Europeanization of French Foreign Policy in Africa

Abstract
Membership in the European Union has brought about profound effects in the national policies of member states. An inherently nationalistic aspect of politics with a state centric view of world politics, foreign policy cannot prevent these effects from materializing. This paper will now employ the categorization of Wong (2006) and the example of French foreign military policy as well as European-African relations to illustrate the process of Europeanization in Africa. In doing so, it seeks to provide a clear picture of actual application of Europeanization theory in real life situations. From here on, it provides a first step to the application of Europeanization in a broader sense of economics and other issues.

Introduction
From the outset, it is necessary to define the objectives of this paper. It is to illustrate the Europeanization of French foreign policy in terms of its military aspects, in the continent of Africa. “The notion of ‘foreign policy’ often carries with it the conceptual assumptions of the state centric view of world politics.” (Wong, 2006, 2) However, it is this paper’s objectives to point out that even in foreign policy, a nationalistic dimension of politics, a member state, in this case France, of the European Union (EU) cannot avoid the influence that their membership could possibly have on itself. More specifically, it is this paper’s objective to show the impact of EU membership and the extent of this impact on a France’s foreign military policy.

To contextualize this illustration, it is necessary to provide a setting in which we can more concretely examine the actual developments of France’s foreign military policy. For the purpose of this paper, I have chosen to study Africa in this context. It is simple to justify this. Africa, particularly North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, has had a long history of interaction with France. For the most part of the nineteenth and twentieth century, much of Africa remained under the French sphere of influence as its colonies. However, French interest in Africa did not end with the decolonization process in the fifties and sixties. As Utley (2002) posits, “major French interest in the region stems from the country’s past as a colonial power but it did not end with decolonization.” (Utley, 2002:129)

Since Africa provides such an interesting specimen, it will be best to conduct a thorough examination of the Europeanization of the French foreign policy in Africa. However, academic limitations dictates that this paper provide a more focused exploration of one aspect of the Franco-African interaction. Hence, the focus of this paper will be on the military aspect of French foreign policy in Africa since “the most overt aspect of France’s residual tie with Africa . . . was the application of defence and military agreements,” [sic] (Utley, 2002:130) which earned the former the name of the “gendarme of Africa” (Utley, 2002:130)

The study of the Europeanization of French foreign policy in Africa is worthy of note because there is a need to substantiate the study of Europeanization theories with concrete applications to real life situations. Thus this paper contributes to the discussion of the application of the Europeanization theory in explaining the effects of membership in the EU on French foreign policy, which Wong (2006) had previously illustrated extensively with regards to East Asia. By first examining the development of French foreign military policy in Africa and subsequently EU’s military policy in Africa, this paper will establish the causal link between the two and in consequence present a picture of convergence. Hence, this will prove the existence of the Europeanization process and also demonstrate the extent to which French foreign policy has been Europeanized.

Europeanization
“Europeanization is a relatively new, fashionable and ill-defined concept in the scholarly literature of European Studies/ International Relations” (Wong, 2006:6). Compared to Europeanization, “traditional foreign policy analysis focuses on the state as a unitary actor with given interests, understood mostly with material terms. However, this approach basically ignores the importance of norms, values or other social factors, such as culture and identity.” (Rieker, 2006:513) Amongst the many Europeanization scholars, Pernille Rieker, for example, looks at “two forms of Europeanization: adaptation and learning” (Rieker, 2006:514), as socialization processes and Wong classifies Europeanization into three schools: national adaptation, national projection and identity reconstruction (Wong, 2006). While the different definitions of Europeanization have similarities and differences, as well as strengths and weaknesses, it is not the aim of this paper to discuss which is better. Instead, it suffices to acknowledge that this paper will employ Wong’s three schools of Europeanization as its working definition because of its more encompassing range, which often incorporates the other scholars.

Since it is the working definition employed in this paper, it is necessary to briefly discuss here what Wong (2006) means by Europeanization. As previously mentioned, Wong classifies Europeanization into three schools of thought: national adaptation, national projection and identity construction. For him, national adaptation is a “top-down process in which the states is reactive, and where the state adapts and makes adjustment in its domestic politics and policy in compliance with the restraints and requirements of European institutions.” (Wong, 2006:8) In this aspect, Europeanization is most clearly seen in the economic realm, whereby the Euro zone, the common market, and various economic policies such as Common Competition Policy have shifted decision-making powers from the national governments to the European Commission. However, Wong also pointed out that other than economic policies, the national foreign policies of member states are under increasing pressure from the “cumulative weight of the aquis of EPC/ CFSP/ CESDP” (Wong, 2006:8), EU’s foreign policies, to converge.

The second school of Europeanization, national projection, works seemingly in opposition to the first school of national adaptation. As Wong puts it, the second school, “at first glance provides a countervailing antithesis to the national adaptation/ policy convergence school.” (Wong, 2006:9) For the second school, Europeanization is a state-centric concept that looks at the exportation of previously national policies “onto a larger European stage.” (Wong, 2006:9) Therefore, in this sense, Europeanization is a bottom-up process that serves to use the EU as a tool for advancing national interests.

The third school of Europeanization, identity reconstruction, is a constructivist argument that looks at EU as a socialization agent. Membership in the EU exposes member states to “sociological institutions” such as “unwritten rules, norms and practices” (Wong, 2006:10) as well as prolonged involvement in European policy-making. These exposures then serve to reorient government officials into acquiring both a common European identity as well as their national identity, resulting in the convergence of policies.
France, power and Africa
In addition to the previous section that broadly explained the working definition of Europeanization in this paper, this section will now go on to give a background summary of Franco-African relations. Franco-African relations are founded on the beliefs in the eyes of the French that France is a world power. The role of Africa in these beliefs is one of a supporting role. As John Chipman (1989) argues,
“ . . . for successive French republics continued French influence in Africa has been an essential aim. Accomplishment of this aim has been linked to maintaining the strength of the state, to assuring some measure of success in implicit or explicit geopolitical struggles, and to improving the image of French power on the world stage. The fact of overseas influence, particularly in Africa, has helped to sustain the idea that the values of the French republic were universal. The maintenance of different degrees of influence in Africa and the French capacity to preserve independent and unique ties on that continent has helped to bolster claims to great power status.” (Chipman, 1989:1)

To further substantiate his point, Chipman gave the two following examples. Firstly, French influence in North Africa gave “shape and substance to the idea that France was a European power with strengths on both sides of the Mediterranean.” (Chipman, 1989:2) By extending its influence beyond Europe, France was able to demonstrate its strength. This is because “for a power to retain its position in international society, it must undertake a degree of activity which has implications for those living beyond its borders.” (Chipman, 1989:24)

Secondly, French power in Africa was also linked to French power in Europe. As Chipman postulates, “the power of the French state in Europe was still seen by some as giving it regional power in Africa and the Mediterranean.” (Chipman, 1989:7) This implies that the strength of France in Europe and in Africa was directly related. The stronger France was in Europe, the stronger it was in Africa and vice versa. Thus Africa became a gauge of French power.

Other than the ideological link between French power and Africa, it is also necessary to know the actual historical French activities in Africa, so as to provide a context for understanding French policy in Africa. “The French have had a long association with Africa, which dates back (in the case of Senegal) at least to the seventeenth century.” (Chipman, 1989:1) More recently, French colonialism in the nineteenth and twentieth century resulted in the bringing of North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, or Black Africa, under French influence. In this period, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco were among the acquisitions to come under French influence, which “came to form a coherent geographical whole whose links with France were immensely important for those who wished to nurture the image of a ‘Greater France’.” (Chipman, 1989:2)

Compared to its northern neighbours, Black Africa, as explained by Chipman (1989), was originally to have less importance. However, it came to have more relevance as France participated in the “Scramble of Africa” in a bid to increase her influence as well as deprive others of theirs in the region. In effect, Black Africa’s importance to France was most highlighted during the two World Wars as it contributed to the French war efforts, consequently increasing its standing within France.

From this section, we have come to understand briefly Franco-African in the light of the idea of French power. Both North Africa and Black Africa’s importance stemmed from their part in playing to the notion of French power since Chipman (1989) also postulated that neither of the two had any real economic consequences for France.

France’s foreign military policy in Africa since decolonization
This section will now proceed to continue the examination of French military involvement in Africa from the time of decolonization till present day. It is this section that will subsequently provide the materials that will be used in comparison with EU’s policy in Africa to determine convergence between the two. The policies of post-decolonization France would be appropriate because it was also around the same time that France became a member of EU as a member of the founding six.

After decolonization, “French leaders, and particularly de Gaulle saw in . . . Africa the one area where France’s military power could still be relevant.” (Chipman, 1989:115) Hence, to continue having its influence overseas and at the same time maintain its great power status, France started signing and concluding defense as well as military assistance agreements with African states. In the two decades spanning the sixties and seventies, France signed around thirty such agreements. (Chipman, 1989)

Other than for the reason of maintaining French power, in the period after the war, the French foreign policy in part was marked by considerations of Cold War tensions, which came to be the defining feature of external politics. With Europe divided into two camps between the Western democratic countries and the Eastern communist countries under Soviet leadership, Africa because of its close proximity just at the south of Europe, was the next possible battleground for proxy conflicts. Therefore, while “France’s military power in . . . Africa has only occasionally been related to general military strategic aims . . . it has certainly made it very difficult for the Soviet Union to establish herself in West and Central Africa.” In the same manner, just like it was in the Scramble for Africa, France presence in the former denied the other powers of their presence. This policy was successful as can be seen that “while the USSR was able to exploit the vacuum created by Portugal’s withdrawal from southern Africa in 1975, she has not sought directly to oppose Western influence when it was well established.” (Chipman, 1989:166)

Following the end of the Cold War in the nineties, French foreign military policy in Africa faced another important impetus for change. “The reasons for this were varied, encompassing political, economic and military factors, and were inextricably linked to the reorientation and adaptation of France’s external policy to the new realities of the post-Cold War era.” (Utley, 2002:131) Up to this point, “it would be difficult to find another region in the world in which the presence and the determining influence of a previous colonial power remains so extensive and so lasting.” (Brüne, 1994:45) Statistically speaking, up till 1994, there were still around “135000 French people living in Africa . . . where France keeps permanent military bases” and “there are about 10000 French soldiers still stationed in the sub-Saharan Africa where the Grande Nation has intervened militarily – both openly and covertly.” [sic] (Brüne, 1994:45)

However all these were changing as France entered the new post-Cold War era. One of the first examples of change was the turn towards multilateralism and the link between humanitarian goals with military intervention. Rwanda, one of the countries that France had signed a military agreement with in 1975, had fallen in a civil war in 1994. In the genocide that ensued, French forces on the ground were defeated, resulting in the consideration of further French actions. “Although the government was divided, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur found a compromise: French military invention would be authorized, but only under strict conditions. The operation had to be explicitly sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council; it was to be of limited duration; and it was to have primarily humanitarian goals” (Utley, 2002: 132) This event displayed a marked change of directions for the French. Autonomy in foreign affairs, previously so precious to France, gave way to multilateralism, at least in terms of decision-making, in terms of UN sanctions. The aim of the operation was also important as a demonstration of French power was no longer the primary reason for intervention but rather, as Utley (2002) pointed out, the operation was to have primary humanitarian goals.

To add on to that, continuously poor economic showings have resulted in a need to tighten the purse strings. On top of that, “France struggled to meet the economic convergence criteria for the single European currency,” (Utley, 2002: 135) meaning that defense budget had to be reduced and more importantly, the stationing of troops in Africa became unsustainable. In addition, President Chirac’s decision in 1996 to reorganize the military by replacing a conscripted army with a “wholly professional armed forces” (Utley, 2002, 134) also made the stationing of troops in Africa more and more difficult. The conscripted French army was not suitable for the types of military operations that France would be involved in while the newly reformed professional forces would. “The problem, however, was that it was hard to develop a state-of-the-art military dependent on expensive technologies at a time of declining budget, which made France’s cooperation in a system of European defense all the more important.” (Kramer, 2002:63) Consequently there was a decrease in the importance of Africa. In its place was the increasing focus towards Europe.

Here we see a direct consequence on the French foreign military policy as a result of the indirect action of France’s participation in the Euro zone. Although the EU did not have a directive that required France to reduce its military involvement in Africa, or rather it could not since at this point of time as it did not have a coherent military nor external policy, France nevertheless had to do so because of the obligations it had under as a member of EU to revise its economy in the impending implementation of the Euro. These led to a significant change in French foreign military policy in terms of the reduction in quantitative figure of French troops in Africa as well as the qualitative change in the agreements between France and its African partners from defense agreements to cooperation agreements. (Utley, 2002) The result is a revision of the agreements made between France and its African partners,
“France would no longer take the primary role in ensuring relative stability in Africa, even on behalf of its former colonies. Troops number would fall, and bases would close. Defence agreements and military cooperation would change – in most cases would diminish. The focus of France’s security commitment in Africa would increasingly be emphasize on multilateral terms, with the onus on African states to develop regional approaches to stability, security and conflict resolution.” (Utley, 2002:136)

From here, we can also see a development of France’s foreign military policy in Africa calling for increased regionalism and responsibility on the part of the Africans. This is also linked to the previous point on multilateralism. France was gradually looking at multilateralism, both from the position of giver, the UN and EU, and receiver, the African states, of military assistance. Multilateralism nonetheless would not result in a reduction of French influence as it would not “prevent an interpretation of future European security in a way that would devolve to individual member-states substantial prerogatives in their traditional areas of influence,” (Bowen, 2005:96) as will be demonstrated later.

European military policy in Africa
EU’s African policy is split into two different regional groupings. Northern African states such Algeria and Tunisia falls under the Mediterranean grouping, while other states such as Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania falls under African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states grouping. “However, at the beginning of the new millennium, the EU launched a new dialogue with Africa to build a strategic partnership with the entire continent which would strengthen existing measures.” (SCADPlus, 2008) Even so, EU’s African policy is “not clear-cut and may lack total consistency and coherence, largely because policy towards Africa has been changing significantly since the end of the Cold War, and is still in a state of flux.” (Olsen, 2004: 425) Despite this, this paper will attempt to trace out the military aspects of the African policy of the EU. In doing so, much of the focus will be on the sub-Saharan Africa since the majority of the military interventions on the continent is in this area.

A close examination of the prevailing literature on EU and African relations would point towards a great emphasis placed on economic development as well as aid and assistance. These were also the focus of the four Lomé Conventions concluded between the ACP countries and the EU. However, Olsen (2004) posits that with the end of the Cold War, the objectives of the EU have change in two main ways,
First, the aims of the European African policy widened from the original goal of promoting economic and social development increasingly towards giving priority to the promotion of stability, security and democracy. Second, the low priority of the region manifested itself very clearly in the continuous reduction in the aid transfers from the EC/ EU during the 1990s.” (Olsen, 2004:426)

One of the reasons for these changes was the frustration with the EU with the “lack of positive results after so many years of development assistance to Africa.” (Olsen, 2004, 429) In addition, there was also the recognition with EU that the three objectives of stability, security and democracy are needed as a foundation to cater for real growth and development.

Interestingly, as mentioned in the previous section, this period was also the same time that France recognized a limit on its ability to continuously sustain a credible military force in Africa. France’s downsizing of its military force and military establishments in Africa and shift towards a “long-term European focus to its external policies, including defence” [sic] (Utley, 2002:134) coincided with EU’s shift in focus towards stability and security in Africa. This paper therefore postulates that, there was a displacement of French objectives in Africa from the national stage to the European stage. This bottom-up Europeanization process saw France use the EU as a tool to carry out and continue having influence in Africa at a time when France could no longer by herself sustain military interventions and operations in the continent.

To facilitate this change of objectives in the European policy on Africa, EU needed real military capabilities and this translated itself into the European discourse calling for military capabilities that match its economic clout and international standing. As Deighton (2002) commented, “a state of military dependence on others should not be compatible with the dignity of nations like those in Western Europe, which should seek to be come more militarily self sufficient in their homeland defence and security.” (Deighton, 2002:721) Notably, in 1998, the leaders of France and Britain came together and called for “EU itself to acquire the capacity for autonomous action backed by credible military forces” (Howorth and Keeler, 2003:10) in the St. Malo’s Declaration. The result is the formation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whose key roles included the Petersberg Tasks of “humanitarian and rescue task, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” (Lindstrom, 2007:1)

It would then come as no surprise that ESDP’s first operation outside Europe happened in Africa. Operation Artemis in Congo involved France as the “framework nation . . . meaning it deployed most of the troops and the commander.” (Olsen, 2004:432) Even though Operation Artemis was a EU operation, France nevertheless was the leading country. By using the EU as a platform, France was able to direct the operation, achieve international recognition, since Artemis was also UN-sanctioned, as well as utilized EU resources in an African state that was its former colony and with which it had military agreements.

Conclusion
It is the objective of this paper to show the Europeanization of French foreign military policy in Africa. It has done so by first defining Europeanization and understanding the historical context of the subject matter at hand. Europeanization in this case is the categorization of Wong (2006) in which there appeared three schools of thought depending on the direction of influence.

This paper has attempted to outline the developments in the military policy of both France and EU in Africa, in doing so it highlighted the reasons for change as well as the changes that took place. I have shown that developments in French policy and EU policy are intrinsically linked and one affects the other. Hence it demonstrated the process of Europeanization in both the national and regional level.

The section on France’s military policy has clearly demonstrated a shift in focus due to the former’s membership in EU. Not only did participation in the Economic Monetary Union indirectly force it to reexamine its military policy, there was also a shift in its international conduct from unilateral to multilateralism, which was often linked with EU. Therefore, they presented evidences of the third school of Europeanization of learning and adaptation. On the other hand, the examination on the European Union’s military policy showed clearly a shift of objectives as well as the creation of a concrete ESDP. I postulate that this is an evidence of bottom-up Europeanization, whereby a member state, in this case France, uses the EU as a tool to project national interest that it could by itself no longer keep up.

In itself, this paper only provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate of Europeanization. However, it also serves as a good starting point in further exploring the evolution of national policies in the face of EU membership. It is my wish that this work represents a stepping-stone for others to look at the effects of the Europeanization process with regards to other areas of French foreign policy in Africa.

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