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Friday, January 18, 2008

According to Amitav Acharya (2000), ASEAN can be considered a nascent “security community”. Do you agree?

By Ng Wee Loon

Introduction

Dr. Amitav Acharya is a professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the Nanyang Technological University of Singapore, with an interest in multilateralism and regionalism, Asian security and international relations theory. Author of numerous books and articles, he discussed the regionalism of ASEAN in his book, “Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia”, using the concept of a security community as first proposed by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s. According to Karl Deutsch, a security community is defined as:
“a group that has ‘become integrated’, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal and informal institutions and practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with ‘reasonable’ certainty over a ‘long period of time.’”

Therefore in order to consider ASEAN as a nascent security community, we must look at whether ASEAN fulfils the criteria as laid out above. In doing so, we will also discuss the limitations of this concept in its application to ASEAN and finally, other contesting concepts that might be applied and their suitability.

ASEAN as a security community
In his definition of a security community, Karl Deutsch also made the distinction between two forms of security community. The first being a community that is “‘amalgamated’ through the formal political merger of the participating units” and the second being a “pluralistic” community in which case members retain their independence and sovereignty.” It is this second form of security community that Dr. Acharya employed in his discussion of ASEAN.

Two main points were identified and emphasised in Karl Deutsch’s definition of a security community. Firstly, a security community is identified by the absence of war. Dr. Acharya interpreted this more accurately as “the ability to manage conflicts peacefully rather than the absence of conflicts”. In this light, ASEAN has managed to fulfil the criteria as since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has managed conflict in its own ways and there had been no escalation of conflicts into open, full-fledged war.

Conflicts are never absent in ASEAN. As pointed by Tim McDonald, the ASEAN declaration of 1967 was “made against the background of the confrontasi between Indonesia and its neighbour over the incorporation of the Borneo territories into Malaysia.” Other than the confrontasi, there continues to exist conflicts between member states of ASEAN. For example, the dispute between Malaysia and Philippines over Sabah, insurgency and separatist issues at the Thai-Malaysia issue and water agreement issues between Singapore and Malaysia.

Yet through the history of ASEAN, member states have been able to peacefully manage their conflicts using what is known as the “ASEAN Way”. Central to this “ASEAN Way” is the agreement between member states to respect each other’s sovereignty and to agree on the non-application of force. “It is a conflict avoidance system relying on informal friendly negotiations in structurally loose settings as opposed to adversarial modes in legally grounded institution.” Other than the “ASEAN Way”, the Treat of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976 further ensured peace in ASEAN, emphasising on the “mutual respect for sovereignty” and the “renunciation of the threat or the use of threat.”

Thus ASEAN, through its unique conflict management system in the “ASEAN Way” and formal treaties such as the TAC has ensured the absence of war and bring itself closer to becoming a security community as conceptualised by Deutsch.

The second point emphasis in Deutsch’s conception of a security community is the “absence of significant organised preparations for war vis-à-vis any other members.” In this aspect, ASEAN members are somewhat lacking.

ASEAN member states have always maintained their military capabilities. Furthermore, member states such as Myanmar and more recently, Thailand are under military rule. As the Singapore Minister Teo Chee Hean pointed out in his speech in April 2005, security is imperative for Singapore’s survival, given their location in a sometimes turbulent region. This underlines Singapore’s, and other ASEAN member states’, continued emphasis on building and developing a military capability. Perceived threats are still very real in ASEAN with regards to regional conflicts and members have continued to ensure that they can maintain their national sovereignty in times of escalated conflict. Though all-out war has been avoided in the past decades, there is still a lacking of trust between member states and they still view each other as possible enemies. This clearly goes against Deutsch’s conception of a security community.

To further illustrate this point, ASEAN member states have continued to maintain high defence budgets. In 2006, Singapore announced its defence budget to be a hefty sum of S$10 billion dollars to maintain “a high state of operational readiness to respond to any conventional or non-conventional threat to Singapore's security.”

Hence with respect to the second aspect of a security community, ASEAN is yet to be suitable to be considered as security community and they will consider to unsuitable unless they are able to cultivate the trust in each other that coercive force will not be employed. Since ASEAN do not qualify as a security community, it is no longer necessary to consider what stage of development it is in.

Limitations of this concept with respect to ASEAN
As pointed out in the work of Dr. Acharya, “Deutsch’s original work on security communities was concerned with the Western world, especially Europe and the North Atlantic.” This raised questions about its suitability as a concept to be applied to ASEAN.

The first problem that he pointed in applying this concept to a non-western world is that compared to the Western world, the Third World is “much more prone to conflict and war.” This, he says, is Third World countries are not in a relationship like the West, which is of a more “profound quality than the collective expectation and preparation to use force against someone else that is the essence of alliance relationship” and that Third World countries continued to be involved in “fragile regional security system marked by high level of conflict and disorder.” ASEAN’s own “ASEAN Way” can in a way be the reason behind this fragile regional security system because “it is not a problem-solving mechanism.” By sweeping the problem under the carpet and avoiding conflicts, ASEAN run the risks of them resurfacing and becoming multipliers in any other conflicts that may arise in the future.
The second problem that Dr. Acharya raised with regards to the limitations of the application of the notion to non- Western world is the “widespread assumption among the liberal theorist that such communities require a quintessential liberal-democratic milieu featuring significant economic interdependence and political pluralism.”

This poses a difficulty for ASEAN. First of all, not all of the member states are the kind of liberal-democratic states as defined by the Western world. Myanmar is currently ruled by a military junta while Brunei is still a monarchy. Secondly, while there has been increasing economic interdependence with the establishment of ASEAN Free Trade Areas, intra-ASEAN trade volume is still not comparable to trade volumes between individual member states and external actors such as the United States. Thirdly, political pluralism remains a problem, as can be seen by the continued dominance of ethnic- and religion-based conflicts. These conflicts take on an international importance when the parties involved engage in cross-border activities. For example, the Malays sympathy for Muslims in Southern Thailand and Myanmar’s cross border chase for ethnic rebels result in conflict between Thailand and Malaysia, and Thailand and Myanmar respectively.

Contesting concepts
Dr. Reuben Wong of the Political Science Department at the National University of Singapore suggested the concept of “regional security complex” (RSC), a concept of Barry Buzan, as a contesting concept to Deutsch’s security community in conceptualising ASEAN. According to him, “regional security complex” is the “durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence”

Taking into definition as the working definition for this paper, a RSC is applicable to ASEAN because ASEAN is a geographically coherent area with a high level of interaction between its member states. RSC also takes into account both positive and negative interactions, as stated in its definition, with the inclusion of both “ patterns of amity and enmity” . This can be contrasted with Deutsch’s security community, which does not take into account enmity.

However, Dr. Wong also advised considering whether are the interactions in ASEAN regular and intense enough for us to call it a complex. This brings us back to the concept of the “ASEAN Way” in which the principles of “musjawarah, meaning ‘consultation,’ and mufakat, ‘consensus’” make intense interaction less probable.

Conclusion
In conclusion,
“There is no question but that the Southeast Asian states’ interests in the maintenance of the cooperative framework of ASEAN has resulted in a security environment in Southeast Asia in which the possibility of armed conflict between member states has been substantially reduced. It would be premature, however,..., to conclude that the ASEAN states have created a ‘security community’ in the Karl Deutsch sense.”

Even though ASEAN do fulfil some criteria of the Deutschian concept of a security community, it is undeniable that member states still view each other as potential, if not real threats, as can be seen by the ever high defence budget and emphasis on expansion and improvement of military capability.

The Deutschian concept was unable to fully explain the ASEAN security environment due to the nature of its conception. That it was meant to explain the development of the Western world made it inherently unsuitable for Southeast Asia, a region that is historically and culturally different from Europe and the North Atlantic region. However, the Deutschian concept could be used as a start point. By modifying the Deutschian concept, taking into account local factors, could possibly allow us to come up with a more suitable theory to explain ASEAN.

Other theorists have tried to come up with their own theory to explain the ASEAN security environment, however, none could fully explain ASEAN on its own. However, the sum of them could be used to explain ASEAN, giving a more holistic and well-rounded explanations.


References
Acharya, Amitav. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. New York: Routledge. 2000

Budget Expenditure. “Ministry of Defence”. Singapore Budget 2006. http://www.mof.gov.sg/budget_2006/expenditure_overview/mindef.html

Buzan, Barry. “Security architecture in Asia: the interplay of regional and global levels”. The Pacific Review 162 (2003): 143-173

McDonald, Tim. “Multilateral Partnership for ASEAN Security”. Paper presented to the Defence Services Asia 1992 Conference “In Search of Pacific Asian Security”, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, April 29-30, 1992

Nanyang Technological University. “Dr Amitav Acharya”. NTU. http://www.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/about_rsis/staff_profiles/Amitav_Acharya.html

Teo, Chee Hean. Ministry of Defence Singapore. “Defending Singapore: Strategies for a small state. MINDEF. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resources/speeches/2005/21apr05_speech.html

Weatherbee, Donald E. Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2005

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