the definition of “ill” in our society, and subsequently explain why drugs are used to increasingly applied in place of other forms of treatments in the alleviation of this “ill”. The last part of the paper will discuss the reasons for the rise of this drug-consuming culture.
Definition of the “ill”
Society is “enmeshed in an orgy of self-medication” and in a “hedonistic society, pain or discomfort are to be avoided at all cost, and this in part explains the overwhelming urge to inhale, gargle, swallow, apply or inject some medication at the slightest discomfort.” (Louria 1971) This discomfort is no longer restricted physical but also psychological manifestation, especially stress. There has been increasing emphasis on stress management because stress affects people from all walks of life regardless of age, gender or occupation and “traumatic stressful events may trigger either behavioural or biological processes that contribute to the onset of disease.” (Despues 1999)
“Pill” for the ill of Stress
As reported by the Telegraph, a British newspaper, “people are increasingly relying on medicinal cures rather than preventive methods or cheaper therapies”. (Telegraph 2005) The same can be said for stress. There are various ways of coping with stress, such as “feeling in control, approach and avoidant, appraisal and reappraisal”, (Despues 1999) yet some people choose to smoke in response to coping with stress.
According to the National Cancer Institute of the United States, one of the reasons for cited by smokers for their habit is to relieve stress. This is temporarily achieved because nicotine, the active ingredient in cigarettes causes the release of neurotransmitter in the brain such as Beta-Endorphin and Dopamine, which results in the reduction of pain and enhanced pleasure, thereby alleviating stress.
Thus, nicotine consumption is can be considered as a quick-fix “pill” for the “ill” of stress. It is chosen by the smokers over other non-drug treatment in combating stress.
The cause of this syndrome
The reason for the rise of this syndrome is as stated in the introduction, that we have “for many year been exposed to the idea that drugs are man’s companions are capable of producing miracles” and this idea was propagated “for their own reasons by the drug industry, media and self-appointed of youth spokesmen of the youth culture”. (Lennard 1971)
This is especially true in the United States where the government allows “Direct to Consumer Advertising”, a multi-billion industry that “cultivate the belief among the public that there is a pill for every ill and contribute to medicalisation of trivial ailments, leading to an even more ‘overmedicated’ society.” (Baumbach 2001) That is because these advertisements portraits drugs as miracles cures and project a false image of drug-taking models as “smiling, happy people” (Baumbach 2001) leaving out other “lifestyle changes or other nonpharmacologic interventions” (Baumbach 2001) which are just as important, if not more, for a healthy and happy lifestyle.
In the case of cigarettes smoking, advertisement plays a major role as well. “The tobacco industry spends 5 billion dollars a year on advertising and promotion.” (Kline 2000) Since the beginning of tobacco and cigarettes advertising, the industry has attempted to project smoking as healthy, for example with the introduction of the menthol cigarettes in the 1950s (Pollay et al 2001), or downplaying the harmful effects of smoking. These advertisements add on to the effects already advocated by the drug and pharmaceutical industry and influence the public into believing the therapeutic effects of cigarettes in relieving stress.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the “pill for every ill” syndrome is all but a man-made phenomenon created by the “medical profession and pharmaceutical industry” as “it is in the interest of both groups to define more and more problems as medical in order to justify both the medical model and the intervention of drugs”. (Lennard 1971)
Furthermore the advertising industry has been employed effectively to reach this end as the “industry with practically unlimited access to the mass media has been confusing the people, young and old alike, that drugs effect instant and significant changes” (Lennard 1971) and the tobacco industry jumped onto the bandwagon and ride on its wave.
With the cigarette example, this paper has illustrated how the drug industry, “in its attempt to increase the market for its products”, “is redefining and relabelling as medical problems calling for drug intervention wide range of human behaviours which, in the past, have been viewed as falling within the bounds of normal trials and tribulations of human existence”. (Lennard 1971)
Stress, which was a natural “process in which environmental demands strain an organisms adaptive capacity” (Despues 1999) now becomes pathological, an “ill” and demands a cure, using drugs. Cigarettes is the “pill” that provides for that hedonistic relief, much like many of the over drugs on the market.
Bibliography
Baumbach, Amy. “A Pill For Every Ill”, <>, (Accessed 1 April 2007)
Cooperstock, Ruth. “A Pill For Every Nervous Ill: Psychotropics As World Concern”. In Drug Use And Misuse, edited by Griffith Edwards, Awni Arif and Jerome Jaffe. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983
Despues, Desiree. “Stress And Illness”, California State University, Northridge, <>, (Accessed 1 April 2007)
Edwards, Griffith. “Drugs And Drug Abuse”. In Drug Use And Misuse, edited by Griffith Edwards, Awni Arif and Jerome Jaffe. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983
Kline, Robert L. “Tobacco Advertising After the Settlement: Where We Are and What Remains To Be Done” Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy, Volume 9, Issue 4 <>, (Accessed 1 April 2007)
Lennard, Henry L. “The Chemical Illusion”. In Drug Abuse: Psychology, Sociology, Pharmacology, edited by Brent Q. Hafen and Eugene J. Faux. Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1973
Louria, Donald B. “Drugs And Society”. In Drug Abuse: Psychology, Sociology, Pharmacology, edited by Brent Q. Hafen and Eugene J. Faux. Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1973
Pollay, Richard W. and Dewhirst, Timothy. “Marketing Cigarettes with Low Machine-Measured Yields”. In Risks Associated with Smoking Cigarettes with Low Machine-Measured Yields of Tar and Nicotine, edited by Donald R. Shopland, David M. Burns, Neal L. Benowitz and Richard H. Amacher.
“Quitting Tobacco: Handling Stress ... Without Smoking”, National Cancer Institute,
“Britons believe in a pill for every ill”, The Telegraph, 8 April 2005
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